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Victim Privacy and the 
Open Court Principle 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 This Report analyzes the tension between victim privacy and the open court principle, 
and especially in the context of sexual assault proceedings.  It explains that the open court 
principle is one of the most highly prized values in t he Anglo-Canadian common law tradition.  
Not only has the jurisprudence under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms reinforced this value, 
it has set more onerous requirements for exceptions to the open court principle to meet.  The 
Report provides an analysis of open court’s transition from common law to constitutional 
principle. 
 
 Historically, the victims of crime have not played a central role in a trial process that is 
conceptualized as a bipolar contest between the state and the accused.  Even before the  Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms was adopted in 1982, however, the status of victims had begun to 
improve.  The law relating to sexual offences was one area in which reforms were most 
forcefully sought, and most frequently secured as a result.  Though statutory measures had taken 
some steps in this direction, protecting the privacy of victims was not recognized, at common 
law, as one of the permissible exceptions to open court’s twin elements of access and publicity.  
 
 Almost exclusively in the context of sexual assault proceedings, the status of crime 
victims changed radically under the Charter.  Albeit in the context of conflict between the rights 
of the accused and the complainant, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a right of victim 
privacy under s.7 of the Charter, and placed it on an equal plane with the defendant’s right of 
full answer and defence.  The Report views this as a critical development because of the 
importance of linking the privacy concerns which arise at different times and for differe nt 
reasons in sexual assault proceedings.  The open court jurisprudence weighs the salutary benefits 
of protecting victim privacy against the deleterious consequences of derogating from open court.  
The invasion of privacy elsewhere in the process, and the  steps that have been taken to address it, 
may influence the judiciary’s perception of proportionality in contests between victim privacy 
and open court. 
 
 The Report adds perspectives from other jurisdictions and provides a discussion of the 
values which are at stake when victim privacy is set against open court.  In doing so, it raises but 
does not answer the question whether victim privacy, and the need for anonymity in particular, is 
justified by the nature of the offence, or should instead be regarded as a remedial measure to 
address the chronic under reporting of sexual offences and encourage victims to trust the system. 
In essence, the question is whether these offences are different and should, from a privacy 
perspective, always be treated differently.  An alternative approach would treat sexual assault 
victims differently, but only for the time being, and because the unfair treatment they have 
suffered in the past has not yet been eliminated.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 Privacy may be an ancient concept that is linked in fundamental ways to the dignity and 
integrity of individuals, but it is a relative newcomer to the law just the same.  Though aspects of 
property and defamation law, as well as some rules of evidence, are related to it, privacy, until 
recently, lacked status as an independent right or concept.  At l east in the North American 
tradition, the development of a legal entitlement began with a watershed article, written in 1890, 
by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Their perception of excesses by the American 
press prompted Warren and Brandeis to dema nd that privacy be recognized and protected by the 
law.  In one of their more colourful passages the authors of “The Right to Privacy” described the 
pathology of what they saw, as follows:  
 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds o f propriety and of 
decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a 
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.  To satisfy a prurient taste the 
details of sexual relations are spread in the columns of the daily papers.  To occupy the 
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by 
intrusion upon the domestic circle.1 
 
Warren and Brandeis argued that the “intensity and complexity of life” rendered  “some retreat 
from the world” necessary at the same time that “modern enterprise and invention” created new 
ways and means of invading privacy.  The result, they concluded, was that individuals could be 
subjected to mental pain and distress “far greater than could be in flicted by mere bodily injury”. 2 
 
 The inventions Warren and Brandeis had in mind included typewriters, which were 
introduced to newsrooms in 1876, telephones which dated to the early 1880s, and news 
photography which arrived in 1897.3  More than one hundred years later, privacy as a legal 
concept has evolved in a number of directions, especially in the United States, where it is a 
viable cause of action in the law of tort.  Today, modern enterprise and invention have developed 
sophisticated broadcast and electronic technologies which dramatically accelerate the 
possibilities for the invasion of privacy.  Not only that, the media promotes a culture of publicity 
which thrives on the details of private lives, whether the object of attention is a celebrity, a 
public figure, or an unlucky individual whose life has taken a turn which can be sensationalized 
for profit.  There can be no doubt that the victims of crime are among those who are unwillingly 
thrown onto the public stage.  While leaving larger questions about the privacy from unwanted 
media attention to another time and place, this study focuses on the privacy of crime victims, and 
of complainants in sexual assault proceedings, in particular.  
 
 “The history of criminal justice is almost synonymous with the  decline of the victim’s 
influence.”4  Historically, the common law treated the victims of crimes as witnesses, not as 
parties to criminal proceedings.  Though the victim initiated proceedings as the prosecutor in the 
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earliest days, the foundations of modern criminal justice were laid when the state undertook that 
responsibility in the name of the victim and the community at large.  From then on, the central 
elements of the criminal trial, which was conceived as a contest between those accused of 
offences and the state, began to evolve.  Over time, substantive principles, rules of evidence, and 
procedures which protected the defendant’s right to a fair trial would offset the considerable 
powers, advantages and resources the state enjoyed in prosecuting those  accused of crime.   
 
 How the frequently competing interests in law enforcement and due process should be 
calibrated is an issue of ongoing adjustment and debate.  Thus, it could be expected that those 
accused of criminal offences would be key beneficiaries when constitutional rights arrived in 
Canada, some twenty years ago.  Today, the process of adjusting the balance between law 
enforcement and fairness to the accused is channelled, for the most part, through the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.5 
 
 Meantime, the victims and witnesses who were participants in criminal trials were not 
only visible to the public but were often the objects of sympathy as well.  Still, as third parties, 
they lacked status or standing in the system, in their own right. As LeSage  A.C.J.O explained, in 
The Queen v. Bernardo: 
 
Historically, there was a period when all crimes were personal to the victim.  Over 
the years, the criminal law evolved toward a recognition that crimes are 
transgressions of societal order and values.  This evolution continued until we 
reached a point where the state interest appeared to be total and the individual 
victim was given little recognition.  The only recognized interest, at that point, 
was the broader interest of the state.6 
 
The Crown could not secure convictions without the assistance of the victims and witnesses of 
crime.  Yet the interests of the victim and the Crown often diverged and, in any case, prosecutors 
lacked the authority to promise victims that their interests, including privacy concer ns, would be 
protected.  Nor were the courts willing, or able, institutionally, to reform the criminal justice 
system in ways that responded to the concerns of victims.  For that to happen, legislative 
intervention was necessary.  
 
 For many years now, victims’ rights groups have been active and effective participants in 
the political and legal processes of government.  As a result of their efforts, the status of crime 
victims has changed in many ways.  Victims’ charters have been enacted in, for example, t he 
province of Ontario.  The 1995 Victims’ Bill of Rights declares that “[t]he people of Ontario 
believe that victims of crime, who have suffered harm and whose rights and security have been 
violated by crime, should be treated with compassion and fairness .”7  In addition, the Preamble 
states that “[t]he people of Ontario further believe that the justice system should operate in a 
manner that does not increase the suffering of victims of crime and that does not discourage 
victims of crime from participating in the justice system.”8  The Bill establishes principles, which 
include a declaration that victims should have access to information on a variety of points about 
the criminal justice system and the proceedings in which they are involved. 9 As well, s.2(1)1 
announces that “[v]ictims should be treated with courtesy, compassion and respect for their 
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personal dignity and privacy by justice system officials.”10  Meanwhile, victim impact 
statements are now admissible at sentence hearings 11 and steps have been taken to address 
victims’ needs for compensation and restitution. 12  
 
 Following his statement above, regarding the traditional role of the victim, LeSage 
A.C.J.O.C. observed, “[d]uring recent years, there has been a gradual shift, or evolution ... to a 
recognition of the concerns, interests and involvement of the individual who has suffered as a 
result of crime.”13  Describing this as a “healthy evolution”, he stated that “[v]ictims should have 
a participation in the criminal law process that is greater than wa s recognized twenty or thirty  
years ago.”14  The proviso he added is that their participation and involvement “can never 
interfere with or be seen to interfere with the accused’s right to a fair trial.” 15  That, of course, is 
when the criminal justice system confronts conflicts between the rights of defendants and their 
accusers.  There, the question is whether the victims of crime can claim entitlements and rights 
of participation in the criminal process, or will remain as third parties, whose recognition i n the 
system is limited to the “soft”, or unenforceable, declarations set out in charters and bills of 
rights.  
 
 Conflicts between the rights of the accused and their victims have been brought to the 
forefront by women’s organizations, which have directed their energies over the years to the 
problems of sexual assault and domestic violence.  In Canada and elsewhere, organizations have 
lobbied effectively for legislative reforms and have participated in high profile court cases.  At 
home, the law has been modified in important ways as a result.  For example, the Criminal 
Code’s offence of rape was repealed in 1982 and replaced by sexual assault, which is a broader 
and more encompassing offence.16  In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized 
battered wife syndrome as a valid aspect of self-defence in answer to a murder charge. 17  
Moreover, through a combination of judge-made law and Criminal Code revisions, it is more 
difficult now for the accused to claim that he mistakenly thought a complainant consent ed to a 
sexual assault, when she in fact did not.18  As well, and in response to a controversial decision by 
the Supreme Court, Parliament has removed intoxication as an available defence to offences 
which interfere with a person’s bodily integrity, including sexual assault.19 
 
 Historically, sexual assault victims were treated poorly in criminal proceedings.  For 
instance, it was once commonplace for defence counsel to question a complainant about her 
previous sexual history, not only with the accused, but with other partners too.20  It was 
presumed that this evidence was relevant to the question of consent: a complainant with a history 
of sexual activity was deemed more likely to have consented or, alternatively, to have led the 
accused to believe, mistakenly, that she had given permission.  Debate about the permissibility of 
this line of inquiry, as well as on access to other sources of information about the complainant, 
initially centred less on a right of victim privacy than on the question whether the evid ence was 
relevant to the defence.  While counsel for the accused maintained that such evidence was 
relevant to the credibility of the complainant and her story, others challenged that view on the 
ground that information, which was extraneous to the offence itself, was irrelevant.  Moreover, 
they argued that assumptions about the relevance of such evidence were based on stereotypical 
views about who gets raped, by whom, for what reason, and in what circumstances.   
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 Through its constitutionalization of the presumption of innocence and other elements of 
procedural fairness, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed defence access to evidence 
which advanced the accused’s right of full answer and defence.   In the circumstances, conflicts 
between the criminal defendant’s new found constitutional rights and the countervailing 
demands that sexual assault complainants be treated fairly were inevitable. The victims of sexual 
offences reacted by asserting their own constitutional entitlements in the criminal process.  As a 
result, the focus gradually shifted away from the question whether private information was 
relevant, and turned toward the establishment of privacy and equality rights for the victims of 
sexual offences.  In due course, the Supreme Court of Canada and Criminal Code set evidentiary 
boundaries around the defendant’s access to personal information about the complainant.21 
 
 The recognition of victims’ rights generally, and the establishment of privacy and 
equality rights for sexual assault complainants are not unrelated to the more specific purpose of 
this study, which is to consider the relationship between victim privacy and the open court 
principle.  Despite the common law’s reluctance to recognize privacy as a permissible exception 
to the presumptions of access and publicity, the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly weighed 
victim privacy in balancing the interests for and against open court.  Thus, in C.B.C. v. New 
Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson), the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to close a courtroom 
during part of a sentence hearing for a sexual offence the defendant had committed against two 
young women.22  La Forest J. acknowledged that “[w]hile the social interest in protecting privacy 
is long standing, its importance has only recently been recognized by Canadian courts.”23 He 
noted that privacy “does not appear to have been a significant factor in the earlier cases which 
established the strong presumption in favour of open courts.”24  Though that approach had 
generally continued and may be inh erent to the nature of a criminal trial, he stated that the right 
of privacy “is beginning to be seen as more significant.” 25  Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
the public can be excluded from the court room, as a way of controlling publicity to protect the 
innocent and safeguard privacy interests.26 
 
 In C.B.C. (Re: R. v.  Carson) and other decisions, privacy has received new and increased 
recognition in relation to the open court principle.  At the same time, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has given that principle strong endorsement.  In a series of decisions, the Court has made 
it clear that access to the courts and their proceedings enables public criticism of the justice 
system and encourages public participation in one of Canada’s democratic institutions .  
Excluding the public from court proceedings or banning the publication of information about the 
trial process undercuts one of the “core” values that is protected by s.2(b) of the Charter’s 
guarantee of expressive freedom. 
 
 The presumption in favour of open court is strong but not absolute, and exceptions are 
permissible.  The rationale, which traditionally was most frequently invoked to support a 
publication ban, was the accused’s right to a fair trial.  Proceedings could also be closed, in some 
instances, to protect the proper administration of justice.  Under the Charter, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has articulated doctrines which place significant restrictions on derogations from the 
open court principle.  In other words, exceptions remain available,  but must satisfy the Court’s 
multi-criteria standards of justifiability.  Even so, the open court Charter doctrines are flexible  
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enough to accommodate exceptions which are necessary, in particular circumstances, to protect 
fair trial, privacy, or other compelling interests.27 
 
 With a doctrinal framework for open court in place, it remains somewhat unclear how it 
will be applied as the jurisprudence evolves.  Whether the Supreme Court enforces a 
presumption in favour of access and publicity, or is generous in its interpretation of exceptions 
will vary on a case-to-case basis.  It is difficult to predict the direction conflicts between open 
court and victim privacy will take under a methodology that is so contextual in nature.  In that 
regard it should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court’s recognition of a right of victim 
privacy under s.7 of the Charter is certain to affect its appreciation of the balance between 
privacy and open court under s.2(b). 
 
 With these introductory remarks as background, the  plan for the study can now be 
outlined.  Chapter Two introduces the constitutionalized concept of open court and traces its 
evolution in four of the Supreme Court of Canada’s important decisions on these issues:  
Canadian Newspapers Co. v.  Canada (A.G.)28; Edmonton Journal v.  Alberta (A.G.)29; Dagenais 
v.  C.B.C.30; and C.B.C. v.  New Brunswick (Re: R.  v.  Carson)31.  Two of the four raise privacy 
questions, and two others pose open court issues in the context of sexual assault proceedings.  
Next is Chapter Three, and though it does not address the open court principle, it is a vital part of 
this study.  The objective of that Chapter is to link the invasion of privacy that sexual assault 
victims experience, throughout the process, from the initial complaint to the final appeal, and to 
demonstrate how privacy concerns which are pervasive in sexual prosecutions key back to the 
open court principle.  Chapter Three explains how a right of victim privacy emerged in the court 
of three Supreme Court of Canada decisions of the 1990s; they are R.  v.  Seaboyer32; R.  v.  
O’Connor33; and R.  v.  Mills34. 
 
 Chapter Four ranges beyond Canada’s borders to see how victim privacy is treated in 
other jurisdictions.  Limited information was available on civilian and other non-common law 
systems.  As well, the Commonwealth countries, which lack a constitutional framework for 
conflicts between these competing interests, contributed little in the way of new insight.  More 
provocative in this Chapter, then, is the analysis of victim p rivacy and the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.  If the American 
jurisprudence fails to supply answers, it at least does not shy from asking the difficult questions.  
 
 Simply enough, Chapter Five is titled “Perspectives.”  Its purpose is to step away from an 
emphasis on statutory provisions and case law, and to try and flush out what is at stake in pitting 
open court against victim privacy.  While it does not claim to provide answers, the discuss ion 
identifies the rationales which are strongly advanced on each side of the ledger.  It also attempts 
to articulate the difficult choices which lie ahead in deciding which of two cherished values 
should be preferred, both generally and in particular circumstances.  In doing so, it draws on a 
substantial secondary literature to discuss the merits of victim anonymity, as well as the 
arguments in favour of identifying the victims of crime.  That analysis is followed by a comment 
on the Homolka-Bernardo proceedings and the conflicting values those proceedings generated.  
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 Chapter Six is relatively brief.  At the conclusion of a lengthy Report, its purpose is to 
summarize and highlight the key elements of the study.  Thus it crystallizes the findings and 
conclusions reached, as well as points up unanswered questions and issues for the future.  It is 
followed by Chapter Seven, which provides a Bibliography of constitutional, statutory and case 
law materials, as well as a list of the secondary literature that was  consulted in the preparation of 
this Report. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The open court principle and the Charter   
 
Introduction  
 Open court is a venerated ideal of justice in common law systems, and a principle that is 
regarded as indispensable.  Generally, the principle requires that court proceedings be open to the 
public, and that publicity as to those proceedings be uninhibited.  No less than the legitimacy of 
criminal justices depends on it; the fairness of criminal process and public confidence in the 
system are at stake. Of signal importance as well, a free flow of information encourages 
feedback and debate among members of the public, thereby promoting the accountability of 
institutions which exercise coercive powers against individuals.  
 
 Yet the rule is one matter and its exceptions, another.  Despite the rhetoric, the common 
law’s commitment to open court has yielded a variety of exceptions from the rule.  As 
fundamental as its underlying values are, securing the fair trial of the accused at times requires a 
ban on the publication of information which could prejudice his right to be presumed innocent.  
In Canada, many such exceptions are found in the Criminal Code, which was enacted for the first 
time in 1892.1  For instance, publication bans today prevent the disclosure of information 
revealed in pre-trial proceedings, such as bail hearings 2 and preliminary inquiries.3  Such 
information can impair fair trial rights by revealing evidence that is inadmissible or by 
undermining the presumption that an accused is innocent until proven guilty.  In default of a 
Code provision, the judge can order a publication ban at trial, as an aspect of his or her common 
law jurisdiction to prevent bias against the accused.4  Bans safeguard the integrity of the process 
in other ways as well; for example, the identity of a juror or jurors is protected, 5 as is the 
confidentiality of jury proceedings.6 
 
 In  s.794, the 1892 Code endorsed the common law principle that every court “shall be an 
open public court”, and added, in s.848, that the hearing “shall be deemed an open and public 
court, to which the public may generally have access so far as the same [room] can conveniently 
contain them”.7  Even so, the Code has, since its earliest days, authorized judges to exclude the 
public from the courtroom in specified circumstances. 8  Up until 1953's revision, the Code 
preserved the judge’s common law power to exclude the public in any case where such exclusion 
was deemed “necessary or expedient”.9  That year saw the introduction of s.428, which is 
substantially the same as the present s.486(1), the latter which reads as follows:  
 
486(1). Exclusion of public in certain cases - Any proceedings against an 
accused shall be held in open court, but where the presiding judge, 
provincial court judge or justice, as the case may be, is of the opinion that 
it is in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper 
administration of justice to exclude all or any members of the public from 
the courtroom for all or part of the proceedings, he may do so. 10 
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This provision codifies the general rule and then sets out the grounds on which the public can be 
excluded by way of exception. 11 
 
 Today, the Code encompasses hundreds of provisions which prescribe the substantive 
and procedural details of Canada’s criminal law.  Though it is the primary source, the Code is 
not the only source of criminal law, and is supplemented in its coverage by drug and firearms 
legislation, as well as by the former Young Offenders Act, and now the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act.12  Further exceptions to the principle of openness are found in these and other statutes.  Yet 
the Criminal Code and criminal law legislation do not completely oust the common law.  To the 
extent statute law is silent, the judiciary retains a discretion at common law to consider and 
determine limits on the open court principle. 13 
 
 Exceptions to the principle of open court are prima facie vulnerable under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms14.  Given that such exceptions from principle had been acce pted in the past, 
it was difficult to predict what difference the Charter would make.  From one perspective, the 
status quo represented a fair balance between the rule and its exceptions.  From another, it 
appeared that the Charter had re-calibrated that balance in favour of expressive freedom, and had 
the potential, therefore, to defeat existing limits on openness.  In this regard it should also be 
noted that Canada’s system of constitutional rights permits exceptions or limits which are 
considered “reasonable” from the perspective of a “free and democratic society”. 15 
 
 Today, more than twenty years later, the Supreme Court of Canada has had the 
opportunity to consider whether and in what ways the open court principle has been altered by 
the Charter.  This Chapter highlights four of the Court’s decisions on this issue: Canadian 
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.);16 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.);17 Dagenais v. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp.;18 and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.) 
(Re: R. v. Carson).19  While three affect privacy concerns, a fourth - which is Dagenais - 
discusses the accused’s right to a fair trial; meanwhile, three of the four consider the 
permissibility of a publication ban and a fourth, C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) invalidates an order 
excluding the public from a court room.  Once again, three are set in the criminal justice system 
and a fourth, Edmonton Journal, arises in a civil context.  Finally, Canadian Newspapers and 
C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) place open court in conflict with the interests of a complainant in 
sexual assault proceedings.  First, it is worthwhile noting, in a general way, the pre -Charter 
status of open court and privacy. 
 
The open court principle at common law 
 Until recently, and with the exception of young off ender legislation, the statute law did 
not protect the privacy of crime victims.  Nor did the common law, as the two key pre -Charter 
decisions reveal.  
 
 Scott v. Scott was a precedent-setting decision of the House of Lords, which held that 
open court does not defer to the privacy concerns of individuals who are participants in judicial 
proceedings.20  There, the issue arose, in a civil context, from an annulment hearing which was 
held in camera.  After the court granted the petitioner an order annulling her  marriage, on 
grounds of her spouse’s impotence, she obtained transcripts of the hearing and circulated them to 
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his father, his sister, and a third party.  Thereafter, he sought an order that she be held in 
contempt of court for publicizing information tha t had been revealed in a closed hearing.  The 
annulment proceedings raised inherently private matters at a time when sensitive problems, like 
male impotence, were not widely discussed.  Even so, the House of Lords quickly rejected the 
suggestion that litigants should be spared the humiliation, pain or embarrassment of having 
private matters publicly disclosed.   
 
 As Earl Loreburn explained, “[t]he inveterate rule is that justice shall be administered in 
open court”;21 the traditional law, “that English just ice must be administered openly in the face 
of all men”, he described as “an almost priceless inheritance.” 22 For his part, Lord Atkinson 
acknowledged that the hearing of a case in public may be “painful, humiliating, or deterrent both 
to parties and witnesses”, and that in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, “the 
details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals”. 23  He concluded, nonetheless, that 
“all this is tolerated and endured”, because a public trial is “the best security fo r the pure, 
impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means of winning for it public 
confidence and respect”.24  
 
 Lord Shaw added to the rhetoric of openness, in passages which have been cited with 
frequency over the years.  In doing so, he invoked and relied on the well-known words of Jeremy 
Bentham, among others.  As Lord Shaw declared: 
 
It is needless to quote authority on this topic from legal, philosophical, or 
historical writers.  It moves Bentham over and over again. “In the darkne ss of 
secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape have full swing.  Only in 
proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial 
injustice operate.  Where there is no publicity there is no justice.”  “Publicity is 
the very soul of justice.  It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all 
guards against improbity.  It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.”  
“The security of securities is publicity.”  But amongst historians the grave and 
enlightened verdict of Hallam, in which he ranks the publicity of judicial 
proceedings even higher than the rights of Parliament as a guarantee of public 
security, is not likely to be forgotten: “Civil liberty in this kingdom has two direct 
guarantees; the open administration of justice according to known laws truly 
interpreted, and fair constructions of evidence; and the right of Parliament, 
without let or interruption, to inquire into, and obtain redress of, public 
grievances.  Of these, the first is by far most indispensa ble; nor can the subjects of 
any State be reckoned to enjoy a real freedom, where this condition is not found 
both in its judicial institutions and in their constant exercise.” 25 
 
Leaving aside the criminal process, which is subject to the requirement of a fair trial, the House 
of Lords could only identify three exceptions to the Earl of  Loreburn’s “inveterate rule”: 
litigation affecting wards, lunacy proceedings, and disputes over trade secrets.  Specifically, Lord 
Shaw rejected the suggestion that openness should be diluted to preserve access to justice.  After 
inquiring whether the fear of giving evidence in public would deter witnesses of delicate feeling 
from giving testimony, and provide a sound reason for administering justice in such cases behind 
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closed doors, he replied that “this ground is very dangerous ground”. 26  He agreed that the 
reluctance to intrude one’s private affairs upon public notice induces many citizens to forgo their 
just claims, and acknowledged that many such cases might have been b rought before tribunals 
which met in secret.  Yet he concluded that “the concession to these feelings would, in my 
opinion, tend to bring about those very dangers to liberty in general, and to society at large, 
against which publicity tends to keep us secure....”27 On its face an uneventful matrimonial case, 
Scott v. Scott provided an exegesis on the open court principle.  
 
 Some years before Scott v. Scott, Duff J., of Canada’s Supreme Court, had written that 
“[t]he general advantage to the country in having  [] proceedings open more than counterbalances 
the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such 
proceedings.”28  And in the wake of Scott v. Scott, Lord Blaneburgh confirmed in McPherson v. 
McPherson, which was likewise a matrimonial case, that publicity is the “authentic hall-mark of 
judicial as distinct from administrative procedure.”29  If openness prevailed over privacy in a 
hearing of private interest to the spouses in a failed marriage, it was difficult to imagine how 
privacy could prevail in a criminal case of the highest public interest.  
 
 Many years later, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the clash between the private 
and public in Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre. 30  Decided in 1982, the year of the Charter’s arrival, 
MacIntyre fell for resolution under common law.  Though not a Charter decision, Dickson J.’s 
opinion nonetheless anticipated the competing interests which would arise under a regime of 
constitutional rights.  There, the contest was between the ex parte and in camera status of a 
search warrant hearing, and the public’s access to information about the investigative process.   
MacIntyre was a journalist who raised the question whether search warrants are documents 
which he was entitled to examine, as a member of the public.   
 
 Mr. Justice Dickson, who wrote the Court’s majority opinion, accommodated them by 
forging a compromise between the interests at stake.  Thus he denied the journalist access to the 
warrants at the time of their issue, but held that the do cuments became public upon being 
executed.  When a warrant is issued, protecting a potentially innocent subject and safeguarding 
an investigative process which could be compromised by disclosure are the priorities. Once an 
investigation is undertaken, however, he concluded that the public was entitled to know the 
details, in the interests of accountability.  Through that approach, Dickson J. protected the search 
warrant process without sacrificing public access to information about the system.  
 
 His discussion of the underlying values in MacIntyre also provided guidance for the 
future.  Citing Bentham, he endorsed a “strong public policy in favour of ‘openness’ in respect of 
judicial acts”.31 On the question of warrants, Dickson J. held that “[t]he concern fo r 
accountability is not diminished by the fact that the search warrants might be issued by a justice 
in camera”.32  To the contrary, he went on, “this fact increases the policy argument in favour of 
accessibility”, because “[i]nitial secrecy surrounding the issuance of warrants may lead to abuse, 
and publicity is a strong deterrent to malversation”.33   Though he spoke in favour of “maximum 
accountability and accessibility”, he found that those values could not be pursued at the expense 
of harming the innocent or of impairing the efficiency of the search warrant” as a weapon in law 
enforcement.34 
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 Mr. Justice Dickson’s analysis did not ignore privacy concerns.  After recognizing that 
such interests are unavoidably compromised by court proceedings, he declared that “[i]t is now 
well established, however, that covertness is the exception and openness the rule”. 35  He noted 
that the public’s confidence in the integrity of the court system and its understanding of the 
administration of justice are fostered by a rule  in favour of openness.  When pitted against the 
very integrity of the justice system, the privacy concerns of individuals do not weigh heavily in 
the scales.  Accordingly, Dickson J. stated that the “sensibilities of the individuals involved are 
no basis for exclusion of the public from judicial proceedings”. 36  At the same time, though, he 
introduced a qualification which would later be cited to support a right of victim privacy under 
the Charter.  Significantly, he announced that public accessibility could be curtailed to protect 
“social values of superordinate importance”.37  In the circumstances, he left the task of 
determining which social values are of that magnitude to future judicial consideration.   
 
 To summarize, MacIntyre is not a Charter decision and has little to say directly on the 
question of victim privacy. In the circumstances of a journalist seeking information about search 
warrants, Dickson J. was concerned about individuals who might be publicly exposed to 
suspicion in the course of an investigation but vindicated, in at least some cases, upon its 
conclusion.  Yet his conception of the openness rule and its exceptions would have broader 
applications.  By combining the principle that “covertness is the exception and openness the 
rule” with the prospect of exceptions to protect “social values of superordinate importance”, he 
introduced a methodology which was flexible enough to accommodate competing values in a 
range of settings and circumstances. 
 
The open court, principles, and the Charter 
 With the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, restrictions on 
openness were challenged under s.2(b), which guarantees freedom of expression and of the 
media.38 Publication bans directly infringe the right to communicate information that is disclosed 
in the course of criminal proceedings.  Meanwhile, orders which exclude the public from 
courtrooms deny access to information about the justice system and, in the case of the press, 
interfere in the newsgathering function.    
 
 At the least, the Charter has changed the way open court issues are analyzed.   Before 
turning to the decisions, it may be helpful to review some key points of Charter analysis. 
Whether and to whom the Charter applies is a central issue that need only be noted here.  
According to s.32, the Charter applies to the federal, provincial, and territorial governments; as 
most of the issues in this study arise under the Criminal Code and other criminal law statutes, the 
Charter applies without argument.39  Even so, it should be no ted that although the Charter does 
not apply per se to the common law, the rules of criminal law and process which remain 
grounded in the common law must comply with the Charter.  
 
 In any discussion of open court and privacy, the key Charter provisions are ss. 2(b), 8, 7 
and 1.  As noted above, s. 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive and press freedom is the source of 
challenges to restrictions on open court.  By comparison and, in the absence of an explicit textual 
guarantee, the Charter’s protection of privacy is less straightforward.  Section 8, which 
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guarantees individuals the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, is related to 
privacy but is concerned, directly, with the rights of the accused in the investigative process. 40  
As Chapter Three explains, the Supreme Court drew on s.8 to incorporate protection for privacy 
into s.7 of the Charter, which prohibits the state from denying an individual’s life, liberty, or 
security of the person in any way that violates the principles of fundament al justice.41  Section 7, 
in combination with s.15's guarantee of equality, provided the basis for the Supreme Court’s 
protection of victim privacy in sexual assault proceedings.  As the discussion in this Chapter 
shows, the privacy rights of complainants played a less significant role in the open court cases 
decided under s.2(b) of the Charter. 
 
 Of central importance to the Charter is s.1, which allows the government to “save” 
legislation which violates a constitutional guarantee, by demonstrating that the infringement is 
reasonable by reference to democratic values.  It is axiomatic that the Charter does not guarantee 
rights absolutely, but sets up an equation; on one side of the equation are the rights and freedoms 
that are guaranteed and, on the other, is s.1 and its concept of reasonable limits.  Specifically, s.1 
states that the Charter’s rights are subject only to “such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society”.  The equation achieves balance by weighing the r ights 
and freedoms in question against the limits placed on them by government.  In simple terms, a 
limit is justifiable under s.1 when the government establishes that it is reasonable to infringe an 
individual’s constitutional rights.  The result there is that democratic limits prevail over 
individual rights.  If the government cannot demonstrate that its limit is justifiable, the right will 
prevail and the violation will be declared unconstitutional.  
 
 The Supreme Court encased the question of reasonable  limits under s.1 in a doctrinal 
framework which was introduced in R. v. Oakes.42  The Oakes test proposed a complex and 
structured  series of requirements for the government to meet in satisfying its burden that a limit 
on Charter rights was demonstrably justified.  Though it has generated variations in application 
over the years, the standard’s fundamentals have remained constant.  The test is cumulative, and 
if the government’s measure fails any part, the infringement is unconstitutional.  The first part of 
Oakes seeks evidence of a government objective that is pressing and substantial enough to 
warrant the infringement of a constitutional right.   
 
 Once that hurdle has been cleared, the second part, which is divided into three elements 
that are known collectively as the proportionality test, must be applied.  The object of 
proportionality analysis is to ensure that the statutory provision is drafted with sufficient 
precision to avoid the needless or gratuitous violation of rights.  In summary, the Oakes 
proportionality test demands that the limit be carefully drawn, be no broader than necessary, and 
maintain proportionality between the measure’s salutary benefits and its deleterious 
consequences.  At the time Oakes was decided, the Supreme Court intended to set up a strict and 
rigorous standard of justification under s.1.  Applied literally, and especially under the terms of 
proportionality, the test proved rigid and inflexible.  As a result, its components have been 
adjusted over time to fit the circumstances of particular facts and issues.  
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 This brief overview of Charter analysis serves as an introduction to the Supreme Court’s 
four key decisions on the open court principle. The discussion below presents them 
chronologically, in order of decision. 
 
Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (AG)43 
 The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the principle of open court for the first time 
under the Charter in Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.).  The issue there was whether 
s.442(3) of the Criminal Code (now s.486(3)) violated s.2(b) of the Charter.  That provision 
allowed a trial judge to impose a ban on the publication of the victim’s identity, as well as on 
information which might identify the victim in sexual assault proceedings; in addition, s.442(3) 
made a publication ban  mandatory at the request either of the complainant or the prosecutor. 44  
In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Chief Justice Howland held under s.1 of the Charter that 
s.442(3)’s  imperative element was unnecessary.  The government’s interest in protecting the 
complainant’s identity could be served, he thought, by making a ban available on an as needed, 
case-by-case basis.45 
 
 There was no dispute that s.442(3) violated s.2(b) of the Charter.  The only question was 
whether the violation was reasonable under s.1.  In answering that question, Howland C.J.O. 
acknowledged the connection between freedom of the press and the principle of open court, in 
these terms: 
 
The freedom of the press to report what transpires in our courtrooms is one of the 
fundamental safeguards of our democratic society.  Justice is not a cloistered 
virtue and judicial proceedings must be subjected to careful scrutiny in order to 
ensure that every person is given a fair trial.... Openness of the courts is essential 
for the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice and to 
further a proper understanding of the judicial system.... It gives the public an 
opportunity to see that justice is done.  There is necessarily implicit in the concept 
of an open court the concept of publicity; the right of the media to report what 
they have heard in the courtroom so that the public can be informed about court 
proceedings, and public criticism, if necessary, engendered should any 
impropriety occur.46 
 
 
 At the same time, he also recognized and endorsed the objective of s.442(3).  Relying on 
MacIntyre, which permitted exceptions to openness when social values of superordinate 
importance were at stake, Howland C.J.O. came to this conclusion:  
 
... it has been clearly established that the social value to be protected, namely, the 
bringing of those who commit such sexual offences to justice, is of superordinate 
importance and can merit a prohibition against publication of the victims’ identity 
or of any information that could disclose it.  It is a reasonable limitation on the 
freedom of the press.47 
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Section 442(3)’s social value was established through evidence from the co -ordinator of a Sexual 
Assault Crisis Centre, whose trial testimony was excerpted in the Court’s reasons, as follows:  
 
Q.  All right, what questions do they ask you about whether to report it or not?  
 
A. Victims are very hesitant.  I think the bottom line is they don’t want people to 
know what happened.  They check us out to see if we are connected with the 
police or hospitals.  They are concerned about privacy, because rape to them, or 
sexual assault, is embarrassing.  They feel ashamed and they are very hesitant to 
report - 
 
Q. - hesitant to report, all right.  What apparent degree of importance is attached 
by them to the issue of publicity of their identity? 
 
A. They are concerned that if they do report, who is it going to be reported to.  
Will it be printed in the paper?  They are very hesitant to come to court because 
that is part and parcel of their concern that other people will find out that [they] 
have been rape victims and there are a number of factors that influence that.  They 
don’t feel they will be believed.  They feel that they will be blamed for what 
happened and they are very frightened about going to court - very frightened 
about other people finding out in the papers and fearful of retribution by the 
accused .... 
 
Q. ... where on the concerns raised with you would the concern over publicity 
rank, from the concerns they disclose to you? 
 
A. From the information I obtain from them, I would say very high on their list of 
concerns, very high. 
 
Q. In light of your experience ... what effect do you feel it would have on the rate 
at which they report the offence to the authorities, should section 442(3) be struck 
down? 
 
A. The rate of reporting would drop even lower than it is now .... 48 
 
 Despite that evidence the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that s.442(3)’s valid interest 
in the prosecution of sexual assaults would be adequately served by the availability of a b an on 
victim identity, at the discretion of the judge.  In doing so, the Court acknowledged its concern 
that in some instances the complainant might have made false allegations, or might have 
previously accused other persons without justification.  In such cases, publishing her name might 
bring forth other witnesses to testify on behalf of the accused. 49  Given that prospect, and the fact 
that the trial judge retained discretion on this issue in other countries, Howland C.J.O. found for 
the Court that the government failed to show  the need for a mandatory prohibition. The Supreme 
Court of Canada disagreed with that conclusion and upheld the provision in its entirety.  
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 The Court’s decision was written by Lamer J., who would later become the Chief Justice 
of Canada.  After noting the infringement of freedom of the press, he indicated that “the main 
issue before us is whether the impugned provision can be salvaged under s.1.” 50  In terms of 
s.442(3)’s objective, he found that the measure  “purports to foster complaints by victims of 
sexual assault by protecting them from the trauma of widespread publication resulting in 
embarrassment and humiliation.”51   In such circumstances, Lamer J. did not hesitate to conclude 
that “[e]ncouraging victims to come forward and complain facilitates the prosecution and 
conviction of those guilty” and satisfies the requirement of a pressing and substantial 
government objective.52  
 
 The second part of the s.1 analysis, which consists of the Oakes test’s three part 
proportionality test, focussed on the question whether a mandatory ban was necessary when a 
discretionary ban would also protect the complainant’s identity, with less intrusive consequences 
for freedom of the press.  Lamer J. also rejected that argument, for the following re asons.  As he 
noted, “fear of treatment by police or prosecutors, fear of trial procedures and fear of publicity or 
embarrassment” are the main reasons sexual assault is underreported. 53   In the circumstances, a 
guarantee of anonymity could play a vital ro le in influencing a complainant’s decision whether to 
report the offence: at the critical moment, the complainant may require a promise that her 
identity will not be disclosed. A discretionary ban, which might or might not subsequently be 
granted at trial, would be less intrusive of s.2(b), but more unpredictable from the complainant’s 
perspective.  Morever, he found that the limits imposed by s.442(3) on the media’s rights were 
minimal.54 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Canadian Newspapers was not a foregone conclusion.  
Reasons, which were framed in the language of law enforcement, protected victim anonymity.  
The Court may have emphasized that rationale because, as seen above, the judiciary had not 
previously been sympathetic to the privacy concerns of participants in the justice system. 55  By 
upholding s.442(3)’s mandatory ban, then, Canadian Newspapers to some extent represented a 
break with the past.  Moreover, as the s. 2(b) jurisprudence evolved, it would become clear that 
blanket prohibitions on expressive freedom, such as the one at stake in Canadian Newspapers, 
are difficult to justify.56  Less intrusive means, such as discretionary bans, are normally more 
desirable because they enable courts to balance interests, rather than choose, absolutely, between 
them.  Canadian Newspapers concluded that an automatic ban was necessary, essentially on the 
strength of one witness’s testimony,57 and failed to consider the underlying rationales of 
openness, including the Ontario Court of Appeal’s suggestion that pub licity might encourage 
undiscovered witnesses to come forward.   Though its reasoning, arguably, was flawed, the 
Supreme Court invoked a law enforcement rationale to uphold s.442(3) and thereby protect the 
privacy of complainants.  
 
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (AG)58 
 Not long after the decision in Canadian Newspapers, the Supreme Court issued a 
landmark in the s.2(b) jurisprudence.  In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), a majority of four 
judges concluded that a statutory provision banning the publication of certain information about 
matrimonial proceedings was unconstitutional.  Citing a countervailing interest in privacy, three 
other members of the Court disagreed and would have upheld the provision. 59 
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   Writing in support of the majority result, Cory J.  strongly advocated values of openness, 
accessibility, and accountability.  Thus, he wrote that “a democracy cannot exist without that 
freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public 
institutions”.60  In his view, the vital importance of free and uninhibited speech could not be 
over-emphasized.  Given that the Charter framed s.2(b) in “absolute terms”, the rights enshrined 
in the guarantee could “only be restricted in the clearest of circumstances”. 61  Mr. Justice Cory 
spoke of the connection between freedom of expression, democracy, and open courts. For 
instance, he emphasized that  “the courts must be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism 
of their operation by the public”. 62  In one of the well known passages from his opinion, he stated 
that “freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society”, and 
continued that “[i]t is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts 
are seen to function openly.”63  Turning to the press, Cory J. added that those who bring the news 
to the public  “must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in 
fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.” 64  
 
 At the same time, Cory J. was not unsympathetic to the privacy of individuals.  He noted 
that society has cherished and given protection to privacy, and indicated that the Court had on a 
number of occasions “underlined the importance of the privacy interest in Canadian law.”65   The 
problem, though, was that the courts must function openly and the public’s need to know cannot 
be denied.  He concluded that in contrast to the ban at issue in Canadian Newspapers, Alberta’s 
restrictive ban on publication significantly reduced the openness of courts and was more 
sweeping than necessary to protect the privacy of witnesses and children. 66  For those reasons, it 
could not be justified under s.1.  
 
 Meanwhile, Wilson J. came to the same conclusion by a different route.  In what she 
referred to as a contextual approach, she juxtaposed the two values at stake.  Like Cory J., she 
strongly advocated the open court principle, and concluded that “there would have to be very 
powerful considerations in order to justify inroads into the open court process.”67  Though 
Wilson J. gave some attention to the privacy interest, she characterized the concern at issue as 
being the “personal anguish and loss of dignity that may result from having embarrassing details 
of one’s life printed in the newspaper s.”68  She turned to Scott v. Scott  for “a stern reminder of 
the importance of not allowing one’s compassion ... to undermine a principle which is 
fundamentally sound in its application.” 69  In her view, there was little in matrimonial disputes to 
warrant a special immunity from publicity in court proceedings.  
 
 She concluded that the two values - the right of the press to publish, and the right of 
litigants to the protection of their privacy in matrimonial disputes - could not both be fully 
respected.  In the circumstances she found it unnecessary for the statute to ban the publication of 
information in all matrimonial cases, to protect the privacy of litigants in the small number of 
cases which might cause trauma or humiliation. 70   
           
 LaForest J.’s dissent would have upheld the statute’s privacy provision.  Prior to the 
Charter, there was no constitutional basis on which to challenge a publication ban which 
nonetheless was contrary to Scott’s open court principle.  Nor, as noted above, does the Charter 
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explicitly guarantee privacy rights.  Despite the absence of a textual guarantee, La Forest J. 
stated that personal privacy has “been recognized by this court as having constitutional 
significance”.71  Though the Court’s protection of privacy was limited to s.8's concept of 
reasonable search and seizure, he suggested that privacy might also be an aspect of s.7's liberty 
or security of the person.  “However that may be”, he went on, “there can be no doubt that in this 
modern age, it ranks high in the hier archy of values meriting protection in a free and democratic 
society”.72  Against the weight of Scott and MacPherson, both of which dealt with a closed 
hearing rather than a publication ban, La Forest J. voted to uphold the statutory provision.  In 
doing so, he concluded that privacy prevailed because of the “very limited character of the 
restriction as compared with the serious deleterious effects on the important values sought to be 
protected by the legislation.”73 
 
 Mr. Justice La Forest also cited  Canadian Newspapers in support of his conclusion.  A 
mandatory ban was acceptable to members of the Court in that setting, however, because victim 
anonymity served law enforcement objectives and not because privacy prevailed over the open 
court principle.  By contrast, the statutory ban in Edmonton Journal could not invoke an 
objective apart from the protection of privacy.  Though La Forest J. saw Canadian Newspapers 
and Edmonton Journal as analogous, the majority on that panel did not.  
 
 Unlike Canadian Newspapers, Edmonton Journal discussed and emphasized the open 
court principle and its relationship to s.2(b) of the Charter.  Moreover, Edmonton Journal  
confronted the conflict between open court and privacy, which Canadian Newspapers did not 
mention.  Finally, the Court recognized in Edmonton Journal that the challenge was one of 
balancing the two values.  According to the majority, the statute’s protection of privacy failed the 
requirement of proportionality that the infringement be no greater than necessary in the 
circumstances.   Despite that conclusion, Edmonton Journal is significant because seven 
members of the Court accepted that privacy has constitutional implications.  As well, and against 
the weight of a common law tradition that valued open court above privacy, three members of 
the Court treated the privacy of litigants as a justifiable limit on s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive 
freedom. 
 
 The discussion of Edmonton Journal concludes by mentioning Vickery v. N.S.S.C. 
(Prothonotary), in which a majority of the Court denied a television producer access to a 
videotape confession which had been submitted as evidence in a murder case. 74  The confession 
was inadmissible, the accused was acquitted, and in response to a request for a copy of the 
confession, the Court held that the defendant’s privacy interests “as a person acquitted of a crime 
outweigh the public right of access to exhibits judicially determined to be inadmissible against 
him.”75  Vickery was not decided under the Charter, and nor did it concern a pu blication ban, as 
was the case in Edmonton Journal. 
 
 It is worth noting, nonetheless, for Cory J.’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by 
Justices L’Heureux Dubé and McLachlin JJ.  Though he expressed respect for the accused’s 
right to privacy and weighed it in the balance, Mr. Justice Cory’s adherence to the open court 
principle was passionate and unbending.  Quoted below are a few of the passages which  
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demonstrate that, for him, the principle was almost unconditional.  Thus, he expressed the value 
of openness in these terms: 
 
[C]ourts must, in every phase and facet of their processes, be open to all to ensure 
that so far as is humanly possible, justice is done and seen by all to be done.  If 
court proceedings, and particularly the criminal process, are to be accepted they 
must be completely open so as to enable members f the public to assess both the 
procedure followed and the final result obtained.  Without public acceptance, the 
criminal law is itself at risk.76 
 
After discussing American experience at some length, Cory J. stated that “[a]s a general rule the 
sensibilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the public from judicial 
proceedings.”77   
 
 Under the heading “some general policy considerations”, Mr, Justice Cory declared that 
an open trial process demonstrates “to all, whether the family of the victim, the family of the 
accused, or the members of the community in general, that the entire criminal process has been 
conducted fairly and that those accused of crimes have bee n dealt with justly.”78  And, though he 
emphasized the role of the media, as the public’s representative in court proceedings, it is the 
value Cory J. attached to openness that is striking.  On that he claimed the following:  
 
There can be no confidence in t he criminal law process unless the public is 
satisfied with all court proceedings from the beginning of the process to the end of 
the final appeal.  Of the three levels of government, it is the courts above all which 
must operate openly.  While what is done in secret is forever suspect, what is 
done openly, whether susceptible to praise or condemnation, is more likely to 
meet with acceptance.  There cannot be reasonable comment or criticism unless 
all aspects of the proceedings are known to the public.79 
 
In the end he cautioned against a “priestly cult of the law whereby lawyers and judges 
exclusively determine” what can be seen and heard by members of the public; in his view, 
“anything that prevents light being shed” on the subject of a trial “can only lead  to a dark 
suspicion of the process.”80 
 
 Mr. Justice Cory’s comments on open court appeared in a dissenting opinion but are 
significant nonetheless.  Through the combination of Edmonton Journal, the Vickery dissent, and 
the majority opinion in C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson), a strong endorsement of the 
value of the open court principle emerged in the Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
   
Dagenais v. C.B.C. 
 Dagenais v. C.B.C. is also a landmark, not only for  s.2(b) and the open court principle, 
but for the rights of third parties in the criminal process too.81  There, conflict arose between the 
fair trial rights of priests accused of sexual offences, and the C.B.C.’s right, under s.2(b), to 
broadcast a controversial docudrama on that subject.  Four members of a religious order, who 
were accused of physical and sexual abuse in Catholic training schools, obtained a publication 
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ban which prevented the C.B.C. from broadcasting The Boys of St. Vincent.   Speaking through 
Chief Justice Lamer, the Supreme Court found that the order was unconstitutional; the evidence 
did not disclose any threat to fair trial rights which could only be averted by banning the 
docudrama. 
 
 Among the numerous Code provisions which permit publication bans and closed 
proceedings, there is none which addresses the threat to fairness that publicity can pose during 
the trial itself.  In default of a statutory rule, the issue reverted to the common law.  As noted 
above, common law rules which apply in criminal proceedings generally must co mply with the 
Charter.   Under those rules, publication bans were traditionally granted to prevent a real and 
substantial risk that publicity might interfere with the right to a fair trial. 82  Although the 
common law standard accorded freedom of expression some deference, the Chief Justice 
questioned whether the rule provided “sufficient protection” for s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive 
freedom.83  In his view, a pre-Charter rule that favoured fair trial over free expression was 
inconsistent with the principles of the Charter.84   Accordingly, Lamer C.J. concluded that it 
would be “inappropriate” to “continue to apply a common law rule that automatically favoured 
the rights protected by s.11(d) over those protected by s.2(b).”85 
 
 He indicated that the power to grant a publication ban may be discretionary, but its 
exercise “cannot be open-ended” and must observe “the boundaries set by the principles of the 
Charter.”86 To direct the exercise of discretion Chief Justice Lamer constitutionalized the 
common law rule.  In doing so, he modified the Oakes test and proposed a standard which would 
limit the availability of a ban to circumstances in which:  
 
a) such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the 
fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not 
prevent the risk; and 
 
b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the 
free expression of those affected by them. 87 
 
The Dagenais framework has since served as a model for determi ning the reasonableness of 
other restrictions on open court.88  On the central question of fair trial versus freedom of the 
press, Dagenais represented an important vindication of openness.  Though it failed to discuss 
and reinforce the underlying values of open court, the majority opinion established a concrete 
standard which rejected the assumption that virtually any risk to fair trial was sufficient to 
warrant restrictions on publicity. 
 
 It is also significant, in terms of this study, that Dagenais advanced the rights of crime 
victims in two ways.  One, which is procedural, altered the status of third parties in criminal 
proceedings.   In an adversarial contest between the state and the accused, third parties, such as 
victims, witnesses and the C.B.C., had little or no status.  Not surprisingly, the Criminal Code 
did not grant such parties a statutory right of appeal from orders affecting their rights under the 
Charter.  In Dagenais, this meant that unless the Supreme Court addressed its claim, the C.B.C. 
would forfeit its rights under s.2(b) of the Charter.  To avoid that prospect, Chief Justice Lamer  
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found that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, under its own statutory powers, to hear C.B.C.’s 
appeal.89  As this avenue of appeal is not exclusive to the press, Dagenais effectively granted 
third parties unprecedented access to justice at the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 
 Second, Dagenais introduced a principle of Charter interpretation which inadvertently 
provided the impetus for the recognition of victim pr ivacy under s.7 of the Charter.  Discussing 
the competing interests at stake, the Chief Justice observed in Dagenais that the Charter draws 
no distinction between ss.2(b), which guarantees expressive and press freedom, and 11(d), which 
guarantees a fair trial.   This led him to conclude that it was inappropriate for the common law to 
privilege one constitutional right at the expense of another, when the two have “equal status”. 90 
More generally, Lamer C.J. stated that “[a] hierarchical approach to rights, which places some 
over others, must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when interpreting the 
common law”.91  In cases of conflict between two rights, he indicated, Charter principles require 
“a balance to be achieved that fully respects the im portance of both sets of rights”.92   If it was  
unclear how conflicting rights could both be fully respected, the key point is that Dagenais 
endorsed a non-hierarchical approach to Charter rights.  How Dagenais contributed to the 
evolution of victim privacy through its rejection of a hierarchy of values is traced, in detail, in 
Chapter Three. 
 
C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson)93    
 C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson) combined Edmonton Journal’s strong 
endorsement of openness values with a doctrinal standard that built on the methodology of 
Dagenais. In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance of the newsgathering function and 
its relationship to an informed public and democratic values.  Unlike previous cases, C.B.C. (Re: 
R. v. Carson) raised the question of access to the courtroom.  Under s.486(1) of the Criminal 
Code, which permits proceedings to be closed to protect the proper administration of justice, the 
trial judge had excluded the public from a portion of the sentence hearing whic h disclosed the 
acts of sexual assault and  interference the accused had committed against two young females.  
Though LaForest J., for the majority, found the order unconstitutional in the circumstances, he 
upheld s.486(1).  In doing so, he accepted that privacy is a valid exception to the rule in favour of 
openness. 
 
 Section 486(1) declares that proceedings shall be held in open court, except when the 
judge concludes that it is “in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper 
administration of justice to exclude all or any members of the public from the court room for all 
or part of the proceedings.”94  Rather than invalidate the provision, LaForest J. stated that in 
applying its exclusionary criteria, a court must exercise its disc retion “in conformity with the 
Charter.”95  In his view, s.486(1) armed the judiciary with a useful and flexible interpretive tool 
to preserve the openness principle, subject to whatever exceptions or limits the proper of 
administration of justice might require.  The fact that the discretion must be exercised within 
constitutional parameters would ensure that the terms of a particular exclusionary order would 
accomplish what was necessary to achieve s.486(1)’s goals, and no more.  When an exercise of 
discretion did not conform with the Charter, it would be appropriate for the Court to quash the 
order.   
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 To provide guidance in determining the validity of an exclusionary order, LaForest J. 
drew on the Dagenais standard.  Stating that the “same directives” are equally useful in 
determining when a court room may be closed under s.486(1), he held that an exclusion order 
can only be issued once the following steps have been taken:  
a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any 
other  reasonable and effective alternatives available; 
b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and  
c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and 
its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular 
expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative 
effects of the order are proportionate.96 
  
In addition, he indicated that the burden of displacing the rule of openness rests on the party 
making the application, and stressed, repeatedly, the need for a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
the order.97   
 
 In the result, the trial judge’s order was inconsistent with s.2(b) of the Charter, not only 
because embarrassment alone is not a sufficient reason to protect witnesses from a public 
presence in the courtroom but also, because there was no evidence that the two victims  would 
suffer “undue hardship” were the public permitted to attend a twenty-minute segment of the 
hearing on sentence.  The vict im impact statements did not indicate any basis for such hardship 
and nor did they disclose the circumstances of the offences.  Most sexual offences involve 
evidence that is “very delicate”, La Forest J. observed, and there was nothing to indicate that thi s 
case should be “elevated” above other sexual assaults. 98  The mere fact that the victims were 
young females was not sufficient in itself, and there were other effective means to protect them. 99  
Excluding the public was unnecessary because the victims’ ide ntities were protected by a non-
publication order, they were not witnesses at the hearing, and there was no evidence that their 
privacy required more protection.100   
 
 Though reluctant to criticize, LaForest J. was not impressed that the trial judge made the 
exclusionary order without first confirming that all the facts had been placed before the court. 101  
He agreed that the criminal justice system must be “ever vigilant in protecting victims of sexual 
assault from further victimization”, but cautioned that t he importance of a sufficient factual 
foundation for s.486(1)’s exercise could not be overstated. 102  In this instance, the trial judge’s 
reasons for excluding were no better than “scant”.103  
 
 The Court’s concern with a factual foundation and sufficient evid entiary basis arise from 
its perception of the s.2(b) values at stake. In that regard, C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) is noteworthy 
for its insights on and endorsement of the open court principle.  First, LaForest J. recognized that 
access to the courts is “integrally linked to the concept of representative democracy and the 
corresponding importance of public scrutiny of the criminal courts.”104  In addition, he 
acknowledged that through the gathering and dissemination of information,  the media plays an  
“integral role” in informing the public about the courts.  As he explained,  “the democratic 
function of public criticism of the courts” would not be possible without a public informed by the 
press, and the press could not discharge its responsibility to the publi c without access to the 
  
 
22
courts.105  In his own words, “[d]ebate in the public domain is predicated on an informed public, 
which is in turn reliant on a free and vigorous press.” 106  Though the Court upheld s.486(1), 
including its discretion to exclude the public from the court room, La Forest J. regarded 
openness, access to information, and the newsgathering function as essential aspects of Canadian 
democracy. 
 
 At the same time, LaForest J. had dissented earlier in Edmonton Journal, and was 
sympathetic to the protection of privacy.  Though openness prevailed in the circumstances of 
C.B.C. (Re: R.  v.  Carson), he did not ignore the privacy concerns of crime victims.  Noting that 
earlier case law had established a strong presumption in favour of open courts, he added that the 
importance of privacy “has only recently been recognized by Canadian courts.” 107 Citing 
MacIntyre, Edmonton Journal, and R. v. O’Connor,108  LaForest J. stated that “the right to 
privacy is beginning to be seen as more significant.” 109 And though openness “appears inherent 
to the nature of a criminal trial,”110 he added that “the court’s power to regulate the publicity of 
its own proceedings serves ... to protect privacy interests, especially those of witnesses and 
victims.”111  His majority opinion concluded that excluding the public under s.486(1) is 
permissible to protect the innocent and safeguard privacy interests, and “thereby provide a 
remedy to the under reporting of sexual offences.”112 
 
 C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) gave the principle of open court  strong vindication under the 
Charter.  At the same time, LaForest J. accepted that privacy interests could justify an exclusion 
order, providing that a sufficient factual foundation was established.  Though the public should 
not have been excluded in the circumstances of that sentence hearing, exclusion orders are 
constitutionally available under C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) when supported by a “sufficient 
evidentiary basis”.  Despite the common law’s reluctance in this regard, the Court showed its 
willingness, under the Charter, to recognize privacy as a valid exception to the open court 
principle. 
 
Conclusion 
 Prior to the Charter, open court was a principle that was highly prized but subject to 
exceptions nonetheless. Though the privacy of participants in the justice system was not an 
exception the common law recognized, the legislatures were free to modify that position and 
protect privacy by statutory measures.  With the Charter’s arrival the relationship between the 
principle and its exceptions remained constant in some ways, and was altered in others.  
 Open court has been given especially strong recognition in the s.2(b) jurisprudence.  
Traditionally, the principle has been linked to the fairness of proceedings, as well as to the 
legitimacy of criminal justice and the public’s confidence in the system.  What the Charter has 
added are a recognition of the link between open court and democratic accountability, and the 
distinctive role the press plays in providing the public the information it requires to scr utinize 
and debate the operations of the justice system.  These values received strong endorsement under 
the Charter in Edmonton Journal and C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson). 
 
 As to results, the open court claims succeeded in three of the four decisions reviewed  in 
this Chapter, and others could be added to the list.113  In that regard, it is important to note that 
the evidentiary threshold for a limit or an exception to the principle has changed dramatically.  
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The common law treated open court and fair trial as im portant values, but assumed that open 
court should yield to fair trial whenever that value might be threatened.  Statutory provisions 
created blanket or mandatory exceptions, or granted judges almost unfettered discretion to place 
limits on access or publicity.  Under the doctrinal framework introduced in Dagenais, and 
developed in the subsequent case law, that would change.  Limits on the principle remain 
permissible,  but must now satisfy particular and more onerous requirements under the Charter.  
Dagenais, C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson), and the more recent Mentuck/O.N.E. cases demonstrate that 
it has become difficult to justify limits on the open court principle. 114  Looking back at Canadian 
Newspapers today, one wonders whether the result would have been the same, had the case been 
decided under the standards established by the subsequent jurisprudence.  
 
 While enhancing the status of open court, the Charter jurisprudence also granted privacy 
concerns important protection.  As seen above, Canadian Newspapers employed a law 
enforcement rationale under s.1 of the Charter to protect the identity of sexual assault 
complainants.  Subsequently, however, and though it did not prevail, the privacy interest was 
considered and weighed by the judges in the majority in Edmonton Journal, and was the 
deciding factor for those who dissented.  Finally, C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) discussed privacy in 
some detail and treated it as a reasonable limit on open court which failed because it was not 
established, as a matter of evidence, in the circumstances of that case.  Without serving as the 
determining factor or changing the result in any of these cases, privacy nonetheless travelled a 
considerable distance from Scott and MacIntyre, and in a relatively short time, under the 
Charter. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Victim privacy, sexual assault, and the Charter  
 
Introduction 
 Privacy was a theme in Chapter Two’s analysis of the open court principle.  Though it 
was an indirect or unspoken factor in Canadian Newspapers v.  Canada (A.G.), and an express 
consideration in Edmonton Journal v.  Edmonton (A.G.) and C.B.C. v.  New Brunswick (Re: R. v. 
Carson), the Supreme Court did not in these cases treat privacy as an entitlement in its own 
right.1 The purpose of this Chapter, then, is to explain how it was recognized as a Charter right 
in sexual assault proceedings.  That development occurred in the context of setting evidentiary 
boundaries around the complainant’s privacy in her past sexual history and in securing the 
confidentiality of her counselling and therapeutic records.2 
 
 The discussion begins by acknowledging the significance of privacy in sexual assault 
proceedings.  Canadian Newspapers acknowledged that anonymity is an element in a victim’s 
decision whether to report the commission of an offence and to proceed with charges.  Privacy 
concerns do not stop there, however, but continue through the investigative and trial processes.  
At every stage, the complainant’s credibility is open to question.  In addition to the unavoidably 
private nature of a sexual offence, which can only be revealed by the complainant, the victim has 
in the past been subject to inquiries into the history of other sexual activities.  More recently, 
complainants’ privacy has been threatened by defence claims for access to cou nselling and 
therapeutic records which are in the possession either of the Crown or private third parties.  
 
 Rules of evidence which regulated the defendant’s access to these sources of information 
provoked contests under the Charter, between the accused’s right to full answer and defence, and 
the privacy and equality rights of complainants.  This Chapter focuses on a trilogy of decisions 
which together led to the recognition of victim privacy under s.7 of the Charter.  In order of 
decision and also of discussion below, those cases are: R. v. Seaboyer,3 R. v. O’Connor,4 and R. 
v. Mills.5  Before continuing, it is important to explain why this development is significant.  First, 
sexual assault’s implications for privacy are complex and multi-dimensional; it would be a 
mistake, therefore, to treat conflicts between open court and victim privacy as an isolated 
phenomenon.  Second, as a result of that connection, the entitlement which emerged in Mills may 
influence the way open court and privacy values will be balanced under s.2(b) of The Charter. 
 
 There is one further preliminary to a discussion of the three key decisions.  Before 
explaining how the Supreme Court resolved conflicts between the defendant’s right to full 
answer and defence, and the complainant’s assertion of privacy and equality rights, it is 
worthwhile to review the Charter status of privacy prior to the Seaboyer-O’Connor-Mills trilogy. 
 
The privacy rights of the accused 
 Nowhere does the Charter explicitly protect privacy, and nor does it mentio n the rights of 
crime victims. Rather, its legal rights, which are found in ss.7 to 14, grant those accused of 
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offences a number of procedural and substantive rights.  Perhaps for that reason, the primary 
beneficiaries of the Supreme Court of Canada’s early Charter jurisprudence were criminal 
defendants.    One of the Court’s first decisions concerned s.8, which provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”6  In commenting on the 
guarantee’s interpretation in Hunter v. Southam, Dickson J. announced that the Charter provides 
for the “unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties”. 7    As for s.8, he rejected the 
suggestion that common law rules rooted in concerns about property and the law of trespas s 
should determine its scope.  Instead, he stated that the Charter’s provisions must be “capable of 
growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities.” 8 Once 
having acknowledged the need for a “broad perspective in app roaching constitutional 
documents”,9 Dickson J. signalled his wariness of “foreclosing the possibility that the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure might protect interests beyond the right of 
privacy”, and indicated that “its protect ion goes at least that far.”10 The question, he held, is 
whether “the public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the 
government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy.” 11 
 
 That determination depends, from one case to t he next, on whether the individual is 
entitled in the circumstances, to “a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental 
encroachments”.12  In R. v. Dyment, Mr. Justice La Forest reinforced the relationship Hunter v.  
Southam had forged between s.8's guarantee and the concept of privacy.  He endorsed the view 
that “privacy is at the heart of liberty in a modern state”, and added that, in being “grounded in 
many’s physical and moral autonomy”, it is “essential for the well -being of the individual.”13 
Worthy of constitutional protection for that reason alone, he declared that privacy has profound 
significance for the public order because restraints on the government’s power to pry into the 
lives of citizens “go to the essence of a democratic state.”14   
 
 La Forest J.  also agreed with Dickson J.’s suggestion that Charter rights should be 
interpreted in a broad and liberal manner.  In terms of s.8, that meant “[i]ts spirit must not be 
constrained by narrow legalistic classifications based on notions of pr operty and the like which 
served to protect this fundamental human value in earlier times.” 15 Quoting from the Task Force 
on Privacy and Computers, he agreed that privacy transcends the physical and engages the 
dignity of the human person.16  His comments about informational privacy are of particular 
interest in the context of this Chapter: 
 
In modern society, especially, retention of information about oneself is extremely 
important.  We may, for one reason or another, wish or be compelled to reveal 
such information, but situations abound where the reasonable expectation of the 
individual that the information shall remain confidential to the person to whom, 
and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be respected. 17 
 
 Hunter v. Southam and R. v. Dyment established a strong foundation for privacy but were 
limited as precedent to s.8 and its application to investigative processes.  Any right of privacy 
outside that context would have to be located elsewhere in the Charter.  Over time, s.7, which 
guarantees entitlements that are more general and abstract, filled that gap in the Charter’s text. 
The provision protects three entitlements - the right to “life, liberty and security of the person” - 
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and then adds an important proviso: a deprivation of those rights which is consistent with 
principles of fundamental justice does not violate the Charter.18 
 
 As s.7's abstract text is amenable to broad and narrow interpretations, it is not surprising 
that the Supreme Court has shifted in both directions.  On t he one hand, the Court has been 
reluctant to freeze or stultify the content of this Charter right; on the other, the judges realize that 
concepts such as liberty or security of the person, as well as fundamental justice, are malleable.  
In the case of privacy, then, the genesis of a right under s.7 is found in dicta discussing the 
meaning of “security of the person.”  In an early decision, Lamer J. claimed that the meaning of 
liberty and security of the person should not be confined to elements of physical integrity, but 
should include violations of an individual’s psychological integrity as well. 19  Despite its 
influence on the s.7 jurisprudence, R.  v. Mills was decided under s.11(b), which entitles the 
accused to trial within a reasonable time. 20  There, Mr. Justice Lamer effictively incorporated 
s.7's guarantees of liberty and security of the person into his interpretation of s.11(b). 21 In his 
view, the reasonable time guarantee was designed to protect the rights set forth in s.7, albeit “in a 
specific manner and setting.”22  Having linked the general contours of s.7 and the particulars of 
s.11(b), he held that under the latter, “the security of the person is to be safeguarded as jealously 
as the liberty of the person.”23  Mr. Justice Lamer then expounded on the meaning of security of 
the person, in these terms: 
 
Security of the person is not restricted to physical integrity; rather, it encompasses 
protection against overlong subjection to the vexations and vicissitudes of a 
pending criminal accusation ... These include stigmatization of the accused, loss 
of privacy, stress and anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including 
possible disruption of family, social life, and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to 
the outcome and sanction. 
 
Surprisingly, dicta which appeared in a dissenting opinion that addressed the scope of s.7 in a 
s.11(b) case dealing with the rights of the accused, and in which privacy was but one in a list of 
security interests, helped provide the foundation for a right of victim privacy. 
 
 The Court picked up on the proposition that s.7 protects an individual’s psychological 
integrity in other decisions as well.  For instance, in R. v. Morgentaler, Dickson C.J. stated that 
“[s]ecurity of the person must be given content in a manner sensit ive to its constitutional 
position.”24  After citing the above passage from Mills, he held that “[i]f state-imposed 
psychological trauma infringes security of the person in the rather circumscribed case of s.11(b), 
it should be relevant to the general case of s.7 where the right is expressed in broader terms.” 25  
Even so, he held that criminal restrictions on a woman’s right to seek an abortion were in the 
circumstances unconstitutional, but concluded that “[i]t is not necessary ... to determine whether 
the right extends further, to protect either interests central to personal autonomy, such as a right 
to privacy or interests unrelated to criminal justice.”26  Meanwhile, Madam Justice Wilson’s 
concurring opinion citing the same passage from Mills, found that “the right to security of the 
person entitled a person to be protected against psychological trauma”, and agreed that the 
entitlement extended to an individual’s physical and psychological integrity. 27  She alone held 
that s.7 guarantees the substantive right to seek an abortion which, in her view, was grounded in 
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s.7's liberty entitlement and its guarantee “to every individual a degree of personal autonomy 
over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives.”28 
 
 As seen above in Chapter Two, the Supreme Court accepted that s.2(b)’s principle of 
open court could be limited, under the s.1 analysis, to protect privacy interests.  As an 
entitlement, however, the concept of privacy was confined to s.8 and those accused of crimes.  
Meantime, both before and after the Charter’s enactment, the women’s movement achieved 
important reforms in many areas of the criminal law.  Early in the 1980s, Parliament repealed the 
Criminal Code’s rape provision and created the offence of sexual assault in its place. 29  That step 
was one of several which, together, comprised a package of reforms.  Even before those reforms, 
Parliament introduced legislation which placed strict limits on an accused’s right to cross -
examine the complainant on her past sexual history. 30  Measures which protected a victim’s 
identity, which were discussed in Chapter Two, are another part of the initiatives that were 
introduced in this period.31  Subsequently, Criminal Code provisions also narrowed or removed 
certain defences in sexual assault proceedings. The two most controversial defences were the 
accused’s claim of a mistaken belief that the activity was consensual, 32 and the excuse that he 
was too intoxicated to be held criminally responsible for his actions. 33 
 
 These changes were afoot at the time the Charter was enacted in 1982.  In the years that 
followed, the Supreme Court’s aggressive protection of the accused’s rights prompted 
complainants to assert Charter entitlements of their own.  In the course of the Seaboyer-
O’Connor-Mills trilogy, the Court extended the concept of privacy that had protected criminal 
defendants from search and seizure under s.8, to the victims of crime, under s.7 of the Charter.  
 
The privacy rights of victims 
 As seen above in Chapter Two, Canadian Newspapers v.  Canada (A.G.) employed a law 
enforcement rationale to protect victim anonymity in sexual assault proceedings.  Yet privacy 
concerns are not limited to the question of identity, but run through the process.  An issue which 
may surface for the first time when a complainant is deciding whether to report an offence can be 
magnified at trial, when she is required to testify about the assault in open court, and then to 
submit to cross-examination by the lawyer for the accused.  That part of the process has been 
especially contentious in recent years.  On the one hand, the accused is entitled, under the 
Charter, to various aspects of a fair trial, one of which is his right to make “full answer and 
defence.”  This entitlement, which is protected under ss.7 and 11(d), gua rantees access to 
whatever evidence is necessary for him to make his defence, including private information about 
the complainant.34 
 
 Before the reforms just mentioned, this evidence in sexual assault proceedings included 
the right to cross-examine the complainant on her past sexual experience.  Common law rules of 
evidence allowed that line of questioning on the assumption that such information was relevant 
to the question of consent. When the common law was modified by Criminal Code provisions 
restricting access to such evidence, those limits were challenged under the Charter, as violations 
of the defendant’s fair trial right and his right to make full answer and defence.   
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 Meanwhile, the perception that complainants were being re-victimized by a process 
which was dominated by myths and stereotypes drew attention to their rights in the criminal trial 
process.  In this way, the privacy and equality claims of sexual assault victims were set up 
against the rights of the accused. This contest gave rise to two major developments in the 
Charter jurisprudence: first, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a right of victim privacy 
under s.7; and second, in doing so, the Court held that the victims of such crimes are not 
subordinate, but equal in their rights, to the accused.  Before turning to the trilogy of cases, it 
should be mentioned that this Chapter does not comment on the concept of relevance, as its 
purpose instead is to trace the evolution of a Charter right of privacy. 
 
R. v. Seaboyer35 
 R. v. Seaboyer was a decision which highlighted the divisive issues which arise in sexual 
assault cases.  There, a Supreme Court majority opinion invalidated s.276 of the Criminal Code, 
which made cross-examination on a complainant’s previous sexual history effectively 
unavailable to the accused in prosecutions for sexual assault.36  According to then Madam Justice 
McLachlin, who wrote the Court’s opinion, the Code’s so-called “rape-shield” provision 
impermissibly infringed the accused’s rights under the Charter.  In restricting access to a line of 
questioning that could result in an acquittal, s.276 denied him the opportunity to answer the 
charge against him.  Though her decision to strike s.276 effectively restored the common law, 
McLachlin J. articulated a number of guidelines to prevent a return to past patterns of cross-
examination.37  
  
 Meanwhile, L’Heureux Dubé J. wrote a stinging dissent which extensively reviewed the  
myths and stereotypes of rape law, before concluding that  s.276 did not offend s.7 and was, in 
any case,  easily justified under s.1 of the Charter.  As far as she was concerned, the exclusion of 
“largely irrelevant and highly prejudicial sexual history evidence does not significantly entrench 
[sic] upon an accused’s right to a fair trial or an accused’s right to make full answer and 
defence.”38 Not only did Seaboyer expose sharp disagreement between the Supreme Court’s two 
women judges, the dissent aggressively supported a feminist interpretation of sexual assault.  Yet 
by majority vote, the rights of the accused prevailed over those of his victims, as they had so 
consistently in the past.  For these and other reasons, Seaboyer marked a defining moment in the 
rising conflict between the rights of those accused of sexual offences and their accusers.  
 
 McLachlin J.’s majority opinion described s. 276 as imposing a “blanket exclusion” on 
evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual history, subject only to three exceptions. 39  In the 
circumstances, her difficulty was that the provision denied the accused access to evidence, in 
some instances, that he was constitutionally entitled to, as a matter of fair trial under s.11(d) and 
fundamental justice under s.7 of the Charter.  After describing a number of situations in which 
such evidence might be relevant, she held that s.276 was constitutionally flawed because an 
absolute exclusion provided no means for evidence to be evaluated. 40  From her perspective, 
such an approach was “inherently incapable of permitting the Court sufficient latitude to 
properly determine relevance in the individual case.”41 
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 Supporters of s.276 maintained that its key purpose was to abolish common law rules 
which permitted evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct that was of little probative value 
and was calculated to mislead the jury.   In addition, they submitted that the provision advanced 
the truth-seeking objective of criminal justice, and that eliminating this evidence would preserve 
the integrity of the trial process, encourage the reporting of crime, and protect the witness’s 
privacy.42  Responding, in particular, to the privacy issue, McLachlin J. stated that such a claim 
could not justify s.276's rigid exclusionary rule. “Important as it is to take all measures possible 
to ease the plight of the witness”, she held that “the constitutional right to a fair trial must take 
precedence in case of conflict.”43  As for the notion that complainants could claim entitlements 
of their own under ss.7 and 15 of the Charter, she noted that s.7 includes a variety of societal 
interests but stated that a measure which denied the accused’s right to full answer and defence 
would violate s.7 in any event.44  For her, the problem was that s.276's “pigeon-hole approach” 
was incapable of addressing the evidentiary question whether the evidence was relevant or not in 
any particular case.45 
 
 Despite invalidating s.276, Madam Justice McLachlin did not favour a return to the 
common law’s “outmoded sexist-based use of sexual conduct evidence.”46 She described as 
“totally discredited” the idea that a complainant’s integrity might be affected by whether she has 
had other sexual experiences, and went on to state that “[t]here is no logical or practical link 
between a woman’s sexual reputation and whether she is a truthful person.” 47 A provision that 
excluded evidence which was sought for illegitimate purposes was unquestionably permissible; 
the difficulty for her was that the existing provision also had unconstitutional effects.  Her 
solution formulated guidelines which were designed to “reduce and even eliminate the concer ns” 
which had prompted the enactment of s.276, and at the same time to preserve the right of an 
accused to a fair trial.48   
 
 Meantime, L’Heureux Dubé J. was adamant that the provision did not violate the Charter 
and should be upheld.  She described McLachlin J.’s optimism that judicial guidelines could 
address Parliament’s objectives and avoid the infirmities of the common law as “badly 
misplaced.”49  In her view, the guidelines were “entirely too broad and support the very 
stereotypes and myths that they are meant to eradicate.”50  But if the tone of her dissenting 
opinion magnified divisions between the two, it is worth noting that victim privacy was not a 
central consideration in either opinion. 
 
  Madam Justice L’Heureux Dubé declared more than once that sexual assault is “not like 
any other crime.”51  Nor was her dissenting opinion limited in scope to the constitutionality of 
s.276; Seaboyer presented the opportunity to write an indictment of the law of sexual assault, and 
so she did.  Accordingly, her lengthy reasons detailed and catalogued the myths and stereotypes 
that infuse the system,52 and serve as a filtering process which “select[s] out the cases not worthy 
of further attention.”53  As a result, when a woman’s victimization does not “fit the myths”, she 
declared it unlikely that an arrest would be made or a conviction obtained. 54  Myths, which she 
unmistakeably viewed as insidious, affect “perceptions of the culpability of the aggressor and the 
moral “character” and, hence, the credibility of the complainant”.55  In summarizing the flaws of 
the system, she found that “from the making of the initial complaint down to the determination 
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of the issue at trial”, discriminatory beliefs are at work, thereby lowering the number of reported 
cases, influencing police decisions to decrease the rate of arrest, and distorting the issues at trial, 
with implications for the outcome.56  L’Heureux Dubé J.’s reasons left little doubt that she 
regarded these beliefs as an endemic and destructive force.  
 
 Not surprisingly, she also found that the common law uncritically “enshrined” these 
discriminatory beliefs in its rules of evidence.  Because the law viewed victims of sexual assault 
with “suspicion and distrust”, unique evidentiary rules were developed, and the complainant in a 
sexual assault trial was treated “unlike any other.”57  In enacting s.276 and a host of other 
reforms, Parliament took important steps to address and remedy discriminatory beliefs that were 
deeply entrenched in the common law.  Under a view that condemn ed the common law and 
applauded the statutory initiatives, the constitutional analysis of s.276 became a foregone 
conclusion.  There, L’Heureux Dubé J. held that s.7 is not confined to the “narrow interests of 
the accused”, and rejected the “recognition of an unfettered right in the accused to adduce all 
relevant evidence.”58  Under s.1, she made these observations about the justifiability of the 
provision: 
 
It is obvious that in respect of the provision at issue in this case, the goal of 
Parliament was to eliminate sexual discrimination in the trial of sexual offences 
through the elimination of irrelevant and/or prejudicial sexual history evidence.  A 
further legislative goal, intimately linked to the first, is to encourage women to 
report their victimization.  My discussion of sexual assault at the outset makes it 
clear that a factor that loomed large in the failure of women to report, and police 
to classify complaints as “founded” and in the high rate of acquittal was the 
admission of prior sexual history into the trials of sexual offences.59 
 
Additionally, it is noteworthy, considering her subsequent opinion in R. v. O’Connor, that she 
introduced s.15 and equality values in her discussion under s.1.  Finally, citing Canadian 
Newspapers and its conclusion that “an absolute ban on publication is the only means to reach 
the desired objective”, she stated that “much the same can be said” of s.276:  in order to 
“effectively combat sex discrimination and increase reporting”, Parliament had attempted to 
eliminate the application of discriminatory beliefs at trials of sexual offences.” 60  
 
 Seaboyer represents a point of departure in the evolution of a privacy right for sexual 
assault complainants.  The analysis and debate between the Court’s two women judges focussed 
on shifting conceptions of relevance and the right of full answer and defence.  Somewhat like 
Canadian Newspapers, then, Seaboyer addressed concerns about victim privacy without 
suggesting or accepting that it might be protected by the Charter. The Court had not reached the 
point of balancing the rights at stake; privacy had not yet emerged as an entitlement, much less 
been granted equal status with fair trial and full answer and defence.  
 
 By the time R. v. O’Connor was decided, the dynamics had changed. While Madam 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s Seaboyer dissent was praised, McLachlin J.’s majority opinion was 
scorned.  In due course, Parliament enacted a new “rape-shield law” along the lines the dissent 
had suggested.61  Meantime, substantial restrictions on an accused’s free rein to explore a 
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complainant’s past sexual history shifted the right of full answer and defence to another source 
of evidence - counselling or therapeutic records which could provide information about a 
complainant that might assist an accused in defending a charge of sexual assault.  
 
R. v. O’Connor62  
 Like Seaboyer, the Court’s decision in R. v. O’Connor took a critical step in the direction 
of establishing a right of victim privacy under the Charter.  Once again, innovative reasoning 
appeared in the dissenting opinion of Madam Justice L’Heureux Dubé.  This time she linked the 
myths and stereotypes reviewed in Seaboyer to the privacy and equality rights of complainants in 
sexual assault proceedings. Not only did L’Heureux Dubé J. set those rights up against the 
accused’s right of full answer and defence, she maintained that their rights were equal, and 
should not be subordinated to those which belong to criminal defendants.  For those reasons, the 
O’Connor dissent may be one of L’Heureux Dubé J.’s most powerful opinions.  In responding to 
the Court’s decision, which applied the Charter in a non-statutory setting, Parliament enacted 
Bill C-46,63 and legislation that rejected the majority opinion in favour of the dissent in 
O’Connor was subsequently upheld in R. v. Mills.64   Through the trajectory of O’Connor, Bill 
C-46, and R. v. Mills, the Supreme Court entrenched a right of victim privacy under s.7.  
 
 Meantime, in the period between Seaboyer and O’Connor, the Supreme Court dismissed 
full answer and defence challenges to Code provisions which protected witnesses who were 
young and vulnerable.  Thus Chief Justice Lamer wrote for a majority in R. v. L.(D.O.),65 which 
agreed that s. 715.1 did not impermissibly violate the accused’s Charter rights.66  Under its 
terms, young complainants who have been the victims of sexual offences are permitted to give 
their evidence by videotape.  L’Heureux Dubé J.’s concurrence spoke of the “innate power 
imbalance between the numerous young women and girls who are the  victims of sexual abuse at 
the hands of almost exclusively male perpetrators.”67  In light of that, she held that the Court 
could not disregard the “propensity of victims of sexual abuse to fail to report the abuse in order 
to conceal their plight from institutions within the criminal justice system which hold 
stereotypical and biased views about the victimization of women.”68  Referring, as well, to 
privacy concerns, she added that the subject matter of the crime “requires that the child provide 
intimate and embarrassing details about the events that occurred - the unwanted interference with 
the child’s body.”69   
 
 Then in Levogiannis v. the Queen, s.486(2.1), which permits a young complainant to 
testify behind a screen, was also upheld.70   Under that provision, the screen blocked the 
complainant’s view of the accused, which might threaten or intimidate the witness, but not the 
accused’s view of the complainant.  There, too, the interest in creating conditions for the 
complainant’s testimony, which would facilitate the prosecution of sexual abuse, prevailed. 
 
 Significantly, Dagenais v. C.B.C. was also decided in the interim between Seaboyer and 
O’Connor. As noted above in Chapter Two, Chief Justice Lamer indicated that the Court should 
adopt a non-hierarchical approach to the interpretation of Charter rights.71  He stated that 
principle in the context of a contest between fair trial and a free press, both of which are 
guaranteed by the Charter’s text.  In O’Connor, however, that part of Dagenais provided support 
for the proposition that the rights of the accused should not prevail over those of their victims.  
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Specifically, Madam Justice L’Heureux Dubé J.’s dissent stated that, “a balance must be struck”, 
which places the Charter rights of complainants “on an equal footing with those of accused 
persons.”72 
 
 For purposes of this Chapter, the key question in R. v. O’Connor was whether an accused 
charged with sexual offences could require third parties to produce counselling and therapeutic 
records which pertained to the complainant.73 A brief digression is necessary to explain how the 
accused claimed the right, under the Charter, to review records which were held by private, non-
governmental parties.  Once again, the entitlement at stake was full answer and defence, and the 
argument was that the accused required access to such records in order to defend the charges 
against him.  The milestone precedent was R. v. Stinchcombe, which imposes a constitutional 
duty on the Crown to disclose all information in its possession  to the accused.74  Parenthetically, 
it is noteworthy that Stinchcombe and Seaboyer were decided the same year; ironically, while 
Stinchcombe expanded the accused’s access to defence evidence, the majority in Seaboyer 
agreed with Parliament that a complainant’s past sexual history was irrelevant in most cases and, 
excepting in specified circumstances, unavailable to the accused.  Thus, effectively denied access 
to areas of cross-examination which had previously been open, criminal defendants began 
seeking another source of evidence - the complainant’s records.   O’Connor raised the question 
whether the Crown’s Stinchcombe duty should extend to records held by third parties, as an 
aspect of the accused’s right of full answer and defence. 75 
 
 In the absence of Criminal Code provisions on this issue, the Supreme Court proposed an 
approach that granted the accused access to such records, but not as a matter of course, and not 
without establishing a procedure to safeguard victim privacy.  Even so, there was a sharp split in 
the way the majority and minority opinions balanced the competing interests.  Without 
rehearsing the differences between the procedures adopted by the two, it is fair to say that Chief 
Justice Lamer and Sopinka J. accepted that victim privacy shou ld be protected, but accorded full 
answer and defence a higher priority; as a result, the joint opinion set a lower threshold for 
access to the evidence.76  Unlike the dissent, their joint opinion did not mention the equality 
rights of complainants, and rejected its suggestion that there should be a presumption in favour 
of privacy. 
 
 Meanwhile, though Madam Justice L’Heureux Dubé’s dissent also balanced those 
interests, her solution was based on the Dagenais principle of equality between rights.  She 
invoked the Chief Justice’s warning in Dagenais, that “the court must exercise its discretion in a 
manner that is respectful of Charter values, ”77 and stated that any production order in favour of 
the accused must balance Charter rights to ensure that any adverse effects on one right are 
proportionate to the salutary benefits for the other.78  At that point, she had not yet established 
that victim privacy is protected by the Charter.  Before addressing that question, L’Heureux 
Dubé J. commented on the scope of full answer and defence.  From her perspective, the right 
could not be considered “in the abstract”; moreover, fairness must be considered, not only from 
the accused’s point of view, but that of the complainant and the community as well. 79   In the 
specific terms of the case, she indicated that the rights of the defendant could not be “so broad as 
to grant the defence a fishing licence into the personal and private lives of others.” 80   
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 Full answer and defence might not be absolute, but that still did not explain or address the 
Charter status of the complainant’s records.  To articulate a right based on privacy, it became 
necessary for L’Heureux Dubé J. to piece together the Supreme Court’s scattered comments on 
the subject.  Thus she explained that, at the level of generality, the Court had “on many occasions 
recognized the great value of privacy in our society”, and had “expressed sympathy for the 
proposition that s.7 of the Charter includes a right of privacy”. 81   For instance, Wilson J.’s 
concurring opinion in R. v. Morgentaler stated the view that s.7 guarantees “a degree of personal 
autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives.” 82  Moreover, as 
noted earlier in this Chapter, Lamer J.’s dissent in R. v. Mills included privacy in s.7 of the 
Charter, via s.11(b).  There, he commented on the “stigmatization, loss of privacy, stress and 
anxiety” an accused might suffer, along with disruption of family, social life and work, costs and 
uncertainty when his trial was unreasonably delayed.83  In L’Heureux Dubé J.’s view, 
substituting the word “complainant” for the word “accused” resulted in “an excellent description 
of the psychological traumas potentially faced by sexual assault complainants.” 84 
 
 Drawing that analogy between the complainant and the accused enabled her to 
incorporate s.8's reasonable expectation of privacy into s.7's entitlements of liberty and security 
of the person.  Her reasoning was that having to produce counselling and therapeutic records is 
compelled production and a form of search; yet respect for privacy is “an essential component of 
what it means to be free”, and the infringement of that right undeniably “impinges upon an 
individual’s liberty.”85  When private records are revealed, “it is an invasion of the dignity a nd 
self-worth of the individual, who enjoys the right to privacy as an essential aspect of his or her 
liberty in a free and democratic society.”86  In her view, it followed that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy that is guaranteed by s.8 is worthy of pr otection under s.7.87 
 
 That, briefly, is how Madam Justice L’Heureux Dubé established a right of victim 
privacy for complainants.  Perhaps to strengthen the textual connection, she included a 
discussion of s.15's guarantee of equality.  Thus she concluded,  not only that “a privacy analysis 
creates a presumption against ordering production of private records, but also that ample and 
meaningful consideration must be given to complainants’ equality rights.”88  In this way she 
made the link between the myths and  stereotypes discussed in Seaboyer and victim rights 
explicit.  As embodied in evidentiary rules both at common law and under the Code, assumptions 
that were discriminatory played a “pernicious role” in the system. 89 Bluntly put, “uninhibited 
disclosure of complainants’ private lives indulges the discriminatory suspicion that women and 
children’s reports of sexual victimization are uniquely likely to be fabricated.” 90 L’Heureux 
Dubé J.’s dissent in O’Connor admonished that the Court should be careful not to permit such 
practices to reappear under the guise of “extensive and unwarranted inquiries into the past 
histories and private lives of complainants of sexual assault.”91  Applied to the facts of the case, 
it meant that the accused should not have ready access to third party records; that would create 
indirect access to the same evidence to which direct access had been prohibited by the rape -
shield provision and other reforms which sought to erase the discriminatory assumptions of the 
past.  In her view, it would be a mistake to “close one discriminatory door only to open 
another.”92 
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 Returning again to Dagenais, L’Heureux Dubé J. stated that “[a]s important as the right 
to full answer and defence may be, it must co -exist with other constitutional rights, rather than 
trample them.”93  Without mincing words, she declared that  “[p]rivacy and equality must not be 
sacrificed willy-nilly on the altar of trial fairness”. 94   Instead, the Charter required  a balance 
“that places the Charter rights of complainants on an equal footing with those of accused 
persons”.95 
 
 O’Connor was decided by a five to four majority at a time when Charter protection for 
the rights of the accused was strong.  The majority opinion balanced the competing interests but 
concluded, ultimately, that victim privacy must defer to the accused’s rights.  Following the 
decision in O’Connor, Parliament enacted Bill C-46, a mini-code of procedure that regulates 
defence access to this evidence and which, in doing so, substantially endorsed the dissenting  
opinion in O’Connor.  In such circumstances, it was inevitable that the accused would challenge 
Bill C-46's breach of his rights under the Charter.  Less inevitable was the outcome in R. v. 
Mills.  There, the Supreme Court of Canada effectively abandoned O’Connor to avoid 
invalidating parts of the mini code which were inconsistent with its majority opinion in that case.  
 
R. v. Mills96  
 The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Mills is significant for several reasons, many of 
which are not of immediate concern here.  There, the Supreme Court concluded that the Charter 
protects the privacy and equality rights of sexual assault victims, and upheld Bill C-46.  Prior to 
Mills, the complainants’ rights had been promoted, mainly, in dissenting opinions by Madam 
Justice L’Heureux Dubé J.  In addition to O’Connor, she explained in  (L.L.) v. (B.(A.) why 
balancing the rights of the accused and the complainants under the Charter was a “better 
approach” than a case-by-case privilege for the private records of sexual assault complainants. 97 
Citing the Dagenais principle that fair trial should not have pre-eminence over “other 
constitutionally protected rights”, she re-iterated her commitment to a procedure that placed “the 
Charter rights of complainants on an equal footing with those of accused persons.”98 
Subsequently, a majority held in R. v. Carosella that a sexual assault crisis centre’s destruction of 
records and non-disclosure to the accused resulted in a breach of his right of full answer and 
defence.99  Once again in dissent, L’Heureux Dubé J. strenuously resisted the suggestion that the 
crisis centre had any obligation to preserve evidence, which she regarded as private in nature, for 
the benefit of the accused’s defence.   
 
 Though L.(L) v. B.(A.) and Carosella were decided by contentious five to four margins, it 
should not be forgotten that, in C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson), the Supreme Court 
recognized that victim privacy could justify an exception to the open court principle. 100  Another 
decision, in M (A.) v. Ryan, should also be noted.101 Ryan concerned the disclosure of 
counselling records in a civil suit arising from a psychiatrist’s sexual misconduct with a young 
woman.  In concluding that a privilege could attach to the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, 
McLachlin J. referred to “the law’s increasing concern with the wrongs perpetrated by sexual 
abuse and the serious effect such abuse has on the health and productivity of the many members 
of our society it victimizes.”102  Significantly, she stated that Charter values, including s.8's  
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interest in privacy and s.15's guarantee of equality, were relevant to the question of privilege.  In 
doing so, she explained why sexual assault has distinctive implications for privacy and equality:  
 
The intimate nature of sexual assault heightens the privacy concerns of the victim 
and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the rule, the difficulty of obtaining 
redress for the wrong.  The victim of a sexual assault is thus placed in a 
disadvantaged position as compared with the victim of a different wrong.  The 
result may be that the victim of sexual assault does not obtain the equal benefit of 
the law to which s.15 of the Charter entitles her.  She is doubly victimized, 
initially by the sexual assault and later by the price she must pay to claim redress - 
redress which in some cases may be part of her program of therapy. 103 
 
 As to Bill C-46, it is clear that Parliament’s mini-code was designed to override the 
majority opinion in O’Connor and thereby enhance protection for vict im privacy.  Not only was 
the legislation inconsistent in many respects with the decision in O’Connor, its preamble 
explicitly endorsed the Charter rights of victims, their rights to security of the person, privacy, 
and the equal benefit of the law, and expressed concerns about the problems associated with the 
reporting and prosecution of sexual offences.  All told, Bill C-46 left little doubt of the impact of 
L’Heureux Dubé J.’s dissenting opinions in Seaboyer and O’Connor.  Its detailed provisions 
followed the lead of the O’Connor dissent in prescribing rules and procedures to limit defence 
access to private records in sexual assault proceedings.   
 
 How the Court rationalized its decision in Mills to uphold legislation, which effectively 
reversed its interpretation of the Charter in O’Connor, is one matter, and what the majority 
opinion said about the privacy and equality rights of complainants is another.  By adopting the 
O’Connor dissent’s privacy and equality analysis, the joint opinion authored by Just ices 
McLachlin and Iacobucci converted it to binding precedent.   
  
 As noted above, the O’Connor dissent applied the Dagenais presumption against 
hierarchies between rights to establish victim privacy and then endow it with the same Charter 
status as the rights of the accused.  Likewise, the joint opinion in Mills endorsed the principle of 
co-equal rights.  At the outset, Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci cited Dagenais for its rejection 
of a “hierarchical approach” to the question of competing interests:   “[o]n the one hand stands 
the accused’s right to make full answer and defence”; on the other hand “stands the 
complainant’s and the witness’s right to privacy.”104  In such circumstances, they held that 
“[n]either right may be defined in such a way as to ne gate the other” and both sets of rights “are 
informed by the equality rights at play in this context.” 105  Signalling the Court’s willingness to 
retreat, the joint opinion further stated that, “it is important to keep in mind that the decision in 
O’Connor is not necessarily the last word on the subject.”106  To emphasize the status of 
complainants, the judges re-iterated a second time that under s.7, “the rights of full answer and 
defence, and privacy, must be defined in light of each other” and “both must be d efined in light 
of the equality provisions of s.15.”107    
 
 As they prepared to address the rights at stake, the judges admonished, once more, that 
“[n]o single principle is absolute and capable of trumping the other.”108  As for full answer and 
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defence, Mills explained that s.7 does not guarantee the most favourable procedures imaginable, 
because fundamental justice “embraces more than the rights of the accused.” 109  Specifically, 
McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. indicated that the ability to make full answer and de fence is subject 
to “other principles of fundamental justice which may embrace interests and perspectives beyond 
those of the accused.”110  In their opinion, the accused’s rights are not “automatically breached” 
when he is deprived of relevant information. 111 
 
 Following the pattern of the O’Connor dissent, the joint opinion in Mills strongly 
endorsed the privacy and equality rights of complainants in sexual assault proceedings.  Absent 
any textual guarantee of privacy, the judges found that an order for the pr oduction of records 
under the Code fell within the ambit of s.8's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.  
After emphasizing the importance of informational privacy and the confidentiality of the 
therapeutic relationship, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. linked those concerns to s. 7's guarantee of 
security of the person, in these terms:   
 
Counselling helps an individual to recover from his or her trauma.  Even the 
possibility that this confidentiality may be breached affects the therapeutic 
relationship.  Furthermore, it can reduce the complainant’s willingness to report 
crime or deter him or her from counselling altogether.  In our view, such concerns 
indicate that the protection of the therapeutic relationship protects the mental 
integrity of complainants and witnesses. ... Therefore, in cases where a therapeutic 
relationship is threatened by the disclosure of private records, security of the 
person and not just privacy is implicated.112 
 
The relationship between ss.8 and 7 that emerged in Mills is this.  Section 8 protects a person’s 
privacy and, in doing so, it addresses a particular application of the principles of fundamental 
justice.  Under that reasoning, a search or seizure can only be consistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice when it is reasonable, and it will only be reasonable when it “accommodates 
both the accused’s right to make full answer and defence and the complainant’s privacy right.” 113   
 
 As they had in the O’Connor dissent, equality rights provided an added dimension to the 
balancing of interests in Mills.  There, the joint opinion made it clear that “an appreciation of the 
myths and stereotypes in the context of sexual violence” is essential in defining the scope of full 
answer and defence.114   
 
As has frequently been noted, speculative myths, stereotypes, and generalized 
assumptions about sexual assault victims and classes of records have too often in 
the past hindered the search for truth and imposed harsh and irrelevant burdens on 
complainants in prosecutions of sexual offences.... The myths that a woman’s 
testimony is unreliable unless she made a complaint shortly after the event (recent 
complaint), or if she has had previous sexual relations, are but two of the more 
notorious examples of the speculation that in the past  has passed for truth in this 
difficult area of human behaviour and the law.  The notion that consultation with 
a psychiatrist is, by itself, an indication of untrustworthiness is a more recent, but 
equally invidious, example of such a myth.  The purpose [ of this mini code] is to 
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prevent these and other myths from forming the entire basis of an otherwise 
unsubstantiated order for production of private records.115 
 
The Court also stated that the accused would not be permitted to “‘whack the complainant’ 
through the use of sexual stereotypes regarding the victims of sexual assault.” 116  To that end, the 
task of balancing privacy and full answer and defence could not be undertaken “in a manner that 
fully respects the privacy interests of complainants,” without an “appreciation of the equality 
dimensions of records production.”117  In summary of the Court’s reasoning, the non-disclosure 
of third party records with a high privacy interest that might contain relevant evidence will not 
compromise trial fairness where such non-disclosure would not prejudice the accused’s right to 
full answer and defence.118 
          
 Mills upheld legislation that contradicted one of the Court’s majority opinions 
interpreting the Charter.  In doing so, Mills gave constitutional sanction to Criminal Code 
provisions that unquestionably promoted the rights of complainants in sexual assault 
proceedings.  As a matter of principle, the most significant aspect of the decision is the Court’s 
adoption of victim privacy as a s.7 entitlement equal to the  accused’s right of full answer and 
defence.  Subsequent decisions, including R. v. Darrach,119 R. v. Ewanchuk, 120 and R. v. 
Regan121 should be noted too, as each confirms the Court’s vigilance in rectifying the 
unfairnesses that are perceived to this day as persisting in the law of sexual offences.  In R. v. 
Darrach, for instance, the Court unanimously upheld s.276 of the Criminal Code, which 
essentially codified the Seaboyer guidelines restricting the accused’s scope of cross-examination 
of complainants in sexual assault cases.  Though neither addressed victim privacy, R. v. 
Ewanchuk and R. v. Regan confirm the Court’s ongoing concern about the “disadvantage that 
women victims have suffered as a result of stereotypes in society and the justice system.” 122  
  
 
Conclusion 
 Chapter Two’s discussion of the open court principle provides one example of the way 
the criminal justice system has accommodated the privacy interests of crime victims in recent 
years.  Yet as developments in the law relating to sexual assault de monstrate, it may not be the 
most prominent example.  Though this study is focused on the relationship between open court 
and victim privacy, it would be a mistake to neglect the emergence of victim privacy in the 
context of the accused’s right to a full answer and defence.  One reason is that although rates of 
reporting and conviction for several offences are low, the precise causes of that problem have not 
been isolated.  For a variety of reasons, including but not limited to anonymity, victims of these 
crimes have not been confident that their complaints would be fairly treated.  From that 
perspective, tracing the evolution of a right of victim privacy beyond the issues at stake under the 
open court principle forms an important part of this study.  
 
 This Chapter has shown that, especially in sexual assault proceedings, privacy is an issue 
for complainants at various stages of the process.  It is not limited to the exposure of identity or 
of the details of a sexual encounter that are threatened by the open court principle.  Complainant 
privacy has been asserted in answer to rules of evidence which permitted counsel for the defence 
to probe a victim’s past sexual history or gain access to third party therapeutic and counselling 
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records.  These strategies are an aspect of full answer and defence which are aimed at uncovering 
information that may be unrelated to the charge but relevant in some way to the complainant’s 
credibility.  The Supreme Court of Canada has now concluded that these rules and practices are a 
breach of privacy whose prohibition does not impermissibly violate the accused’s right to make 
full answer and defence. 
 
 Purely as an exercise in the evolution of law, the transformation of the concept of privacy 
that was traced in this Chapter is noteworthy.  From its foundation in s.8, the investigative 
process, and the rights of the accused, privacy became an entitlement belonging to the victims of 
sexual offences.  Although the Charter does not explicitly protect privacy, this development 
occurred when unfairness in the rules of evidence was linked to the privacy of complainants, and 
to the Charter’s guarantee of equality.  From the dissents in Seaboyer and O’Connor to the 
majority opinion in Mills, it did not take long for a right of privacy to emerg e. 
 
 In terms of the focus of this study, the relationship between the privacy rights discussed 
in Chapters Two and Three is this.  Under reporting has been a chronic problem in the law of 
sexual offences for many years, and it is unquestionably linked to perceptions that the system 
will re-victimize those who make a complaint.  Privacy is consistently mentioned as a concern, 
and as one of the reasons, complainants give for not reporting an offence or pressing a charge.  It 
is not only the defendant’s right  to cross-examine the complainant, but the fact that the criminal 
process ordinarily takes place in open court; the combination of the two compounded the 
invasion of privacy in the past.  At present, though, the jurisprudence does not consider how 
these elements of privacy interact; in particular, there is no indication whether anonymity and 
open proceedings would raise the same concerns about privacy in a system that removed the 
discriminatory beliefs and stigma which attached to sexual offences in the pas t.  More will be 
said about this in Chapter Five.  For now, the point is that if the precise cause of low rates of 
reporting, prosecution and conviction cannot be pinpointed, at the least it is known that privacy 
is one of the factors that discourages comp lainants from coming forward. 
 
 As well, the emergence of a privacy right in Chapter Three’s trilogy of cases provides a 
jurisprudential context and analogy for privacy in the open court context.  At the time, Canadian 
Newspapers v.  Canada (A.G.) was decided, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on 
victim privacy. By granting victim privacy Charter status, the O’Connor dissent and Mills 
decision may affect the balancing of interests the next time privacy and open court are in 
conflict.  At the same time, some words of qualification should be added.  Privacy emerged as an 
entitlement in Chapter Three’s trilogy, in response to a history of discriminatory practices.  
Sexual offences were different, and were subject to rules of evidence that were based o n myths 
and stereotypes which discriminated against complainants and violated their privacy.  As a 
result, Seaboyer, O’Connor and Mills are part of a judicial and legislative process which is aimed 
at rectifying this blot on the criminal justice system.  To summarize, the privacy of several 
assault victims was uniquely violated and now must be restored.  
 
 The above analysis is not as compelling in the open court setting.  To the extent their 
identity and privacy are protected by Criminal Code provisions, sexual assault complainants are 
granted preferential or special treatment by the system.  Whatever the consequences for their 
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privacy, the victims of other crimes are not entitled to a publication ban protecting their identity, 
and persuading a judge to close the courtroom in the interest of privacy would be even more 
difficult.  That raises the question whether sexual offences are by their nature different, and 
therefore subject to distinctive rules for the benefit of victim privacy.  Another way of putting the 
question is to ask whether victim privacy in this area is a short -term remedy for the myths and 
stereotypes of the past, or whether these offences warrant permanent exceptions to the open court 
principle.  Before pursuing that question in Chapter Five,  the next Chapter explores comparative, 
transnational and international perspectives on these issues.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Comparative, transnational and international perspectives 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This Chapter on comparative, transnational and international perspectives is necessarily  
impressionistic.  Generally, the movement to establish rights for the victims of crime in Canada 
is reflected in developments around the world.  Many countries have endorsed bills of rights,  
charters, and declarations which are a imed at improving the status of victims.  As well, statutory 
measures have addressed their many grievances, granted them rights of participation in the  
criminal justice system, and provided access to compensation or restitution.  Internationally, the 
rights of victims have been recognized by the United Nations, and are reflected in the procedures 
adopted by the International War Crimes Tribunal.  
 
 Though privacy is an issue for the victims of crime, it is not a dominant concern.   
Parallels to the issues and  developments canvassed in Chapters Two and Three above can be  
found, however, in the law relating to sexual offences.  Even so, the non -domestic materials on 
victim privacy and open court are uneven and asymmetrical.  Jurisdictions, which differ  
fundamentally in their conception of criminal justice, approach these issues from distinctive  
perspectives.  For that reason, and also due to gaps in the information, the discussion in this  
Chapter can only offer a bare survey on the status of victims in legal syst ems which are either 
civilian or inquisitorial in nature.  
  
 From a comparative perspective, Canada stands between the common law tradition of  
Britain and other commonwealth countries like Australia and New Zealand, and the  
constitutional tradition of the United States. Developments in commonwealth jurisdictions which 
lack a regime of constitutional rights are statutory in nature.   To the extent privacy was not  
recognized, traditionally, as a valid basis for derogating from openness, that position has been  
altered by legislation.  As a result, changes to Canada’s  Criminal Code, which deal with victim 
anonymity as well as with privacy and confidentiality in sexual assault proceedings, can be  
found elsewhere, albeit with local variations.  
 
 Meanwhile, by emp owering the courts to invalidate statutory provisions and court orders 
inconsistent with the open court principle,  the Charter of Rights and Freedoms changed the way 
those issues are analyzed.  Canada’s constitutionalization of that principle renders the American 
experience instructive; while there are points of difference between the two countries, there are 
similarities, too.  For instance, parallels to Charter guarantees are found in the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedom  of the press, and the Sixth Amendment,  
which protects a public trial. 1  Much like the  Charter, the American Bill of Rights fails to  
include any right of privacy.  At the same time, privacy interests have been granted constitutional 
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protection.  Even so, and in deference to the First Amendment and the principle of  
accountability, the U.S. jurisprudence has struck a different balance, one which is reluctant to  
permit exceptions to the open court that would protect the privacy of victims.  The question the 
American jurisprudence raises is whether the  Charter’s interpretation will evolve in that  
direction and adopt an uncompromising commitment to open court; otherwise, the Supreme  
Court of Canada might continue to treat victim privacy as the co -equal of other Charter rights, 
including s.2(b) and its protection of open court. 
 The discussion begins by outlining key points of comparison between common law and 
non-common law systems of criminal justice.  It is followed by an account which identifies the 
general elements of statutory protection for victim privacy in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand.  The Third part of the Chapter explores the relationship between the open court  
principle and victim privacy under the U.S. Constitution.  
 
1.  Non common law jurisdictions 
 The rise of victims’ rights movements in the United States prompted interest in  
comparative analysis.  For these and perhaps other reasons, there is a  secondary literature in the 
English language which describes, reviews and analyzes deve lopments in other legal systems.  
Yet this literature is more scattershot than systematic, and the information that is drawn from it 
does not provide a complete picture.  Moreover, articles discussing the role of victims in  
European and socialist systems ar e only tangentially concerned with privacy issues.  As well, it 
should be noted that civilian and inquisitorial models of criminal justice rest on assumptions and 
procedures which differ, fundamentally, from those that describe common law jurisdictions.   
 
 At least historically, an adversarial conception of the criminal trial treated victims and  
witnesses, essentially, as outsiders rather than as participants.  Vindicating their interests was not 
the central objective of the trial, and their stake in the o utcome was secondary to that of the state 
and the notional community at large.  By contrast, legal systems, which do not subscribe to a  
bipolar model of criminal justice, are not required, by their underlying assumptions, to minimize 
the victim’s role or e xclude that person from the process. In Russia, for example, the victim not 
only has rights, but actively participates in the criminal trial.  This includes the right to question 
witnesses and the accused. One author reports witnessing trials “where the ro le of the victim was 
to frequently interrupt with shouted accusations that had no role in a ‘fair’ criminal trial.” 2 
 
 At least in Europe, one of three models for victim participation will generally be found.  
In some jurisdictions, the victim has the righ t to prosecute the crime or participate, to some  
degree, in the prosecution.3  One form of participation, which is examined further below, enables 
the victim to serve as a subsidiary or supporting prosecutor.  Otherwise, in countries which  
include France, the victim may present a civil claim in the course of a criminal proceeding.  Such 
a claim is termed a  partie civille or, in jurisdictions with a German legal tradition, may be  
designated as “adhesive” in nature. 4  Finally, some countries treat the victim,  effectively, as a  
witness and no more.5  Though it strays from the subject of victim privacy and open court, a brief 
discussion of Germany’s  Nebenklage process follows, for it demonstrates a conception of the  
victim that is quite foreign to common law sys tems.  It is of particular interest that the  
Nebenklagerin, or subsidiary prosecutor, can invoke the process when the crime which has been 
committed is a sexual offence.  
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 Roughly, Nebenklagerin means “secondary accuser” or subsidiary prosecutor. 6  The  
procedure known as Nebenklage permits victims to participate through counsel at trial on nearly 
equal footing with lawyers for the state and the defense.  Note, parenthetically, how  
unprecedented it was, in Chapter Three, for the Supreme Court of Canada to agree that the  
privacy rights of complainants are on a par with the rights of the accused.  The question there  
arose in the limited context of rules of evidence and the defendant’s access to information about 
the complainant. From that perspective, it is cl ear that  Nebenklage contemplates a more  
innovative process, in which the victim is an active participant throughout the criminal process, 
including the investigative stages of proceedings.  In this it is interesting that the Federal  
Constitutional Court re jected a challenge to the institution of the victim -plaintiff, which was  
raised on the ground that the procedure interfered with the rights of criminal defendants.  This 
result reinforces the point that civilian systems can treat the victim as a party to t he proceedings 
without upsetting the contest mentality that defines criminal justice in common law systems.  
 
 The Nebenklagerin is entitled to participate at the investigative stage.  Not only is the  
victim and his or her lawyer granted access to the inve stigatory files of the police and the  
prosecutor, the victim’s interest in participating in pre -trial proceedings is recognized in other  
ways.  The victim-plaintiff is entitled to be present throughout the trial, and may ask questions at 
trial through a la wyer.  Counsel for the victim is also permitted to make a closing statement, but 
in doing so generally does not address the question of sentence.  
 
 Although Nebenklage has been a part of German criminal procedure since 1877, major  
reforms expanded the cate gory of crimes in which the victim was entitled to participate as a  
secondary accuser.  As they might not otherwise be prosecuted,  Nebenklage was originally  
aimed at and reserved for more minor offences.  Then in 1986 the  Victim Protection Law 
extended the  victim’s direct participation to crimes considered particularly serious, and victim -
plaintiff status is “now seen as an opportunity for injured parties thought to be particularly  
worthy of protection to pursue justice on their own behalf”. 7  Significantly , the 1986 legislation 
added sexual assault to the list of crimes that are eligible for Nebenklage. 
 
 Though the procedure is invoked by victims in a relatively small number of cases, the  
exception to this is sexual offences, where there has been a conside rable increase in the  
percentage of victims who participate as secondary accusers.  These victims may seek their own 
legal representation “due to the highly personal and demeaning nature of the crime, as well as the 
nature of such trials, where it is not u nusual for the character or reputation of the victim to come 
under attack”.8  In the circumstances, the decision to include sexual assault in the reform statute  
of 1986 was an important recognition of the special problems these victims face in court.  
 
 Victim-plaintiffs who invoke this status are visible participants in the trial of the  
defendant.  Though it is their choice to be active in the process, doing so does not mean that their 
privacy must be sacrificed.  Whether as victim or as victim -plaintiff, the complainant in a sexual 
assault case may apply to exclude the public during her testimony.  The request will normally be 
granted unless the public’s interest in hearing the testimony outweighs the interest of the victim. 9 
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 This brief discussion does not offer an evaluation of  Nebenklage or other variations on  
the role and status of the victim in jurisdictions which are not based on the common law  
assumption of a two party contest between the state and the accused.  It does illustrate, however, 
that victims are granted rights of participation, in varying degrees, in other legal systems.  In the 
common law world, extending rights and powers to the victims of crimes would undoubtedly be 
resisted on the ground that such changes would upset the balance of th e criminal justice system  
and disadvantage or even create unfairness for the accused.  Such concerns are a familiar theme 
in the American literature.  The comparative point here is that the Supreme Court of Canada’s  
recognition of victim privacy in Chapter  Three is, alongside Germany’s  Nebenklage, a modest  
development.  Though the rights of victims have gained a foothold in common law systems,  
those who are the victims of crime are still regarded as third parties.  Changing that status and 
granting victims  a stronger role in the proceedings would require a re -conceptualization of the  
criminal trial at common law. 
 
Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand 
 The overview of common law jurisdictions which follows is more focused on privacy  
and, in particular, the anonymity of sexual assault victims.  Albeit with local variations,  
protecting the identity of these victims can be described as a widely accepted statutory exception 
to the open court principle in Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.  In none of  these 
countries is there a system of constitutional rights analogous to that either of Canada or the  
United States.  For that reason there is little jurisprudence on the question of open court versus 
victim privacy.  The statutory provisions state the law,  and although questions of application may 
arise, the law itself cannot be challenged in court.  
 
 As noted in Chapter Two, the open court principle is a common law concept which finds 
its roots in a long -standing tradition of British justice.  Though exce ptions to publicity and open 
courts were recognized at common law, victim privacy was not among them. 10  Thus in Britain, 
“where the tabloid newspapers give huge coverage to sexual offences”, any woman “could count 
on the whole country knowing who she was and what had been done to her”. 11  In due course,  
this was “too nauseating for even English public taste” 12 and in 1976 Parliament passed a law  
which made it an offence to disclose a rape victim’s identity. 13   
 
 Gaps in the law quickly became apparent, howeve r.  The statutory ban did not apply until 
a person had been accused, which meant that the victim could be identified up until her attacker 
became known.  In one case, a newspaper ran a photo of a clergyman’s daughter attending  
church, not long after she ha d been raped in her father’s vicarage by burglars. 14  She could be  
identified under the then existing provision because the gang of burglars was still at large. The  
law was soon amended to protect the victim’s identity from the time the commission of an  
offence is reported.15  Second, the ban initially applied only to those who are victims of rape, and 
has now been amended to include the victims of other offences, such as buggery, indecent  
assault, and incest.16 
 
 In addition to the distinctive statutory measu res that protect victims of sexual offences, 
legislation permits the court to prohibit the identification of a child. 17  The victims of other  
offences are occasionally protected by a judge’s discretionary power to forbid the publication of 
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an individual’s identity.  At common law, the court has a general power to order that a name be 
withheld; this kind of order is often considered appropriate, for example, in a blackmail case. 18 
 
 More generally, it appears that the advent of victims’ rights is relatively re cent in  
Britain.  The Victim’s Charter, released in 1990, confers no rights or privileges but merely lists 
the ways in which the criminal justice system “ought” to be sensitive to the victim’s position. 19  
Though there has been “an enormous growth of new po licies and provision for victims and  
witnesses in the U.K.”, progress is slow. 20  For example, fear of aggressive, humiliating and  
irrelevant questioning in court has been cited as the largest single factor in prompting women to 
withdraw complaints of sexua l offences. 21  As of 1997, the conviction rate for rape was in  
decline, despite s.2 of the  Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, which introduced a rape -shield 
provision broadly akin to the measure considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in  R. v. 
Seaboyer.22 
 
 One of the reasons the British law is perceived to be a failure is that cross -examination on 
a complainant’s sexual history is within the discretion of the judge.  In the circumstances,  
witnesses can never be sure, in advance of trial, whether they will fa ce humiliating and intimate 
questions about their personal lives.  A similar issue was discussed in Chapter Two’s analysis of 
the Criminal Code’s mandatory ban on victim identification.  There, Canada’s Supreme Court  
held that a discretionary ban was inade quate to provide victims the protection they sought in  
deciding whether to report an offence.  Likewise, Canada has adopted statutory provisions which 
severely limit the accused’s freedom to question complainants about their past sexual history.  
    
 Meanwhile, as occurred elsewhere, concern for the victims of crime rose in Australia too, 
and inquiries were commissioned to report on their status in the criminal justice process during 
the 1980s.  As a result, all state governments issued declarations or char ters of victims’ rights. 23  
Parenthetically, it should be noted that, like Canada and the United States, Australia is a  
federation.  Though the federal government has jurisdiction over the criminal law in Canada, it is 
the reverse both in Australia and the United States, where the states have that authority.  Instead 
of one system of criminal law that is national in scope, these countries have a number of systems 
which function independently of each other.  In any case, without creating entitlements for  
victims or enforceable duties on others, these “charters” provide guidelines for the treatment of  
victims.  Typically, these instruments state that victims should be treated with courtesy and  
compassion and with respect for their dignity; that victims should be kept informed, at various  
stages and about various elements of the process; and that the privacy of victims should be  
protected.24  For instance, the Victims Rights Act of New South Wales provides, as do others, that 
a victim’s residential address and tel ephone number should not be disclosed unless a court  
otherwise directs.25 
 
 In addition, there are statutes which address the problems of law enforcement of sexual  
offences.  Like Canada, Australia has broadened the scope of sexual assault and debated the  
question of consent.  As well, all states have adopted special rules to limit the cross -examination 
of victims on their prior sexual history. 26  For instance, Queensland’s  Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Act not only prohibits evidence of the complainant’s re putation and prior sexual  
history,27 it requires the public to be excluded from the courtroom during the complainant’s  
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testimony.28  Likewise, the statute places a mandatory ban on the publication of any information 
which might identify the complainant, unle ss the court, “for good and sufficient reasons shown”, 
orders to the contrary.29  Interestingly, s.7 of the Act also prohibits the publication of information 
which would identify the defendant prematurely. 30 
 
 New Zealand’s response is consistent with develo pments in Britain and Australia.   
There, too, statutory measures prohibit the publication of names in specified sexual offences, and 
permits a ban on the publication of names in certain other circumstances.  Otherwise, there is  
some case law in New Zealand  on the question whether and when name suppression is  
appropriate for an accused.  In  R. v. Liddell, which is a leading case, the court held that the  
privacy interests of the offender’s family rarely justify an order suppressing disclosure of his  
identity.31  In considering the statutory powers to prohibit the publication of names, the court  
said that, “the starting point must always be the importance in a democracy of freedom of  
speech, open judicial proceedings, and the right of the media to report the lat ter fairly”.32  Citing 
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, the court also noted that those principles may be seen in “vigorous 
- and, to some, even startling  - operation in the Supreme Court of Canada....” 33  In the  
circumstances, the New Zealand appellate court wa s reluctant to concede too much to the  
privacy interests of the offender’s wife and two children.  As the court observed:  
 
But anguish to the innocent family of an offender is an inevitable result of many  
convictions for serious crime.  Only in an extraord inary case could it outweigh, in 
relation to the reporting of the name of a person convicted of a serious crime, the 
general principle of open justice and the open reporting of justice. 34 
  
 To summarize, each of Britain, Australia and New Zealand has taken  steps, by statutory 
enactment, to protect the identity of sexual assault victims.  In addition, other systemic law  
enforcement problems in this area have been addressed through modification to the definition of 
the offence, as well as to the rules of evid ence which govern the cross -examination of  
complainants.  In the absence of any constitutional guarantee of expressive or press freedom, the 
protection of victim identity has been relatively uncontroversial in these countries.  By contrast, 
publication ban s are virtually unavailable in the United States, and access to the courts is  
likewise given strong protection by the U.S. Constitution.  
 
The United States of America 
Introduction 
 As in post-Charter Canada, the resolution of these issues in the United States is governed 
by constitutional considerations.  By way of introduction, a few points of information about U.S. 
constitutionalism may help to set the discussion in perspective.  It is useful to know, for example, 
that different rules of federalism apply to the systems of criminal justice in Canada and the  
United States. By virtue of s.91(27), the Constitution Act, 1867 grants Canada’s  federal  
government authority over the criminal law and criminal procedure? 35  As a result, the Criminal 
Code and other cri minal law statutes enacted by the federal government apply in all parts of the 
country. 
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 By contrast, the American Constitution does not grant the U.S. government a similar  
criminal law power.  Under their model of federalism, all powers not expressly de legated to the 
national government by the Constitution are reserved to the states.  The states’ plenary authority 
over all else that is not granted to the national government is referred to, in the American  
constitutional tradition, as the “police power.”   To compare, there is one system of criminal  
justice in Canada, but fifty - plus one - in the United States: one for each of the states, as well as 
one that is federal in nature.  That feature of U.S. federalism makes it cumbersome to review  
statutory prov isions on open court which govern in fifty jurisdictions.  Some uniformity on  
questions of open court and victim privacy is achieved, however, through constitutional  
interpretation, as state laws which violate the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendm ent’s 
guarantees of free speech and a free press, are unconstitutional.  
 
 Like s.2(b) of Canada’s  Charter, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution  
guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 36  Unlike the  Charter, though, the  
American Bill of Rights has no provision like s.1, which permits limits on rights to accommodate 
democratic values.  Though rights are not absolute and are subject to judge -made limits, the First 
Amendment has been granted strong protection by the U.S. Supreme Court.  A n example, which 
affects the open court principle, is the presumption against publication bans, which is deeply  
entrenched in the American jurisprudence.  A ban on the publication of information is a form of 
prior restraint and, as such, is regarded as a particularly insidious form of censorship.  Banning 
publication halts expressive activity in advance, before it is known whether it will have harmful 
effects or consequences.  Meantime, the  Charter case law has not yet adopted a similar  
presumption against such bans: while some have been invalidated under the Charter, others have 
been upheld.37  The discussion below demonstrates how difficult it is to sustain a publication ban 
under the First Amendment.  
 
 In addition, the balancing of values that takes place  under the Charter does not occur in 
the same way under the First Amendment.  That is, in part, because the U.S. text has no  
limitations clause and, in part, because the First Amendment itself is framed in the language of  
an absolute guarantee.  Culturally and historically, it has been considered the first freedom or the 
“matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of  [freedom].” 38  As important a 
value as it may be, privacy does not have the same status as freedom of speech or the press.   
Though it, like its Canadian counterpart, has been granted a measure of recognition in the  
jurisprudence, it is not explicitly protected by the constitutional text. 39  Ironically, a civil right of 
action for the invasion of privacy exists in all U.S. stat es, and has generated a considerable tort 
jurisprudence.  In Canada, where the Supreme Court has been sympathetic to victim privacy in 
criminal proceedings, it is more difficult to bring a civil action for the invasion of privacy. 40  
Under the Charter, however, our Court has protected the privacy of crime victims and placed the 
privacy of complainants in sexual assault proceedings on the same plane as the rights of the  
accused.  By contrast, in the United States, the First Amendment has consistently prevaile d over 
privacy on open court issues.   
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Publicity versus anonymity 
 In contrast to Canada, where the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory ban on victim  
identity in  Canadian Newspapers v.  Canada (A.G.), the U.S. Supreme Court has favoured the 
right to publish  over an individual’s freedom from unwanted publicity.  In each of four cases  
considered below, the American Court held that the press could not be held criminally or civilly 
responsible for disclosing an individual’s identity.  Two of the four cases, Oklahoma Publishing 
Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court,41 and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.42, concerned 
the identity of juveniles who were accused of criminal offences; each arose in the context of  
statutory provisions which regulated the disclosure of  a youth’s identity.  Two others,  Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,43 and The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,44 raised the question whether the  
press could be held civilly liable for disclosing the identity of a rape victim.  
  
 Certain principles emerge from this group  of cases.  First and foremost, the First  
Amendment protects the press from being punished for publishing truthful information on a  
question of interest to the public.  Under that principle, and assuming that a victim or juvenile  
offender is correctly identified, the only debating point is whether the information is of interest to 
the public.  Moreover, the press cannot be faulted for publishing information it obtained from the 
state.  If the press cannot be held accountable for disclosing information the s tate made available, 
it follows that protecting a victim’s privacy is the state’s responsibility, and not that of the press.  
Finally, the state has control of the information and has the power to protect a victim or a  
juvenile’s identity: information is o nly publicized when the state fails to protect the individual’s 
anonymity.  In such circumstances, the victim’s remedy should be against the state, and not the 
press.   
 
 The first of the four,  Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, is an influential decision. 45  There,  the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a television station could not be held civilly liable for broadcasting 
the name of a rape victim, which the reporter had obtained from the indictments against the  
accused.  The documents were public records and had been ma de available for inspection in the 
courtroom.  In addressing the competing interests, White J. observed that “the century has  
experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so -called right of privacy”, 46 but also that the 
privacy claim confronted the co nstitutional freedoms of speech and the press.  Framed by those 
considerations, the question was whether the state could impose sanctions for the accurate  
publication of the name of a rape victim, obtained from records which were made open to public 
inspection. 
 
 Many years before LaForest J. would make similar comments in  C.B.C. v. New 
Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson), White J. acknowledged that “[g]reat responsibility is [] placed  
upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of governmen t, and official 
records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.” 47  As 
well, he indicated that, “even the prevailing law of invasion of privacy recognizes that the  
interests in privacy fade when the information involv ed already appears on the public record.” 48   
Mr. Justice White went on to surmise that the state must have concluded that the public interest 
was being served by placing the information in the public domain on official court records.  Such 
records “by thei r very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of  
government, and a public benefit is conferred by the reporting of the true contents of the records 
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by the media.”49  Not only was the press discharging its constitutional function, he concluded, in 
doing so it conferred a benefit on the public. To encourage a rule that made public records  
generally available and then forbade their publication would under this analysis make it difficult 
for the media to inform citizens about the public business. The result would be to invite “timidity 
and self-censorship”50 on the part of the press. 
 
 Mr. Justice White’s opinion in  Cox Broadcasting made it clear that, in the American  
jurisprudence, the conflict is between the press and the state, not th e press and the victim.  He  
explained that dynamic in the following terms:  
 
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States  
must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of  
private information.   Their political institutions must weigh the interests in  
privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish.  Once 
true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, 
the press  cannot be sanctioned  for publishing it.  In this instance as in other  
reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or to  
broadcast.51 
 
 The next two decisions arose when members of the press published a juvenile offender’s 
identity, contrary to statu tory provisions which prohibited disclosure.   Although neither  
addresses the issue of victim privacy, both entrenched the principles that were introduced by Cox 
Broadcasting.  In the first,  Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma District Court, the U.S.  
Supreme Court struck down an order enjoining the press from publishing the name or picture of 
the defendant.52   There, a juvenile’s name, which was disclosed during a detention hearing, was 
published by newspapers, as well as by radio and television stations.   Subsequently, at the  
accused’s arraignment hearing, the judge enjoined publication of his name and picture.   
Although state legislation authorized the order, the U.S. Supreme Court declared it an  
unconstitutional prior restraint.   
 
 In reaching that conc lusion, the Court relied on  Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart, which,  
one year earlier, placed strict limits on the availability of pre -trial publication bans. 53  The  
principle from Nebraska, that information disclosed in a public hearing cannot be the subject of a 
prior restraint, was directly applicable in Oklahoma Publishing.  Cox Broadcasting also applied 
because the juvenile’s name and picture were publicly revealed at the detention hearing, with the 
full knowledge of the presiding judge, the prosecutor, an d the defence counsel.  Despite the  
state’s legislation, which required juvenile hearings to be held in private and permitted  
restrictions on access to records, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “Cox and  Nebraska are  
controlling nonetheless.”54 It was a simp le matter of applying the rule from Nebraska Press, that 
once a hearing is public the information disclosed cannot be subject to a prior restraint, and the 
principle of  Cox Broadcasting, that the press cannot be punished for publishing truthful  
information that is lawfully obtained.  
 
 Oklahoma Publishing was followed, within two years, by Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Co.55 On facts which were not entirely dissimilar, the Supreme Court arrived at the same  
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conclusion.  Once again, newspapers and radio stati ons had published the name of a juvenile  
who was arrested in connection with a shooting.  West Virginia legislation prohibited the  
publication of any juvenile offender’s name without the prior approval of the juvenile court.  The 
difference was that in Daily Mail, indictments were returned against members of the press which 
had violated the prohibition. 
 
 The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the statutory provision was in itself a 
prior restraint, for “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can  
satisfy constitutional standards.” 56  Neither  Cox Broadcasting nor  Oklahoma Publishing was  
directly controlling, as in each case the government provided or made possible press access to  
the information.  In  Daily Mail, the juvenile’s identity was obtained through routine newspaper 
reporting techniques.  Though it recognized the connection between confidentiality and  
rehabilitation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the interest was not strong enough to support the 
imposition of a criminal penalty.57 
 
 Rehnquist J. disagreed with the Court’s analysis.  In his view, a state’s interest in  
preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders far outweighed any minimal interference with 
freedom of the press that a ban on publication of y ouths’ names entailed.  In discussing the right 
to publish a juvenile’s name, he made the following remarks:  
 
The press is free to describe the details of the offense and inform the community 
of the proceedings against the juvenile.  It is difficult to understand how 
publication of the youth’s name is in any way necessary to performance of the 
press’ “watchdog” role.  In those rare instances where the press believes it is  
necessary to publish the juvenile’s name [the law] permits the juvenile court judge 
to allow publication. [That judge], unlike the press, is capable of determining  
whether publishing the name of the particular young person will have a  
deleterious effect on his chances for rehabilitation and adjustment to society’s  
norms. 58 
 
A question that is deferred for the moment to Chapter Five, is whether the name of an individual 
is a relevant piece of information for purposes of the accountability principle, which is so central 
to the concept of open court.  Though he supported anonymity, Mr. Justice Rehnquist agreed in 
the result because the legislation, in applying only to newspapers and not to the electronic media, 
was incapable of accomplishing its objective and was therefore constitutionally flawed.  
 
 Though the outcome was more controversial than  in Cox Broadcasting , the Court held a 
second time, in  The Florida Star v. B.J.F., that the press could not be held responsible, civilly, 
for publishing the name of a rape victim. 59  Unlike the victim in Cox Broadcasting, the plaintiff 
in The Florida Star was not killed, and suffered some harassment following the publication of  
her identity.  Her name was published in violation of a Florida statute, in contravention of signs 
posted in the pressroom which made it clear that the names of rape victims are not  matters of 
public record, and in violation of the newspaper’s own internal policy.  Notwithstanding those  
damaging facts, the key consideration for a majority of the Court was that the reporter obtained 
the victim’s name from a police report which was plac ed in the Police Department’s press room.  
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While a majority held, in the circumstances, that the paper’s right to publish fell within the  
principle of  Cox Broadcasting, three members of the Court dissented on the ground that the  
earlier decision was “wholly distinguishable” and did not apply.  
 
 The question was whether the earlier trilogy of decisions  - Cox, Oklahoma Publishing, 
and the  Daily Mail - were inapplicable, both because the information in the other cases had  
appeared on a “public record”, and bec ause the privacy interests there were less profound than in 
The Florida Star.  Given that “press freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly rooted in the  
traditions and significant concerns of our society’”, and the “sensitivity and significance of the  
interests” presented in clashes between the two, the majority opinion by Marshall J. emphasized 
the decision to rely on limited principles that would sweep no more broadly than the case at  
hand.60 
 
 In doing so, the Court synthesized three principles from th e trilogy: first, that the  
government retained ample other means of safeguarding significant interests which might be  
compromised by publicity, including a rape victim’s identity; second, that once the government 
has made information publicly available, it  is not only anomalous to sanction persons other than 
the source, it is unlikely that a meaningful public interest is served by restricting its further  
release; and third, that to threaten repercussions against those who relied on “the government’s  
implied representation of the lawfulness of dissemination” would foster “timidity and self -
censorship” on the part of an uncertain press. 61  Applied to B.J.F.’s circumstances, and despite 
the “tragic reality of rape”, the First Amendment protected the publication of truthful information 
which was lawfully obtained.  To mute the force of the dissent, however, the majority opinion  
stressed the narrow and limited nature of its ruling:  
 
We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally  
protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may 
protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never 
punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.  We hold only that 
where a newspaper publishes truthful information which is has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may be lawfully imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a  
state interest of the highest order....62 
 
 The dissenting opinion of White J. began with a powerful reminder that “[s]hort of  
homicide, rape is the ‘ultimate violation of self’”. 63  In his view, the trilogy cases were “wholly 
distinguishable”; while the victim’s identity in  Cox Broadcasting was found by consulting  
public, judicial records, according to the statute,  as well as police and press practice, the  
information in The Florida Star was private rather than public.  As for Oklahoma Publishing and 
Daily Mail, White J. remarked that “[s]urely the right of those accused of crimes and those who 
are their victims must differ with respect to privacy concerns.”64  
 
 In disagreeing with the way the majority opinion struck the balance between competing 
values, he found “a place to draw the line higher on the hillside”, a spot which, in his view, was 
“high enough to protect  B.J.F.’s desire for privacy and peace -of-mind in the wake of a horrible 
personal tragedy.” 65   In stating that “there is  no public interest  in publishing the names, 
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addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of crime”, he agreed with the  
views expressed by Rehnquist J. in Daily Mail.66  Likewise, White J. could not understand what 
public interest would be served in immunizing the press from liability in the rare cases where a 
state’s efforts to protect a victim’s privacy had failed. 67 
 
 The principle that the government cannot punish the publication of truthful information  
that is lawfully obtained is strongly entrenched in the American jurisprudence.  In each of these 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court faulted the state for allowing the informati on to become public, 
and then estopped the state from punishing members of the press, either by criminal or civil  
means, for then publicizing it.  In this, there is a significant difference between the Canadian and 
American responses to the question of vic tim privacy in sexual assault proceedings.  As Chapter 
Two demonstrated, publication bans which protect the identity of victims are not only  
permissible but mandatory under the Criminal Code.  In addition, there are different perceptions 
of what is at stak e in the Canadian and American constitutional systems.  In the American  
tradition, publication bans are seen as a conflict between the state and the press, and less  
emphasis is placed on the relationship between the victim and the press.  By contrast, the  
question in Canada is whether the state can mediate the competing interests of the press and the 
victims of crime.  Not only that, it is not unusual in Canada for information to be made available 
at trial, on condition that it not be disclosed or published .  For instance, it is routine to ban the 
publication of evidence that is disclosed at the preliminary inquiry. The First Amendment  
assumes differently, though, that once the state reveals information it cannot subsequently ban its 
disclosure.  Finally, it  should be noted that the rationale which the Court adopted in  Canadian 
Newspaper v.  Canada (A.G.), that anonymity was necessary to encourage complainants to come 
forward, was not before the Court in  Cox Broadcasting or  The Florida Star.  In the two  
American cases that discussed a rape victim’s anonymity, the issue arose through a civil action 
for invasion of privacy, and not in the course of a criminal trial.  
 
 At the same time, two qualifications to the apparent rigidity of the First Amendment’s  
position should be noted.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that its rulings in these  
decisions were narrow and did not foreclose limits on publicity to protect the anonymity of  
victims.  The Court inferred that privacy can be protected, providing that th e measures taken  
interfere, to the least extent possible, with the First Amendment.  Second, there is an important 
divergence between principle and practice in the United States.  Though the press is free, under 
governing Supreme Court authority, to publis h accurate information which is lawfully obtained, 
in practice, the press voluntarily declines to publish the names of rape victims in most cases.  
 
Access to the courts 
 On access to the courtroom, the landmark U.S. decision is  Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia.68  The issue for decision there was whether a criminal trial could be closed to the  
public, at the defendant’s request, and without any evidence of a threat to his right to a fair trial, 
or of some other overriding consideration.  Citing an “unbroken, uncontradicted history”, which 
is supported by reasons “as valid today as in centuries past”, Chief Justice Burger held that, “ a  
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial.” 69  Not only does  
openness provide assurance that the proceedings are conducted fairly, it discourages perjury, the 
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. 70  In addition, the  
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U.S. Chief Justice maintained that public trials have “significant community therapeutic value”. 71  
That is to say, the open processes of justice serve the important prophylactic purpose of  
providing “an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion”; public trials also vindicate 
“the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done”, as well as  “the urge for retribution”.72 
 
 The Court’s lengthy discussion of openness led to the principle that “[a]bsent an  
overriding interest articulated in findings”, criminal trials must be open to the public. 73  The  
problem in Richmond Newspapers was that the trial judge made no findings of fact to support the 
closure order, and failed to consider whether alternative measures would have met the need to  
ensure fairness.   As a result, the two prerequisites for an order excluding the public are the  
presence of an overriding interest, and the absence of any viable alternative means to protect that 
interest, short of closure.    The  Richmond Newspapers standard is more demanding, but at the  
same time is not unlike the criteria La Forest J. proposed under s.486(1) of t he Criminal Code in 
C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson)).74 
 
 Conflict between the privacy of sexual assault victims and the open court principle arose 
shortly thereafter in  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.75  The question in  Globe 
Newspaper was  whether the First Amendment prohibited the mandatory closure of trials, for  
certain sexual offences, during the testimony of victims under age 18.  After reviewing the  
underlying values of openness, Brennan J. indicated that to deny access to inhibit the disclosure 
of sensitive information, the state must show that the denial is “necessitated by a compelling  
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”. 76  In other words, an order 
to close a courtroom is subject, in American const itutional terminology, to strict scrutiny.   
Practically speaking, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a closure order to survive 
once strict scrutiny is applied.  The statutory provision at issue in  Globe Newspaper failed  
because Brennan J.  concluded for a majority that mandatory closure was not necessary; a trial  
court could instead determine whether closure would protect the welfare of a minor on a case to 
case basis.  Note, parenthetically, that this is what occurs in Canada through the c ombination of 
s.486(1) of the Criminal Code and the C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) criteria. 
 
 Significantly, Brennan J. rejected the suggestion that mandatory closure was permissible 
because it would encourage victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide  accurate 
testimony.  In doing so, he noted that the state provided no empirical support for its claim that 
automatic closure would lead to an increase in the number of minor victims coming forward and 
cooperating with state authorities.  Not only did he vi ew the proposition as speculative, he stated 
that it is “also open to serious question as a matter of logic and common sense,” because the  
press was not denied access to the transcript or other sources of information about the victim’s 
testimony.77  As well , Brennan J. was reluctant to recognize any exception which would run  
contrary to the right of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers.  In any case, he noted that 
even if mandatory closure encouraged these victims to come forward, the same could be said of 
other crime victims. 
 
Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex crimes are the only crime 
victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to  
come forward and testify.  The State’s argument based on this intere st therefore 
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proves too much, and runs contrary to the very foundation of the right of access 
recognized in Richmond Newspapers....78 
 
In comparing sex crime victims to the victims of other crimes, Brennan J. at least implicitly  
rejected the proposition tha t the victims of these offences are vulnerable in ways that set them  
apart. Meanwhile, in dissent Rehnquist J. complained of the majority opinion’s “wooden  
application” of a “rigid standard”. 79  Given that the press and public would have access to the  
victim’s testimony through transcripts, he claimed that  “[t]heir additional interest in actually  
being present during the testimony is minimal”. 80  As far as he was concerned, the law had a  
minimal impact on First Amendment rights.  Moreover, he characterized t he Court’s dismissal of 
the under reporting rationale as an instance of “cavalier disregard for the reality of human  
experience”.81   
 
 Albeit on a question of closure, Globe Newspaper is reminiscent of the debate that took 
place in  Canadian Newspapers v. Canada, between the Ontario Court of Appeal and the  
Supreme Court of Canada, on the question of a mandatory versus a discretionary publication  
ban.82  In  Globe Newspaper, Rehnquist J. was unwilling to “leave the closure determination to 
the idiosyncrasies of  individual judges”. 83  Like Lamer J. in Canadian Newspapers, he referred 
to the uncertainties in the victim’s mind prior to the trial, and noted that “[t]he mere possibility of 
public testimony may cause parents and children not to report these heinous cri mes”.84  Though 
in dissent, Rehnquist J. concluded that it was within the state’s power to provide for mandatory 
closure to alleviate understandable fears and encourage the reporting of such crimes.  In  
Canadian Newspapers, however, Mr. Justice Lamer wrote  the Supreme Court of Canada’s  
majority opinion. 
  
 Both the United States and Canada contemplate that proceedings can be closed in some 
circumstances.  Under the American jurisprudence, however, the case for closure must be close 
to invincible; the state i nterest must be compelling, it must be supported by empirical evidence, 
and the Court must be satisfied that the interest cannot be satisfied in any other way but closure.  
Though C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson) also set a high threshold, it is not as strict as 
the doctrine that has emerged under the First Amendment.  The American jurisprudence also  
endorses a broader conception of what the public interest is and how it is protected by the First 
Amendment.  Whether the public has a sufficient int erest in being physically present in the  
courtroom or in knowing a victim’s identity raise policy questions that are pursued in Chapter  
Five. 
 
Conclusion 
 Comparative and transnational perspectives are of some assistance in understanding the  
choices that are presented when the principle of open court conflicts with the demands of victim 
privacy.  In that regard, differences in practice from one system to another can be as revealing as 
similarities.  For instance, even a limited review of civilian and other models of criminal justice 
demonstrates that victims are not, by unavoidable definition, third parties in the trial process.   
They can be and are treated as participants in some jurisdictions; under Germany’s institution of 
Nebenklage, the victim-plaintiff can play a role as secondary or subsidiary prosecutor.   
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According the victims of crime such status would, however, be inconsistent with the governing 
assumptions of criminal justice in common law jurisdictions.  
 
 On first impression, the British and Com monwealth systems might be expected to  
provide the closest analogy for Canada.  And it is true that many of the Criminal Code’s reforms, 
which enhance the status of victims and complainants in sexual assault proceedings, will also be 
found in British, Aust ralian and New Zealand law.  Yet the same debate between victim privacy 
and other values, such as open court and the accused’s right of full answer and defence, has not 
taken place in that jurisprudence. Unlike Canada, these countries lack a system of cons titutional 
rights.  Yet as Chapters Two and Three explained, conflicts between victim privacy and  
competing values intensified and assumed new form, analytically, under Canada’s  Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.  For that reason, the resolution of those conf licts in common law systems 
without constitutional rights is less relevant than it would have been in Canada’s pre -Charter era. 
 
 By the same token, the American jurisprudence also fails to provide a precise analogue.  
Though the issues are addressed under  a regime of constitutional rights, the assumptions of  
American constitutionalism may not apply, or may apply with less force in Canada.  A good  
example, which was mentioned above, is the presumption against publication bans, which is  
deeply rooted in Firs t Amendment doctrine.  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Canada has not 
yet held that the element of prior restraint in such bans raises particular issues of concern under 
s.2(b) of the  Charter.  As well, the First Amendment jurisprudence can be militant whe n 
confronted by measures, whether criminal or civil in nature, which interfere with the watchdog  
role of the press.  In contests between the press and the state, the press tends to win.  Meanwhile, 
provisions which are aimed at protecting the privacy of vi ctims are more likely to be seen in  
Canada as a reasonable compromise or balance between competing values.  
 
 Despite assuming a harder line on the principle of open court, the American  
jurisprudence and literature offers a vigorous debate of the policies o n both sides.  That debate is 
taken up in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Perspectives 
 
Introduction 
Debate about sexual offences has, in recent years, been focused on the myths and 
stereotypes surrounding the crime of rape.  It is a debate which, to some ex tent, has been 
polarized between those who dispute the existence or persistence of such perceptions and beliefs, 
on one side, and those who claim that the criminal justice system is tainted by them, on the other.  
As Chapter Three explained, the Supreme Court of Canada has concluded that these perceptions 
are part of the dynamics which have defined sexual assault proceedings in the past.  Those 
dynamics can result in an ugly contest between the complainant and accused which re -victimizes 
those against whom crimes have been committed.  In passing, it can be noted that rape myths 
extend in many directions, as the sorry history of race discrimination attests.  Not so long ago 
and perhaps to this day, discriminatory beliefs about the sexual appetites of black me n and their 
lust for white women resulted in lynchings, wrongful convictions, and many other injustices in 
the United States.1   
 
 It is not difficult to see how myths and stereotypes that promote prejudicial beliefs at the 
expense of truth can undermine criminal justice.  The system is not functioning when offences 
are not reported or, if reported, are not prosecuted as a result of such beliefs. Unpunished crimes, 
in turn, compromise the community’s interest in law enforcement, and victims pay a personal 
price when their bodily integrity is violated with impunity.  Society’s need of retribution and 
denunciation is denied, and the victim’s right to vindicate and restore her sexual integrity is 
sacrificed.  
 
 But nor does the process function smoothly when complaints are prosecuted; a conviction 
cannot be secured without the victim’s decision to testify and thereby forego her privacy as well, 
in many cases, as her dignity. Latterly, procedures and rules of evidence too often enabled the 
accused to savage a victim’s character and expose her past sexual activity to excuse a non-
consensual contact.  Rules of evidence, which permitted what are now recognized as irrelevant 
questions, were experienced by victims as humiliating and insulting.  The consequences for 
complainant privacy and dignity were discussed in the context of the Charter jurisprudence, in 
Chapter Three above.  
 
 Not only did such questions in and of themselves constitute an invasion of privacy, they 
rebounded back to the open court principle and the problem that sexual offences are chronically 
under reported. For complainants, the travails of submitting to cross-examination were surely 
compounded by an open court principle which treated sexual assault victims the same way as 
other victims of crime.  Newspapers and broadcasters were free to publish the private and 
intimate details of a named complainant’s sexual encounter with the accused.  And, before 
restrictions were placed on this evidence, details of the victim’s sex life with others could also be  
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freely reported because it was disclosed in open court.  In the circumstances, it is understandable 
that the victims of these crimes were reluctant to trust the criminal justice system.  
 
 The reforms of recent years have done much to ameliorate the statu s of complainants in 
sexual assault proceedings.  Initiatives in judicial and legislative forums have been aimed at 
rectifying the perceptions and beliefs that disadvantaged this class of crime victims.  As a result, 
debate about the relative rights of complainants and the accused is, in Canada, quiet for the time 
being. Though proponents of the accused’s rights resist the suggestion that the defendant and his 
victim are “equal” under the Charter, statute law and judicial precedent have made it clear that 
there is no “hierarchy of entitlement” between the accused and his victim. Yet competing 
interests remain strong;  the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated, at the same time, that 
victim privacy cannot be promoted, absolutely or disproportionately, at the expense of the 
accused’s right of full answer and defence. 2  By the same token, nor does victim privacy stand 
above the open court principle.  Thus, the Supreme Court accepts that victim privacy can be 
protected, and also places access and accountability at the core of s.2(b)’s underlying values.3 
 
 Another element of the myths and stereotypes which surround the crime of rape concerns 
the way sexual offences are reported by the media and how the public, in turn, perceives the 
complainant4.  As explained by Helen Benedict, “[s]ex crimes have a unique ability to touch 
upon the public’s deep-seated beliefs about sex roles,”5 and the press plays a role in “establishing 
or reinforcing those attitudes.”6  In her 1992 book, Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex 
Crimes, the author identifies a number of rape myths which in her view are “still alive and 
well.”7   She maintains that these myths condition the way the press reports sexual offences, and 
the way the public responds to a complainant’s allegation of rape.   Benedict suggests that sex 
crime victims are squeezed into one of two images: “she is either pure and innocent, a true victim 
attacked by monsters - [a virgin] or she is a wanton female who provoked the assailant with her 
sexuality - [a vamp].”8  In light of how “deeply terrible a crime sexual assault is”, this kind of 
stereotyping is particularly unfair.  Benedict describes her understanding of rape in these terms:  
 
I learned how it destroys the fundamental sense of autonomy and privacy of the 
victim - one’s body is used as an object, one’s humanity degraded; how it 
introduces trauma and distrust between the victim and those close to her, often 
destroying marriages and families; and how little the police, the press and the 
public at large understand or even sympathize with these troubles.  I learned how 
rape victims become trapped in a cycle of injustice: having fallen victim to a 
violent crime through no fault of their own, they are blamed for it, sometimes 
mocked for it by neighbors, friends, family, and  the law.  I also learned that, even 
after two decades of feminist attempts to educate the public about rape, women 
are still screamed at or run out of town for it, and are still commonly portrayed as 
promiscuous liars by the press and public....9 
 
 With reforms now in place, it is difficult to know whether sexual offences are traumatic 
because the attack is sexual in nature, because the myths and stereotypes aggravate and worsen 
the victim’s trauma, or because the attack and its mythology have not yet and perhaps cannot be 
disentangled. Benedict predicts that “[a]s long as people have any sense of privacy about sexual 
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acts and the human body, rape will [] carry a stigma”, and this is “not necessarily a stigma that 
blames the victim for what happened to her”, but a stigma “that links her name irrevocably with 
an act of intimate humiliation.”10   
 
 For purposes of this study, it is important to identify the rationales which support victim 
privacy in cases of sexual assault.  Specifically, in relation to the ope n court principle, the 
question is whether exceptions to access and publicity are necessary to overcome the mythology 
and negative history of law enforcement in this area, or whether sexual offences always have 
been, and always will be different. The first  view would regard exceptions to open court as a 
temporary measure to protect the privacy of complainants who are caught in a criminal justice 
system and media culture which has not yet eliminated prejudicial attitudes about sexual 
offences.  The other perspective would treat victim privacy as a permanent exception to the open 
court principle in sexual assault proceedings.  That view is grounded in the belief that a sexual 
offence should be treated differently because the crime necessarily commits a violation of its 
victim that is distinctive. 
 
 In addressing those points of view, it is important to contextualize the problem of myths 
and stereotypes and the open court principle.   Chapter Three explained how discriminatory 
beliefs entered and pervaded the proceedings, from the investigation through to the rules of 
evidence which applied at trial, and in doing so treated sexual assault complainants unfairly.  
Despite having been addressed by reforms, these patterns of unfairness are systemic and will be 
slow to disappear.  By contrast, the open court principle neither endorses nor incorporates the 
myths and stereotypes which infused other aspects of sexual assault proceedings in the past.  The 
presumption in favour of access and publicity does not treat sexual assault victims differently or 
unfairly; rather, it assumes that the same principles which apply to other victims of crime should 
also apply to those who suffer a sexual assault. 
 
 Yet there is a qualification to that; victim anonymity is protected by s.486(3) of the 
Criminal Code, as an exception to openness which is justifiable because of the link between 
victim identification and under reporting.  As well, but only in circumstances where the evidence 
supports the order, s.486(1) permits a judge to close part or all of a proceeding. Moreover, even 
if the open court principle is not based on any myths or stereotypes, according to Benedict, 
media reports continue to trade on a variety of prejudices about sexual offences.  From that 
perspective, exceptions to open court place a check on the media’s tendency to reinforce or even 
establish myths and stereotypes about the victims of sexual offences.  On that view, sexual 
assault prosecutions should be regarded as seamless, in the sense that the privacy implicatio ns of 
the open court principle cannot be separated from the privacy implications of the confrontation 
between the victim and the accused. 
 
 It is beyond the scope of this Chapter, and the study, to resolve the complex dynamics 
that are identified above.  Instead, this Chapter provides a discussion of the rationales which 
enter into the equation when open court and privacy are in conflict.  It is divided into two parts 
which correspond to the two major open court issues analyzed in Chapter Two: publicity ver sus 
publication bans on victim identity; and access to proceedings versus orders excluding the public  
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from the court room or the evidence.  Accordingly, the first section below explores victim 
anonymity and, in doing so, draws on the extensive American l iterature on this issue. 
 
 The second part of the Chapter examines the open court questions that arose in the 
Homolka-Bernardo proceedings, with two objectives in mind.  One is to consider when and for 
what reasons it may be permissible to exclude the publ ic from the courtroom, or deny it access to 
critical elements of the evidence.  A second is to explore the concept of a victim.  It is trite that 
the commission of a single offence can create many victims, and it is well established that the 
victims of crime have not been well treated by the criminal justice system in the past.  In such 
circumstances, granting the victims of crime new opportunities to participate in the criminal 
process unavoidably challenges the traditional concept of a single victim.  The  question is 
whether “secondary” victims should also be recognized and, if so, in what ways or for which 
purposes.  Though the Charter has conferred some status on third parties, such initiatives are 
controversial because they alter the concept of a criminal trial as an adversarial contest between 
two parties: the state and the accused. 
 
 The discussion of these difficult issues is followed by a brief conclusion.  
 
Victim anonymity 
 Unlike the evidence cases on defence access to private information, victim a nonymity in 
sexual proceedings has generated little discussion in Canada.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision to uphold the Criminal Code’s mandatory publication ban on victim identity was not 
particularly controversial, and the complainant’s right to remain anonymous has not since been 
challenged.   At the same time, Chapter Two noted Howland C.J.O.’s reasons for concluding that 
identity should not automatically be protected.  In his view, disclosure in at least some cases 
might bring fresh evidence or witnesses to the fore.  That Chapter also traced the evolution of 
litigant privacy in the justice system, from a low point in Scott v. Scott, to the present, including 
the discretion under s.486(1) to close all or part of the proceedings to protect victim  privacy. 
 
 Reforms to protect victim privacy, along with more sweeping modifications to the law of 
sexual offences, have been in place for many years now.  At this point in time, it might be 
helpful to know whether these changes have favourably influenced  rates of reporting, 
prosecution, and conviction for sexual offences.  In the absence of data, the debate on anonymity 
takes the form of principled arguments on each side of the question.  
 
 An initial point, and an important one, which was flagged in discu ssion of the American 
jurisprudence, is whether the open court principle is compromised when a victim’s identity is 
withheld from the public.  On that point, it is not obvious that access to information, or the 
transparency and accountability of the criminal justice system, require the victims of crime to be 
publicly identified.  Presumably, what matters is the offence that has been committed, and the 
guilt or innocence of the accused that is at stake, and not the name or particulars of the victim.  
To the extent such particulars are relevant to the fairness or credibility of the trial, those details 
remain available through the public’s access to the courtroom and to reports of the proceedings 
in the print and broadcast press.  To put it another way, it is reasonably arguable that excising the 
victim’s identity constitutes a minimal trivial derogation from the requirement of openness.  
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 Thus Rehnquist J., who has been the Chief Justice of the United States for many years, 
claimed in Smith v. Daily Publishing Co. that publishing a juvenile’s name was unrelated to the 
watchdog role the press plays in monitoring the criminal justice system. 11  Given its freedom to 
describe the details of the offence and inform the community of the proceedings against the 
juvenile, the prohibition on identity was, in his view, “a minimal interference with freedom of 
the press.”12 Rehnquist J.’s position on anonymity was based on his concerns for a young 
offender’s rehabilitation, as well as on the existence of a judicial discretion to permit publication. 
 
 Likewise, White J. dissented in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., on the ground that there is “no 
public interest in publishing the names, addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the 
victims of crime.”13 In his view, it was “not t oo much to ask the press, in instances such as this, 
to respect simple standards of decency and refrain from publishing a victim’s name, address, 
and/or phone number.”14  As far as he was concerned, if the First Amendment prohibited a 
private person from recovering for publication of the fact that she was raped, there might not be 
any facts which were too private for publication. 15  The majority opinion provided two answers 
to Mr. Justice White’s concerns.  First, Marshall J. claimed that the article generally, as opposed 
to the specific identity contained within it, involved a matter of paramount public interest.16  
Second, his opinion did not rule out the possibility that civil sanctions for publication might be 
necessary to serve the interests at stake.  In the circumstances, he concluded that imposing 
liability on the Florida Star was “too precipitous” a means to protect a victim’s safety and 
privacy, or encourage other victims to come forward without fear of exposure. 17 
 
 If the majority’s answers are not entirely persuasive, the question whether the name or 
identity of a person is important remains unanswered.  It is not self evident that withholding 
victim identity would undercut the press function as watchdog, or that the name of a crime 
victim matters to the public.  In addressing that question, NBC News President Michael Gartner 
explained, that “we are in the business of disseminating news”, and that “[n]ames and facts are 
news” which “add credibility to stories and give viewers or readers information the y need to 
understand issues.”18  On its face, that assertion is difficult to prove or disprove; though 
undoubtedly true in some cases, it hardly supports an absolute right to name victims.  A more 
realistic view is that of Howland C.J.O., who found in Canadian Newspapers that identity might 
make a difference in some cases, when disclosure of a victim’s name prompts others to come 
forward. 
 
 On a different point, if the public does not need to know the identity of a sexual assault 
victim, it is questionable whether it is essential to know the identities of any victims of any 
crimes.  This recalls the observation Brennan J. made in Globe Newspaper, in explaining why it 
was inappropriate to close the court room for the young victims of sexual offences, and not f or 
other victims.  There, he commented that the victims of sex crimes are not the only ones who 
would be more likely to come forward when guaranteed a closed hearing.  The dilemma in 
drawing distinctions between victims is that none are voluntary participa nts in the criminal 
justice system; they are part of the process through force of circumstance rather than choice.  
Those who suffer a sexual assault are not alone in this, and if victim privacy is taken seriously, 
an anonymity order should be available to  any victim who seeks it.  That approach is 
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unacceptable, however, because it would transform an exception from the open court principle 
into a rule of anonymity.  Such an expanded concept of victim privacy, which is still a newcomer 
in the criminal justice system, would raise the concerns voiced by Lord Shaw in Scott v. Scott 
and echoed, as well, by Wilson J. in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (AG).19 
 
 A further point, which is often raised in the American literature, concerns fairness to the 
accused.  Some claim that protecting the identity of the complainant infers that the unnamed 
person was indeed a victim and undercuts the presumption that the defendant is innocent.  For 
instance, American criminal defence lawyer Alan Dershowitz expressed that view in thes e terms: 
 
People who have gone to the police and publicly invoked the criminal process and 
accused somebody of a serious crime such as rape must be identified.... In this 
country there is no such thing and there should not be such a thing as anonymous 
accusation.  If your name is in court it is a logical extension that it should be 
printed in the media.  How can you publish the name of the presumptively 
innocent accused but not the name of the accuser?20  
 
Michael Gartner, President of NBC News during the William Kennedy Smith and Central Park 
jogger incidents, agreed that fairness as between the suspect and the accuser is an issue, yet his 
view was that the decision whether to name victims is an editorial question and should be made 
on a case to case basis. 21  It is sometimes argued that the identity of the defendant should also be 
protected, at least until trial proceedings are concluded.  Doing so would effectively create an 
anonymous trial process, though, and that would be anathema to the values of transparency and 
accountability that have been jealously guarded over the years by the open court principle.  
 
 The main issue between those who support the naming of victims and those who support 
anonymity is stigma, and how it can or should be addressed in the c ontext of sexual assault.  One 
view is that sexual offences should be normalized, and from that perspective, special protocols 
simply perpetuate the stigma and shame of being a rape victim.  Nadine Strossen maintains, for 
instance, that, “if we are ever to get beyond the situation where rape is seen as stigmatizing, 
where the victim is seen as ‘damaged goods’, then we have to stop mythologizing it and treating 
it as some special kind of crime.”22  She and others contend that mandatory anonymity implies 
and encourages the view that rape is disgraceful.  Likewise, a former President of the National 
Organization of Women stated that prohibiting publication “merely establishes the victim as an 
outcast”; she urged others to “pull off the veil of shame.  Print the name.”23  Though it may be 
less credible, given that its source has an interest in identifying victims, Michael Gartner of the 
NBC News argues that, “by not naming rape victims, we are participating in a conspiracy of 
silence which does a disservice to the public by reinforcing the idea that there is something 
despicable about rape.”24 He added that “[r]ape is a despicable crime of violence, and rapists are 
deplorable people”, but rape victims, on the other hand, are “blameless.”25  His view of the press 
role is “to inform the public, and one way of informing the public is to destroy incorrect 
impressions and stereotypes.”26 
 
 Meanwhile, the arguments in favour of anonymity are as forcefully advanced.  One such 
argument is that it is not the victim’s burden to educate the public and de-stigmatize the offence 
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of rape by exposing her personal circumstances.  A person who has already suffered the ordeal of 
rape should not bear responsibility for changing prejudicial views about rape and its victims:  
 
[W]hy must the victim, who has already suffered from the ordeal of rape, be 
forced to bear the responsibility of educating society and changing its prejudicial 
view toward rape and its victims” These negative views have been developed and 
reinforced by many segments of our society - parents, teachers, newspaper and 
television reporters, film-makers, politicians, sports heroes, and other role models.  
The seeds of change must come from these same individuals if society is to make 
any meaningful progress in changing its att itude about rape victims.27 
 
Benedict echoes this view in the assertion that to expose a victim to the humiliation of being 
identified without her consent is “nothing short of punitive.”28  She considers that the media 
covers rape “too irresponsibly” to be able to de-stigmatize the crime merely by naming victims, 
and adds that until rape coverage is reformed as a whole, “naming victims will only further 
humiliate, expose, and endanger them.”29  
 
 In any case, it is noted that revealing the victim’s identity fo cuses attention on the victim, 
and not on those who may have prejudicial views.  The stigma surrounding these offences 
renders its victims especially vulnerable and creates distinctive challenges for them in the 
healing process.  The public disclosure of a victim’s identity could disrupt her healing process, 
and although commentators argue that stigma is removed by routinely revealing the names of all 
victims, those who are caught in the transition period would be unduly harmed while the stigma 
still exists.30 
  
This section closes with two observations about the question of victim anonymity in the 
American literature.  As the discussion has shown, the debate tends to be conducted on an all or 
nothing basis.  For instance, Michael Gartner explained that, “pro ducers, editors, and news 
directors should make editorial decisions, rather than lawyers or legislatures.” 31 To that he added, 
“I oppose preventing news organizations from disclosing the names of rape victims who prefer to 
remain anonymous.”32  And, on a point of equality, he added that, “we do not give newsmakers 
in any other category of news the option of being named or not being named.” 33 From his 
perspective, the state cannot dictate newsroom decisions about what is or is not newsworthy.  On 
the other side, women’s organizations and those who seek to reform the law of rape insist that 
the victim’s identity should never be disclosed without her consent.  
 
 The first observation, then, is that the polarization between sides that characterizes debate 
at the level of constitutional principle is not reflected in current practice.  Whether or not a state 
law prohibits publication of a rape victim’s name, the American practice is for the media not to 
reveal her identity.  Though a statutory ban has not yet been uphe ld under the First Amendment, 
the media has voluntarily adopted the principle of anonymity.  In doing so, it is unclear whether 
the press has conceded that victim identity is either irrelevant or marginally relevant to the 
accountability rationale, or has concluded that the privacy of the victim outweighs the public’s 
need to know her identity.  
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 Second, those who are opposed to disclosure are offended that the victim’s name is 
revealed without her permission.  Put another way, whether to be known to the pu blic as a victim 
of rape should be a matter of choice.  In that regard, Nancy Ziegenmeyer is an example.   
Ziegenmeyer is an American woman who chose to come forward and reveal the explicit details 
of her rape.  She has been praised for her courage in doin g so, and the story of her violation 
earned its author a Pulitzer Prize.  Ziegenmeyer maintains, however, that any decision to speak 
out should be made by the victim and only when she has healed enough.  Her own experience led 
her to offer the following advice: 
 
I would encourage any rape victim to come forward who has gone through 
enough counselling and has a support system and she thinks it is right for her.  No 
one should dictate to crime victims that they should speak out.  It must be their 
choice.34 
 
 To conclude, reference should be made to R. v. Adams, a decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada on the question whether, when and at whose instance a sexual assault publication ban 
can be lifted.35  In that case, the ban was imposed at trial upon the request  of the Crown, and not 
the complainant.  When the trial ended in an acquittal of charges against the accused, the judge 
revoked the publication order, citing his findings that the complainant “was a prostitute and a 
liar.”36  In restoring the order, Mr. Justice Sopinka of the Supreme Court found that the language 
of s.486(4) did not expressly authorize the revocation of such orders.  Nor was he prepared to 
imply such a power in the statutory provision, given the purpose of the ban, which is to provide 
the complainant a permanent guarantee of anonymity. In his view, a revocable ban, like the 
discretionary ban at issue in Canadian Newspapers v. Canada (AG), “would fail to provide the 
certainty that is necessary to encourage victims to come forward.” 37   
 
 Nor did the trial judge have an inherent power to revoke the order, because it was 
mandatory at the request of the Crown, and the Crown had neither withdrawn its application nor 
consented to the revocation of the order.  In any case, Sopinka J.  held that even i f the Crown 
consented, the judge still would have no power to revoke the order if the complainant did not.  
Such an order can only be lifted when both the Crown and complainant consent.   
 
 In Canada, then, the complainant in sexual assault proceedings controls the disclosure of 
her identity, during the process and following its completion as well.  Though the victims of 
these crimes are free to identify themselves to the public and speak to their experiences, few, if 
any, have chosen to do so thus far.   
  
Access to proceedings 
 Despite its entrenchment in the s.2(b) jurisprudence, the open court principle remains 
vulnerable.  The shock value of violent crime ensures that exceptions to the rule will be sought 
whenever the circumstances are frightening enough to threaten competing values such as fair 
trial and victim privacy.  At present, decisions will be made on a case -to-case basis, under the 
analytical frameworks established in Dagenais v. C.B.C, C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. 
Carson), and R. v. Mentuck and R. v. O.N.E.38 Generally speaking, exclusion orders constitute a 
more serious infringement of the open court principle than publication bans; perhaps for that 
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reason C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson) emphasized the need for a sufficient evidentiary foundatio n to 
justify closing all or part of a hearing. In addition, closure orders unavoidably deny access to the 
information which is imparted during proceedings and that is problematic because once access is 
denied that part of the hearing is effectively lost to  the public.  
 
 Under s.486(1) of the Criminal Code, the public can be excluded, to protect the privacy 
of victims or witnesses, for  part or all of a proceeding.  That question arose with particular 
poignancy in the course of the Homolka-Bernardo trials.  There, the survivors of the French and 
Mahaffy victims fought to keep graphic videotapes of sex torture out of the public domain.  
Though not to sympathize with their cause might seem heartless, on a point of principle the 
Homolka-Bernardo crimes raised as yet unanswered concerns about the accountability of the 
criminal justice system.  To this day, the public is sceptical of the deal the Crown “cut” with Ms 
Homolka, and doubts whether she received just punishment for the crimes she committed.  At 
the same time, the privacy and dignity interests of the victims and their survivors could scarcely 
have been more compelling. That is why the open court issues at stake in the Homolka and 
Bernardo trials are so pertinent here; in each, the competing concerns under  discussion in this 
Report were at an apex.   
 
 The open court principle was challenged three times in the course of separate trials for 
the defendants Homolka and Bernardo.  First of all, at the hearing to consider Ms Homolka’s 
plea bargain and sentence, Kovacs J. excluded the public and foreign press from the courtroom, 
and imposed a wide-ranging publication ban on the domestic press. 39  Second, as the date for Mr. 
Bernardo’s trial neared, the families of the French and Mahaffy victims applied for orders 
excluding the public during those parts of the proceedings in which the videotapes would be 
shown or discussed.40  Third and finally, after the Bernardo trial and appeals were concluded, the 
families applied again for orders to destroy the videotape evidence, and that task was carried out 
late in 2001.41 
 
 The elemental facts are well known and require little attention. 42  Karla Homolka and 
Paul Bernardo were lovers who then married and carried out a series of sexual offences which 
they committed, together, against at least four victims.  Two of the four, Leslie Mahaffy and 
Kristen French, were murdered and a third, Ms Homolka’s sister Tammy, died accidentally 
following sexual assaults that occurred while she was unconscious.  For some time the police did 
not regard Tammy Homolka’s death as suspicious, were unaware of Jane Doe, the surviving 
victim, and were without leads in the French and Mahaffy murders.  The investigation broke 
when Karla Homolka presented herself to the police as a victim of spousal assault i n January, 
1993.  Once she implicated her spouse, Bernardo was arrested.  Charges of manslaughter in the 
deaths of French and Mahaffy were brought against Ms Homolka on May 18, 1993, and the next 
day murder charges, among others, were laid against Mr. Bernardo. 
 
 At the time of the Homolka trial, three features of the case worried and concerned the 
public. First, little was known about the sexual captivity and offences the victims endured before 
being murdered, except that their treatment was rumoured to be  sadistic, horrific, and 
unimaginable.  Second, little was likewise known about the respective roles Homolka and 
Bernardo played in committing those offences and then killing their victims.  Third, by the 
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spring of 1993, it was apparent that the Crown’s case against Bernardo depended on his spouse’s 
evidence against him.  In simple terms, to secure a conviction against him, her story had to be 
believed.  Yet on no view of the facts then known could she be exculpated; by casting her as a 
victim of his predatory behaviour, her responsibility for the crimes that were committed could be 
diminished and her credibility as a witness preserved.  
 
 Karla Homolka’s trial took place on June 28, 1993, some two years before Bernardo’s, 
amid intense public interest.  Whet her or not they were unprecedented, the trial judge’s orders on 
the open court issues were at least extraordinary.  Not only did Kovacs J. impose a near -blanket 
publication ban on the proceedings, he excluded the public and foreign media from the 
courtroom.43  As a result, the only details from her trial and sentence hearing that could be 
reported were the contents of the indictment, whether there was a joint submission as to 
sentence, whether a conviction was registered but not the plea, the sentence imposed, and a few 
other unrevealing aspects of the Court’s reasons.44  In addition, the non-publication order applied 
to the transcript of the trial proceedings.45  As to access, beyond the families of the accused and 
the victims and court personnel, only the Canadian press were allowed into the courtroom; the 
public at large and the foreign press were specifically excluded by order under s.486(1) of the 
Criminal Code.46  Moreover, it was a condition of access, to those admitted to the proceedings, 
that there be “no publication of the circumstances of the deaths of any persons referred to during 
the trial.”47 
 
 By his own admission, the sensibilities of the victims’ families and the community at 
large played no role in the judge’s decision to impose a publication ban  and exclude the public 
from his courtroom. Thus Kovacs J. apologized that he could not act on his  “real concern for the 
psychological well being of the innocent victims.” 48  He did not consider it permissible, under 
the existing case law, to create an exc eption to open court in deference to the privacy or dignity 
of the families.  For the same reason, he did not take the trauma which might be experienced by 
the community of St. Catherine’s into account, should the proceedings be publicized. 49 
 
 Oddly, given the circumstances, the publication ban and exclusion order were granted to 
protect Bernardo’s right to a fair trial at some later date.  On the strength of Nova Scotia v. 
MacIntyre, Kovacs J. found that protecting an accused who is presumed innocent and s ecuring 
the integrity of the court’s process were values of superordinate importance, sufficient to warrant 
an exception to the open court principle.50  Yet Bernardo opposed the publication ban and 
indicated that he was prepared to waive his right to compla in that the publicity surrounding the 
Homolka proceedings would deny him a fair trial.  The trial judge refused to treat his insistence 
that the open court principle be followed  as determinative. In his view, permitting Bernardo to 
waive the fair trial claim would be tragic, if his own trial led, as a result of pre -trial prejudice, to 
the conviction of an innocent man.  And if he was guilty, the harm to society would be 
“inestimable” if his conviction was flawed because a fair trial had been impossible due  to the 
irreparable publicity surrounding the Homolka trial. 51 
 
 After listing some of the extraordinary features of the case, Mr. Justice Kovacs held that 
the considerations for a fair trial outweighed the right to freedom of the press. 52  The order 
excluding the public and foreign press was linked to his concerns about publicity.  In the 
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circumstances, a publication ban which could not be enforced against the American media would 
be inadequate to protect the integrity of the process.  There remained the ris k, should the public 
be granted entry, that the U.S. press would succeed in gaining access to information about the 
proceedings and then publish it. 
 
 From an open court perspective, the trial judge’s reasons are not strong.  Kovacs J. did 
not attach significant value to freedom of the press or to the public’s access to information about 
the trial, including the opportunity to debate the justness of Homolka’s sentence.  Moreover, in 
assuming that publicity would jeopardize the fairness of Bernardo’s trial, he failed to consider 
whether alterative measures, such as a change of venue, could obviate the need for an exception 
to open court.  Finally, it should be noted that his publication ban and exclusion order predated 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in C.B.C. v. Dagenais and C.B.C. v. New Bruswick (Re: R. v. 
Carson), both of which set onerous standards under the Charter to justify exceptions to the open 
court principle.53 
 
 At the time, the ban and closed hearing were enormously controversial.  As Frank Davey 
explained, the judge’s order was “perhaps, from the point of view of public knowledge, the most 
unfortunate moment in Ontario history for the imposition of such a ban.” 54  The dynamics at 
play, including the media’s role, led to a public perception of the cas e as “an enormous collection 
of deceits and concealments.”55  For instance, the victims’ families were perceived as being 
concerned with “unjustly protecting their privacy”; it looked as though the police were 
determined to keep the media and the public “from finding out about even inconsequential 
information”; it appeared that the police and Crown were making deals “against the public’s 
back”; and it was widely held that Homolka received an “unjustly light sentence.” 56 Yet Davey is 
most critical of the media, which he characterized as behaving in a self -serving manner 
throughout: 
 
Arguably, it was not the ban itself that might cause disrespect of the court system, 
but the reception of the ban in the media.  The media have a large role in controlling 
what issues the public is encouraged to see as important.... In the debate over the 
publicity ban, the media were the only public institutions to publicize and criticize 
the judge’s order.... Without the media’s repeated writing about their own 
indignation about the order ... that is, without the media making themselves the 
story-much of the debate of the ban would not have occurred. 57 
 
 Nor did subsequent events restore confidence in Homolka’s sentence or the judicial 
orders that  shielded details about the offences and her participation in them from public scrutiny. 
Some time after her sentence had been imposed, videotapes documenting the crimes committed 
against Mahaffy and French were surrendered to the Crown by defence counsel for Bernardo.  
The discovery of this evidence altered the entire complexion of the case.  First, the video footage 
uncovered a surviving but previously unknown victim, Jane Doe, and revealed the events leading 
up to Tammy Homolka’s death.  Second, tapes that proved Bernardo’s sexual offences rendered 
the Crown’s case less dependent on Homolka’s direct evidence against him.  Moreover, footage 
which recorded her willing participation in the commission of those offences undercut any claim 
that Homolka had been an unwilling participant and helple ss victim of spousal abuse.  Not 
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surprisingly, these revelations rendered the sentence which was imposed at her hearing even 
more suspect, and not the least because it did not include punishment for the offences she 
committed against Jane Doe and her own sister.  
 
 Third, the discovery of the videotapes subjected the victims’ families to untold agony, 
and brought them into the proceedings which led up to and followed the Bernardo trial.  The 
order by Kovacs J. had the effect, though not the purpose, of protecting the privacy and dignity 
of the victims’ families.  Yet the publication ban was temporary and would expire at the 
conclusion of Bernardo’s trial.58  In the ordinary course, however, the tapes would be entered as 
evidence and played in open court at those proceedings.   Faced with that prospect, the families 
pressed the courts to protect them and their deceased daughters from the public violation of their 
privacy and dignity.  
 
 Prior to the Bernardo trial, the Crown brought an application under s.486(1) of the 
Criminal Code to exclude the public from the courtroom during its presentation of the videotape 
evidence.  While members of the media opposed it, the families of the deceased victims 
supported the Crown’s application. First, it was necessary for t hem to secure status as intervenors 
in the process.  Ordinarily, third parties are not permitted to participate  in criminal proceedings, 
and though the status of third parties, including victims, has changed  under the Charter, the 
criminal trial remains a contest between the accused and the Crown.59   
 
 Through their counsel, the families maintained that their constitutional rights would be 
violated if the tapes were shown to the public.  The difficulty was that if the victims’ families 
were granted standing in Bernardo’s case, it might be difficult to refuse other crime victims 
similar status.60  LeSage A.C.J.O.C., who would later preside over the jury trial, noted that, “in 
general victims and parents of victims do not have a right to intervenor status in a criminal 
trial.”61  Even so, he granted the Mahaffy and French families’ requests, “as an indulgence”, and 
on the strength of the “unique and different perspective” they would have to offer. 62  
Emphasizing that it was rare for the Court to grant third parties such status, he did so because the 
circumstances of the case were “so strikingly unusual”. 63 
 
 On its merits, the Crown’s s.486 application posed a difficult question.  The case for 
access to the proceedings, including the video evidence, could hardly have been more 
compelling.  That evidence documented the relationship between Homolka and Bernardo, and 
proved their respective roles in the commission of multiple sexual offences.  And, if the purpose 
of the evidence was to establish Bernardo’s guilt, the degree of Homolka’s complicity in the 
offences, including murder, and the legitimacy of the Crown’s “bargain” with her, remained 
contentious.  From that perspective, the adage that, “pictures don’t lie,” seemed to offer some 
hope of getting at the truth of what happened.  In this instance, however, the fair trial rationale 
could not provide a cover for victim privacy, as it had at the Homolka proceedings.  
Parenthetically, it should be noted that questions surrounding the videotape were decided before 
the Supreme Court’s decision in C.B.C. (Re: R.  v.  Carson), which identified the protection of 
privacy as a permissible reason for excluding the public from the courtroom.  
  
 
67
 
 Playing the tapes in open court could only be experienced by the Mahaffy and French 
families as a cruel and even a barbaric act.  Thus, the Crown submitted that the failure to 
recognize the distress of the victims, including the families, would adversely affect the 
perception of the administration of justice, which is referred to in s.486( 1) as one of the 
permissible exceptions to openness.  Without accepting that the deceased victims or their 
families could assert Charter claims, LeSage A.C.J.O.C. forged a compromise between the 
demands of open justice and victim privacy.  Specifically, he  decided that the audio portions of 
the videotapes would be played in open court, but that their visual images would be shown only 
to the jurors, lawyers, the accused, the judge, and any Court staff whose presence at the 
proceedings was required.  In doing so, his analysis was based more on the harm their 
publication would cause than on the privacy of the families.  Specifically, he stated:  
 
... I am satisfied that the harm that flows from the public display of this videotape 
far exceeds any benefit that will flow from the exposure of sexual assault and child 
pornography.  When I refer to harm, I am not suggesting that individual members 
of the public need to be protected from the harm that may flow from viewing these 
videotapes.... By harm, I am referring to the injury that most likely will be 
occasioned upon the surviving members of these three young girls if the videos are 
played in open Court.  The families will suffer tremendous psychological, emotional 
and mental injury if the evidence, as the Crown described it ... is publicly 
displayed.64  
          
 Unsatisfied with that result, the families sought and were denied leave to appeal that 
decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.65  They did succeed, however, in obtaining an order, in 
subsequent proceedings, that the videotapes be returned to the Attorney General for destruction, 
when no longer required for the due administration of justice. 66  On further appeal, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal rejected their submission that s.486(1) is unconstitutional and held t here was 
“no room” to attack its validity on the basis that it treats openness as the rule and exclusion as the 
exception.67  As Moldauer J.A. noted, there is a difference between a person’s right to engage in 
certain conduct, such as child pornography, and the public’s right of access to observe conduct 
captured on videotape and tendered as an exhibit in court proceedings. 68  In any case, the 
appellate court did not disturb the trial judge’s destruction order.  Accordingly, the final stage in 
the videotape saga occurred when the families of the victims witnessed the incineration of the 
videotapes late in December 2001.69 
 
 One way of assessing the way competing demands were resolved in the Homolka -
Bernardo proceedings is to ask, in hindsight, how the deleterio us consequences for open court 
and the salutary benefits for victim privacy compare. 70 That question of final proportionality 
between the reason for the exception and the harm to open court is a key consideration in the 
Supreme Court’s Dagenais, C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson), and Mentuck doctrines.  The benefits 
which accrued from the exceptions to open court throughout the proceedings are relatively 
straightforward; the Homolka exclusion order and publication ban, the Bernardo videotape order, 
and the order which led to the destruction of the tapes provided the families of the victims who 
were videotaped a degree of privacy within the criminal justice system which they ordinarily 
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would not have received.  At the same time, their interests were not absolutely pro tected.  The 
Homolka publication ban was lifted once the Bernardo trial ended.  Moreover, the families 
sought not only to deny the public access to the audio and visual portions of the tapes but also, to 
exclude the public from the courtroom when witness t estimony disclosed any statements made 
by the victims on tape. As seen above, LeSage A.C.J.O.C. was not prepared to go that far.  
 
 The deleterious consequences for the open court principle are more difficult to assess.  It 
can be argued that the Kovacs order had limited consequences because the ban on information 
was temporary.  From that perspective, the public’s access to information about the justice 
system was merely delayed.  At the same time, there can be little doubt that the publication ban 
and exclusion order had a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the integrity and 
legitimacy of the police investigation, the Crown’s plea bargain, and the Homolka trial itself.  
That gap in confidence widened once the tapes were discovered, and to this da y, the wisdom of 
such extensive limits on information about the Homolka proceedings remains open to serious 
question.  Meanwhile, the salutary benefits of these orders, which were aimed at protecting 
Bernardo’s right to a fair trial, could well have been achieved by alternative measures including a 
change of venue, jury screening, and instructions to the jury.  Kovacs J. did not seriously 
entertain any of those measures.  Absent the video evidence, which would not appear until later, 
it is questionable whether the privacy and dignity of the victims and their families were 
compelling enough to warrant exceptions to open court on the scale of the Kovacs publication 
ban and exclusion orders.  Under the existing doctrine, Kovacs J. was right in concluding that t he 
answer was no; and, even under the subsequent criteria of C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. 
Carson), the issue is debatable.  
 
 The deleterious consequences of derogating from the open court principle to protect 
victim privacy, in the case of the videotape order, may seem modest.  As LeSage A.C.J.O.C. 
stressed, “it is not necessary”, for there to be an open trial, that “the public gallery be shown the 
graphic display of one of the victims lying in the bathtub whilst the accused attempts to defecate 
and actually urinates on her head and face.”71  Given that members of the press and public could 
hear the evidence, he concluded that it was not essential for anyone but the principals, including 
members of the jury, to view the tape.  Yet LeSage A.C.J.O.C. did concede that, “it is difficult to 
rationalize why the verbal, but not the pictorial, images may be publicly displayed.” 72  The 
answer he gave was that  “traditionally we do not display, for public viewing, photographs of 
dead bodies, close-up photographs of wounds, photographs of autopsies, photographs of 
exhumations, and similar type evidence”.73  The analogies he relied on are not perfect, though, 
because the examples he listed simply documented the consequences of violent crime.  Unlike 
the Bernardo videos, photos of wounds and autopsies do not constitute proof of a crime’s 
commission.  In any case, the question before LeSage A.C.J.O.C. was not whether access to the 
tapes fell within traditional practices, but whether a different answer was required by the 
Charter’s constitutionalization of open court. 
 
 Sparing the families further and undue suffering was compassionate in the circumstances.  
The video order also spared public suffering, and avoided implicating the criminal justice system 
in the unwilling distribution of child pornography.  Still it left broader and important questions of 
principle unanswered.  Primary among is the definition of a victim, and whether the secondary 
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victims of a crime can advance rights in their own name.  If there is no doubt that the 
commission of a single crime can create several victims, the problem is one of deciding which 
ones and how many should be granted standing in the criminal justice system.  In that, it quickly 
and unavoidably becomes subjective to draw comparisons between victims and the relative 
degrees of harm they suffer. The Bernardo video order is defended as an exception to open court 
which, by virtue of its circumstances, was unprecedented.  Once created, however, precedent 
seeks the company of analogous circumstances, and rarely remains a solitary and isolated 
decision.  In any case, to limit the video order to a once in a lifetime case privileges the victims 
of the Mahaffy and French tragedies, and excludes other victims whose privacy and dignity 
interests might be as profoundly harmed.  Then again, should the Bernardo video order be see as 
a precedent for the protection of victims, including the secondary victims of crime, the 
consequences for the open court principle would be quite troubling.  This is the d ilemma that 
arises when compassion for the victims of crime is in conflict with the demands of principle.  
 
Conclusion 
 Open court and victim privacy unavoidably come into conflict, and choosing between the 
two is not easy.  To some, it may seem that the de rogations from openness which are required to 
protect victim privacy are minimal, and are readily outweighed by the equities which run in 
favour of those unfortunate enough to be a crime victim, and especially a victim of sexual 
assault.  From that perspective, demanding the right to publish a victim’s name or to see the 
Bernardo videotapes suggest an attachment to the open court principle that is needlessly 
scrupulous.  As these pages have shown, however, there are compelling reasons why the pre - and 
post-Charter tradition in Canada claims strong adherence to that principle.  
 
 At the same time, victim privacy imposes costs on the system.  By singling sexual assault 
complainants out for distinctive treatment (among a few others), such rules raise fairness an d 
equality concerns.  Moreover, secrecy in any aspect of criminal justice can erode confidence in 
the legitimacy of the system.  Protecting the privacy of some victims also leaves unanswered the 
status of others, as well as of secondary victims who may als o have suffered horribly.  At 
present, the statute law and jurisprudence have not established a clear rationale or set of 
guidelines to address the issue of victim privacy. In the case of sexual assault, it is assumed that 
anonymity is linked to law enforcement.  Yet the Court relied on chronic under reporting in 
Canadian Newspapers and Adams without addressing privacy as an entitlement in its own right.  
How anonymity has affected reporting, and whether sexual assaults raise distinctive privacy 
issues, regardless of law enforcement concerns or the persistence of past prejudices, are 
questions which should be asked and answered.  
 
 By way of postscript, two developments which arose since the Chapter was written 
should be mentioned.  First, on the issue of vic tim anonymity, it is noteworthy that Simon and 
Shuster has scheduled the publication of the book, I Am the Central Park Jogger, in April.  The 
identity of the jogger who was brutally assaulted and left for dead has never been disclosed, but 
now the victim, whose name is Pimsleur, has come forward.  Second, the publication of Stephen 
Williams’, Karla: A Pact with the Devil, in English Canada has revived the contest between the 
French and Mahaffy families, and those who are of the opinion that the accountabil ity issues in 
the Homolka plea bargain remain inadequately canvassed. 74  The victims’ families complained, 
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in particular, about two photographs, one of which showed the cement blocks that encase Leslie 
Mahaffy’s body, and the other, which showed Jane Doe with Homolka, albeit with a black bar 
across her eyes.  In this instance, their point may have moral force, but it is without legal 
foundation. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusions 
 
At least in common law systems, the sensibilities of crime victims have historically n ot 
been granted consideration in the trial process.  Though their participation was vital to the 
outcome, victims and witnesses were third parties who lacked independent standing or status in 
what was a two-way contest between the state and the accused.  In many ways, which include an 
increasing recognition of their privacy concerns, that conception of the victim has been 
changing. Today, the victims of crime, and of sexual assaults in particular, are more visible in the 
criminal justice system than ever be fore. 
 
 The commission of a crime not only robs an individual of his or her integrity, its 
investigation and prosecution may unavoidably entail an invasion of that person’s privacy.  In a 
system that focused attention on the commission of an offence agains t the community, the 
individual who suffered the violation was an object of sympathy in most cases; even so, 
vindicating his or her personal suffering was secondary to the objective of the system.  That view 
of criminal justice, and the importance of vindicating the offence against the community, 
supported a particular conception of open court.   Granting access to courtrooms and permitting 
the evidence and outcomes of proceedings to be widely publicized was an essential part of 
maintaining the public’s confidence in the legitimacy, justness and fairness of the system.    
 
 Chapter Two of this Report explained the relationship between three sources of law that 
have defined Canada’s conception of the open court principle over the years.  Those sources are 
the common law, statute law, and - since 1982 -  the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The 
common law principle of open court protected the twin concepts of access to proceedings and 
publicity.  Exceptions to the principle were also recognized mainly, but not exclusively, to 
preserve the fairness of a criminal trial.  For a variety of reasons, the common law was relatively 
unresponsive to the privacy concerns of victims or witnesses in the criminal trial process.  
 
 The common law is subject to modification by t he legislature, and exceptions to the open 
court principle increased in number as the Criminal Code and other criminal law measures were 
amended.  Though many measures were introduced to protect the fairness of the trial and thereby 
preserve the presumption of innocence, some addressed the status of victims and witnesses.   
 
 As Chapter Two explained, the Charter created uncertainty about the status of common 
law and statutory exceptions to the open court principle.  Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has, 
in its s.2(b) jurisprudence, strongly endorsed that principle.  In doing so, the Court has linked 
open court to the fundamental values it supports: public confidence in the justice system; the 
legitimacy of criminal justice; and the accountability of courts and judges.  What the Charter has 
added to the common law conception of openness is a deeper awareness of the connection 
between an open process, and the legitimacy of the justice system as one of the central 
institutions of Canadian democracy.   
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 Chapter Two also traced the evolution of doctrine under s.2(b) of the Charter, which 
guarantees freedom of expression and the press.  To summarize briefly, the three most important 
features of that jurisprudence are: first, the establishment of constitutional “tests” in Dagenais v. 
C.B.C.  and the subsequent case law; second, the requirement that exceptions to the principle rest 
on a sound evidentiary basis; and third, the recognition that open court should in some cases be 
limited to protect victim privacy. 
 
 With that foundation in place, Chapter Three took a closer looked at the status of victim 
privacy in sexual assault proceedings.  In that context, privacy concerns were raised in answer to 
rules of evidence, which in the past permitted an accused to probe the details of a complainant’s 
private life or allowed the defence, more recently, to gain access to confidential medical and 
counselling records.  Chapter Three explained how the Supreme Court of Canada responded by 
introducing a right of victim privacy under s.7 of the Charter, and placing it on an equal plane 
with the rights of the accused.  For purposes of this Report, the point of Chapter Three was to 
demonstrate that for complainants, the privacy issues at stake are not limited to the open court 
issues of anonymity and closure or the definition of “relevant” evidence; the privacy concerns 
which arise in sexual assault proceedings are instead linked throughout the process of 
investigation and trial. 
 
 In other words, victim privacy has multiple dimensions. The incursion begins when the 
complainant makes a decision to report the offence, and continues during the process of 
investigation, when authorities consider whether the allegation is credible enough to warrant 
charges and prosecution.  The loss of privac y can then only be magnified during the trial process, 
when the victim must testify and then submit to cross-examination.  Traditionally, the 
proceedings took place in public, under rules of evidence, which were based on a concept of 
relevance that permitted counsel for the accused to probe the details of a complainant’s sexual 
history, or to demand access to private records created in the course of a confidential 
relationship.  The loss of privacy that is inherent in the open court principle could only be 
aggravated by investigatory practices and evidentiary rules which exposed the victims of sexual 
assault to scrutiny and doubt that is not experienced, generally, by other victims of crime.  
 
 Chapters Four and Five added further dimensions to the Report by offering comparative 
perspectives from other countries and systems of law, as well as by providing reflections on the 
deeper issues at stake.  For instance, the importance of victim anonymity will depend on the 
degree to which those who suffer a sexual ass ault are considered the same as, or different than, 
other victims of crime.  That issue in turn raises other questions which remain unanswered at 
present.  Specifically, it is unclear whether anonymity is granted as a remedial response to the 
under reporting of sexual offences, as the Supreme Court claimed in Canadian Newspapers v. 
Canada (AG).  On that view, anonymity is necessary to promote enforcement of the law but not, 
in particular, because there are privacy interests at stake.  It follows from that position that sexual 
assault victims are in principle no different from other victims of crime, with this qualification: 
the history of myths and stereotypes which accompanies the law of sexual offences has made it 
imperative to rectify the invasions of privacy that occurred in the past.  Once the myths and 
stereotypes have been eliminated, the remedy will no longer be needed.  Determining when past 
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patterns have been eliminated and the victims of these offences are “normalized”, vis -a-vis other 
victims of crime, is an exercise that does not lend itself to precision.  
 
 Under another view, sexual assault victims are fundamentally different because the nature 
of the offence that has been committed against them is unique.  The underlying assumption there 
is that special measures to protect the privacy of these victims are justifiable on an ongoing and 
permanent basis.  As the discussion in Chapter Five revealed, however, opinions vary on the 
question whether the stigma that is associated with these offences is in creased or decreased by an 
anonymity rule.  While some maintain that protective measures perpetuate that stigma, others 
argue that it is unfair to place the burden of de-stigmatizing this offence on individual victims.  
 
 It is one of the Report’s themes that the relationship between the practices and beliefs, 
which were rejected by the Supreme Court, and the open court principle, is important.  As long 
as prejudicial beliefs about sexual assault persist and are reflected, not only in the rules and 
protocols of the justice system but in the media coverage of sexual offences as well, the 
vulnerability of its victims may require or justify exceptions to the open court principle.  As 
noted above, however, access and publicity do not reflect any bias against or d iscriminatory 
beliefs about the victims of sexual assaults.  The problem, instead, is that the system around 
these offences, and the cultural attitudes which are attached to sex, have resulted in measures 
which protect the anonymity of victims and allow proceedings to be closed, though only on a 
discretionary basis which is fettered by standards that must comply with the Charter. 
 
 In the past, the victims of sexual assault did not readily place their trust in the criminal 
justice system.  Against the need to secure their confidence that complaints will be treated fairly, 
and that any proceedings undertaken will be reported with some objectivity, the exceptions to 
open court that are in place at present appear modest.  Perhaps for that reason and in recognit ion, 
as well, of the ways sexual offences have been mismanaged, the derogations have not been 
particularly controversial.  The guarantee of anonymity is linked to the complainant’s decision to 
report, but the decision to report is also linked to fears about the other invasions of privacy that 
will necessarily occur during the processes of investigation and prosecution.  Eliminating or 
minimizing these unpleasant elements of the process will take time, and whether steps taken in 
that direction have been successful will in any event be a matter of perception.  
 
 In principle, and with an exception for young victims, those who suffer sexual assaults 
should be treated the same way as other victims of crime.  Assuming that discriminatory beliefs 
about the “looseness” or “availability” of women who have been assaulted can be overcome, the 
remaining argument for a special rule of anonymity is that these offences are uniquely private in 
nature.  For that reason, it can be argued that the identity of those who are its victims should be 
protected.  The difficulty in responding to that claim is that it remains almost impossible to 
separate the nature of the offence from societal attitudes about sexual offences, which have been 
systemically expressed and entrenched both in  the justice system and in the press.  Yet it is 
unclear why anonymity should attach to the victim of an offence that causes shame because it is 
private or intimate, and not to the victim of an offence who suffers deep pain arising from an 
offence that is violent or disfiguring. 
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 Another issue which might be reconsidered is the guarantee or promise of anonymity, no 
matter what the circumstances.  Under the current Criminal Code provision and judicial 
interpretation, sexual assault can be committed in a number of ways which are not all that 
intimate or private, and which fall short of the violation that was required to establish the 
predecessor offence of rape.  In other words, the invasion of privacy that is inherent in sexual 
assault varies significantly with the facts and circumstances of the case.  From that perspective, 
the necessity of an absolute promise of anonymity is less compelling than in the past.  It is also 
less justifiable under the evolving s.2(b) jurisprudence, and its disapproval of  absolu te 
prohibitions, than it was in 1988, when Canadian Newspapers v. Canada (AG) was decided. 
 
 As to closed proceedings, the Supreme Court of Canada’s standard in C.B.C. v. New 
Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson) reflects a healthy suspicion of decisions to exclude  the public from 
the courtroom.  There, Mr. Justice La Forest made it clear that it is in the nature of criminal 
process that the victim’s circumstances must be exposed, and that exclusion orders will not be 
justifiable unless a sufficient evidentiary basis is present to demonstrate why an exception to 
openness is permissible in the circumstances of a particular case.  Though trial judges have the 
discretion to make that decision, the Supreme Court has indicated that the exercise of that 
discretion must comply with the Charter. 
 
 Access to evidence raises problematic issues.  If LeSage A.C.J.O.C.’s Bernardo video 
order felt right in the circumstances, it is more difficult to defend as a matter of principle.  The 
troubling question there was whether the public was entitled to know what was on those tapes, 
and who, to the contrary, could be considered a victim for purposes of defending the privacy and 
dignity interests which were at stake.  Though his was a dissenting opinion, it is doubtful that 
LeSage A.C.J.O.C.’s compromise between the audio and video components of the tapes was 
consistent with Cory J.’s comments on access to evidence in Vickery v. N.S.S.C. (Prothonotary).  
For the time being though, the Bernardo video order can be viewed as a decision which was 
based on its exceptional facts.  But the questions it raised, on points of principle, will surface 
again. 
 
 Open court and victim privacy have received strong endorsement in the Charter 
jurisprudence.  Yet only one of the two can be protected in any given case.  As Wilson J. noted 
in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (AG), the open court principle and privacy cannot both prevail at 
the same time; a choice must be made when the two are in conflict.   The Supreme Court of 
Canada has put doctrines in place which are designed to reinforce the open court principle, and 
accommodate exceptions at the same time.  Whether the Court holds more strictly to the 
principle in the future, or instead grants exceptions generously, to protect the privacy of victims, 
remains to be seen.   
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Chapter Seven 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
1  (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, at 196. 
2 Id. 
3 C. Work, “Whose Privacy?”  (1994), 55 Montana L. Rev. 209, at 221. 
4 K. Kury and M. Kaiser, “The Victim’s Position within the Criminal Proceedings  - An 
Empirical Study”, in G. Kaiser, H. Kury and H. -J. Albrecht, Victims and Criminal Justice, Vol. 
51 Criminological Research Reports 581 (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute for Foreign and 
International Penal Law, 1991). 
5 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) c.11. 
6 The Queen v. Bernardo, unreported decision of LeSage A.C.J.O.C., May 29, 1995, at 38 
(emphasis in original). 
7 Preamble, The Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.O.1995, c.6. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at s.2(1)2. 
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
11 See s.722 of the Criminal Code (providing that the court shall, for purposes of sentencing, 
consider any statement prepared by a victim of the crime describing the harm done or loss arising 
from the commission of the offence); S.C. 1995, c.22, s.6.  
12 See, e.g., s.738 and following in the Criminal Code (providing for orders that the offender 
make restitution to the victim or victims or his or her crime); S.C. 1995, c.22, s.6.  
13 Bernardo, supra note 6, at 38. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Section 271, Criminal Code 1980-81-82, c.125, s.19. 
17 R. v. Lavallee, (1990), 76 C.R. (3d) 329. 
18 See s.273.2, 1992, c.38, s.1 (indicating when belief in consent is not a defence); see also R.  
v.  Ewanchuck (1999), 22 C.R. (5th) 1 (elaborating on the requirements of the statutory provision, 
and confirming that the accused must how an honest and mistaken belief that the complainant 
had communicated consent). 
19 See s.33.1, 1995, c.32, s.1 (defining the circumstances, which include interfering with  the 
bodily integrity of another person, when a defence of self -induced intoxication is not available; 
see also R. v. Daviault, (1994), 33 C.R. (4th) 165 (S.C.C.) (recognizing intoxication as a defence 
to a charge of sexual assault). 
20 It is understood that the complainant in sexual assault proceedings may either be a male or 
a female.  The history of sexual assault, and the privacy and equality concerns of complainants is 
not gender-neutral.  Recognizing, then, that males can also be victims but that the p rivacy issues 
have been discussed in gender -specific terms, the Report in most cases describes the complainant 
as female. 
21 See Chapter Three, titled “Victim privacy, sexual assault, and the Charter”. 
22 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
23 Id. at 504. 
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24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 505. 
27 See Chapter Two, titled “The open court principle and the Charter”. 
28 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122. 
29 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. 
30 [1994] 3.  S.C.R. 835. 
31 Supra, note 22. 
32 [1991] 2. S.C.R. 577. 
33 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
34 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
1  Criminal Code, 1892, c.29. 
2  See s.517 (providing for an order of non -publication of information disclosed in a show cause 
hearing, which is mandatory on application by the accused, where either the accused or the  
prosecutor intends to show cause under s.515). 
3  See s.539 (1) (providing for a non-publication order of evidence taken at a preliminary inquiry, 
which is discretionary at the request of the prosecutor and mandatory at the request of the  
accused).; see also s.542 (2) (prohibiting the disclosure of  any admission or confession tendered 
in evidence at a preliminary inquiry).  
4  See Dagenais v. C.B.C., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. 
5  See s.631(6) (protecting the identity of jurors).  
6  See s.649 (prohibiting the disclosure of jury proceedings).  
7  Criminal Code, 1892, c.29, ss.794, 849. 
8  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, s.645. 
9 Id., s.645 (3). 
10 As enacted in 1953-53, s.428 provided as follows:  
The trial of an accused that is a corporation or who is or appears t be sixteen years 
of age or more shall be he ld in open court, but where the court, judge, justice or 
magistrate, as the case may be, is of opinion that it is in the interest of public  
morals, the maintenance of order or the proper administration of justice to exclude 
all or any members of the public  from the court room, he may do so.  Criminal 
Code, 1953-54, c.51, s.428. 
11 See C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (Re: R. v. Carson), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
12 Supra, note 8; see also the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act; and the Firearms Act, S.C. 
1995, c.39.  See Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.Y-1, ss. 38 (prohibiting the publication of 
the names of young persons involved in the commission or prosecution of offences); 39 (granting 
a court or justice the power to exclude a person or the public from the proceedin gs); and 17  
(providing for the non -publication of information disclosed at an application for transfer to  
ordinary court). The  Youth Criminal Justice Act, R.S.C. 2002, c.1, came into effect April 1,  
2003, ss. 110 and 111 (identity of offender, victims and  witnesses not to be published); 132  
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(granting a court or justice the power to exclude a person or the public from the proceedings);  
118 (prohibiting access to records unless authorized). 
13 See  Dagenais v. C.B.C. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835;  R. v. Mentuck (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4 th) 512  
(S.C.C.); and R. v. O.N.E. (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542 (S.C.C.). 
14 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part 1 of the  Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the  
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)  c.11. 
15 Section 1 of the Charter id., states: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and  
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
16 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122. 
17 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. 
18 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. 
19 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
20 [1913] A.C. 417. 
21 Id., at 445. 
22 Id. at 447. 
23 Id. at 463. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 477. 
26 Id. at 485. 
27 Id. 
28 Gazette Printing Co. v. Shallow (1909), 41 S.C.R. 339, at 359. 
29 [1936] A.C. 177, at 200 (J.C.P.C.). 
30  [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175. 
31 Id. at 183. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 183-4. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 185. 
36 Id. (emphasis added) 
37 Id. at 186-7. 
38 Section 2 states that “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b) freedom of  
thought, belief, opinion and expression, includi ng freedom of the press and other media of  
communication”; the Charter, supra note 14. 
39 Section 32, id., specifies that the Charter applies to the Parliament and government of Canada, 
including matters relating to the Territories, and to the legislature and government of each  
province; the Charter, supra note 14. 
40 Section 8, id., provides: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or  
seizure”; Id. 
41 Section 7, id., provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of t he person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental  
justice”; Id. 
42 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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43 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122. 
44 When first enacted, s.442(3) provided that the order could only be made if the prosecut or 
applied for it, but then it was mandatory for the trial judge to grant it.  S.C. 1974 -75-76, c.93.  It 
was amended to enable the judge to make the order at his or her initiative, and to make the order 
mandatory once either the prosecutor or complainant applied for it. S.C. 1980-81-82, c.125. 
45 (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 557 (O.C.A.).  
46 Id. at 574-75. 
47 Id. at 577. 
48 Id. at 564. 
49 It is understood that the complainant in sexual assault proceedings may either be a male or a  
female.  The history of sexual assault , and the privacy and equality concerns of complainants is 
not gender-neutral.  Recognizing, then, that males can also be victims but that the privacy issues 
have been discussed in gender -specific terms, the Report in most cases describes the complainant 
as female. 
50 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122, at 129.  
51 Id. at 130. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at 133. For instance, the section applies only to sexual offences, it restricts publication of  
facts related to identity and does not provide for a general  ban, and is limited to instances where 
the prosecutor or complainant requests the ban. 
55  See, e.g., R.  v.  Several Unnamed Persons (1983), 44 O.R. (20) 84 (Ont.  H.C.)  (dismissing 
applications by several  accused charged with gross indecency for orders  banning the disclosure 
of their identities). 
56 See, e.g. Peterborough City v. Ramsden, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084. 
57 Note, though, that her testimony was based on interview information with more than 100  
victims.  Supra note 45, at 563-64. 
58 (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.). 
59 Justice Cory wrote for himself, as well as for Chief Justice Dickson and Lamer J.; together  
with Wilson J., who concurred, the four judges formed a majority.  La Forest J.’s dissent was  
joined by L’Heureux-Dubé J. and Sopinka J. 
60 Id. at 607. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 608. 
63 Id. at 610. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 614. 
66 Id. at 615. 
67 Id. at 589. 
68 Id. at 590. 
69 Id. at 592.  
70 Id. at 593. 
71 Id. at 600. 
72 Id. 
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73 Id. at 603. 
74 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671. 
75 Id. at 679. 
76 Id. at 687 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 702 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 714 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. 
81 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 876 (emphasis in original).  
84 Id. at 877. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 875. 
87 Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).  
88 In addition to C.B.C. (Re: R. v. Carson), see R. v. Mentuck (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4 th) 512; and 
R. v. O.N.E., (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542. 
89 Dagenais,  at 857 -67 (explaining the convoluted grounds for finding jurisdiction to hear the  
appeal). 
90 Id. at 877. 
91  Id. 
92 Id. 
93 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480. 
94 R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46. 
95 New Brunswick, at 508. 
96 Id. at 515-6. 
97 Id. at 516 and f.  
98 Id. at 521. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 “Indeed”, La Forest J. remarked, “Rice Prov. Ct. J. expressly stated that he did not have all  
the facts before him in making the order”; id. at 520. 
102 Id. at 521. 
103 Id. at 522. 
104 Id. at 493. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 497. 
107 Id. at 504. 
108 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, see Chapter Three.  
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 503. 
112 Id. at 505. 
113 See R. v. Mentuck (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512; and R. v. O.N.E. (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542. 
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114 In  Mentuck, Iacobucci J. re -framed the  Dagenais test to allow explicitly for other crucial  
aspects of the administration of justice.  There, the issue was whether a publication ban on the  
details of an undercover operation violated s.2(b) of the  Charter.  After  agreeing with the  
Dagenais requirement that the ban be necessary and proportional, he stated the proper analytical 
approach this way: In his view, a ban should only be ordered when:  
a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the pr oper administration of justice 
because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and  
b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweighs the deleterious effects on the rights and  
interests of the parties and the public, including the eff ects on the right to free expression, the  
right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
1  See Chapter Two. 
2  It is understood that the complainant in sexual assault proceedings may eit her be a male or a  
female.  The history of sexual assault, and the privacy and equality concerns of complainants is 
not gender-neutral.  Recognizing, then, that males can also be victims but that the privacy issues 
have been discussed in gender -specific terms, the Report in most cases describes the complainant 
as female. 
3  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
4  [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
5  [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
6  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the  Constitution Act, 1982, being  
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. 
7  Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155. 
8  Id. at 155. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
11  Id. 
12  R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 428. 
13  Id. at 427. 
14  Id. at 428. 
15  Id. at 426. 
16  Id. at 429. 
17  Id. 
18 Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”  
Charter, supra note 6. 
19 R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863. 
20 Sectio n 11 states that “Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (b) to be tried  
within a reasonable time.” Charter, supra note 6. 
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